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Florent,<br>
<br>
What you have to say is either hard to argue with, or, if not that,
very easy to pick up for further discussion. It is refreshing to
see this component of the "uploading" concept laid out so clearly.<br>
<br>
Just a couple of comments:<br>
<br>
<div>"That's when I realized that this whole "original" and "copy"
thing was an illusion. There is no "real" me, there is just a
pattern that creates the experience of me, a pattern that doesn't
"belong" to me but just exists because atoms have arranged
themselves in this particular way. This experience and
consciousness is the same for every identical pattern, regardless
of how these patterns evolved and where they come from. There is
no "true" one, physics don't work that way. We must understand
that there's nothing special about us."<br>
<br>
Well, yes and no... That there is nothing special about us is
clear. We are made from the same atoms from which everything else
is made. However, with such a realization being of great value in
other places, it doesn't help us in grappling with the main issue
here: the mind is not made up of atoms, only the necessary
correlate of the mind is constructed.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As a follow-on to that,<br>
<br>
"As counter-intuitive as it is, there is nothing to be afraid of
concerning destructive uploading, the pattern that makes your
consciousness is the only thing that matters. Gradually
transferring a mind is no different tha[n] destroying it [and]
recreating it. Nobody else would make the difference and neither
would you, because there isn't any."<br>
<br>
Uploading, as I've seen it defined in this group so far, involves
determining the exact physical location of every neuron, axon,
dendrite and synapse, and mapping all those into a computer in
some fashion. Clearly, although proponents tend to gloss over the
complexities, the functioning of each element would be need to be
reduced to an equation to support a simulation, and there would
need to be some kind of executive working to conduct the
symphony. None of this describes the uploading of the mind. The
idea that transferring the structure of the brain into a database
would also upload the mind is the central dogma of uploading.
Arguments pertaining to the central dogma that a priori assume the
central dogma make me kind of dizzy.<br>
<br>
Going on to assume the central dogma, there is a dilemma that
arises with uploading, made the more interesting if the process is
not destructive; which mind contains the individual identity that
goes forward, if the upload goes onto two computers at the same
time? If we don't survive as ourselves when making the transition
from carbon to silicon, then there is no point to the exercise at
all in terms of the dogma. If we continued conscious awareness
when doubled, or tripled if the process is non-destructive, which
one are we aware of, or are we aware in multiple places at the
same time? Trying to get my arms around going from me into two
other simultaneous me's, and then having them immediately diverge
due to dissimilar experiential development while still being me,
makes me even more dizzy. <br>
<br>
FutureMan<br>
</div>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 9/3/2011 3:07 AM, Florent Berthet wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAA9DTzSy1at4tHc13ezg_yXY-AEPauQQC-Y0NQEPQULy+Bir4w@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">I used to think that continuity of consciousness was
obviously important for uploading. My reasoning was "if I create a
copy of myself, and if I die in the process, that is as if I had
created a clone of myself that would be able to live in exchange
for my life. But I don't want my clone to survive, I want ME to
survive."
<div>
<br>
</div>
<div>So for me, a Star Trek teleporter that disassemble atoms and
reassemble them in an other place was out of the question,
because it would kill the "real" me.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Then I thought "but when I go to bed, I wake up in the
morning made of a slightly different pattern of atoms (dreams
have formed new memories, for example). Nevertheless, I feel
like I'm "the same" person. But what if I had been scanned
during my sleep, destroyed and instantly recreated in my bed? I
wouldn't even know it. This wouldn't make a difference. So, what
I am afraid of? And if there is no difference, do we "die" each
night, waking up as a whole new person? Should I be afraid of
fallins asleep? </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>So I was like "well, my consciousness blacks out for several
hours every night, but there's still this background activity
that keeps the continuity on... so I'm the same person..." but
things started to become not as sharp and obvious, something was
bothering me.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I thought: is continuity of consciousness even relevant? I
mean, imagine a guy in a coma who goes brain dead for a few
moments. If we were to bring him back to life, nobody would say
"ha! He died! So he's not the same person now!". So, damn,
continuity of consciousness is not relevant...</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The only things that could matter now are the actual atoms
that compose the brain and body of the guy. So, imagine that
during that brief time of brain inactivity, we could change one
carbon atom of his brain and replace it with another carbon
atom. That wouldn't change a thing, atoms are the same, we take
one out and we put another back. Imagine that instead of one
atom, we replace a bunch of atoms, well, same thing, nothing has
changed. Hell, imagine we replace the whole brain by this
process, it's still the same thing! Atoms are the same, the
pattern is the same. Physically, nothing has changed.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Another example: if we could instantly move all your atoms 1
cm to le left, I'm sure you would say you would end up the same
person. Now if it wasn't instantaneous but if you were out of
this world for a millisecond during the process, there's no
reason you would object, what would have changed? What about out
for one second? One year? </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>That's when I realized that this whole "original" and "copy"
thing was an illusion. There is no "real" me, there is just a
pattern that creates the experience of me, a pattern that
doesn't "belong" to me but just exists because atoms have
arranged themselves in this particular way. This experience and
consciousness is the same for every identical pattern,
regardless of how these patterns evolved and where they come
from. There is no "true" one, physics don't work that way. We
must understand that there's nothing special about us.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As counter-intuitive as it is, there is nothing to be afraid
of concerning destructive uploading, the pattern that makes your
consciousness is the only thing that matters. Gradually
transferring a mind is no different that destroying it a
recreating it. Nobody else would make the difference and neither
would you, because there isn't any.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">2011/9/3 Adrian Tymes <span
dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:atymes@gmail.com">atymes@gmail.com</a>></span><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div class="im">2011/9/2 john clark <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jonkc@bellsouth.net" target="_blank">jonkc@bellsouth.net</a>></span><br>
</div>
<div class="im">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<td style="font:inherit" valign="top">
<div>On <b>Fri, 9/2/11, Adrian Tymes <i><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:atymes@gmail.com"
target="_blank">atymes@gmail.com</a>></i></b>
wrote:<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>
<div style="margin-left:80px">"The
original what?"<br>
</div>
<br>
<div style="margin-left:40px">"The
biological pattern"<br>
</div>
<br>
</div>
The biological pattern of an animal is the
ordered arrangement of cells, and the
biological pattern of a cell is the
structural framework of a system of atoms;
so biological pattern is a function of
information on where to place things. <br>
<br>
Information can be duplicated, information
can be uploaded, and its meaningless to talk
about an original bit of information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div><br>
What's proposed to be emulated is the intelligence,
not necessarily the animal<br>
itself. Further, an emulation of a thing is, by
definition, not actually the thing<br>
that is being emulated - even if a single identity may
span from original to<br>
emulation, and even if the instances are identified by
the same name.<br>
<br>
Thus, the silicon and wires that run the informational
pattern are not the same<br>
as the biological network that originally ran that
same informational pattern.<br>
"The original", in this case, refers to that
biological network, which is replaced<br>
by the silicon and wires - even if the informational
pattern is maintained during<br>
the transition from one to the other.<br>
</div>
<div class="im">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0pt 0pt
0pt 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204, 204,
204);padding-left:1ex">
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</blockquote>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0pt 0pt
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204);padding-left:1ex">
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<td style="font:inherit" valign="top">what's
so original about this mythical beast called
"The Original" if every single bit of it has
been replaced many many times? I have asked
this question often over the last decade on
this list but have never once received a
straight answer or even the hint of one.<br>
<br>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br>
It is akin to a forest. What is a forest, if not the
combination of all the trees<br>
within? But what if every tree is, one by one, replaced -
is it the same forest?<br>
<br>
More practically, what about a ship, whose every part is
replaced - again, one<br>
by one - over decades? Almost all people will identify it
as the "same" ship.<br>
<br>
You argue for and perceive a three dimensional snapshot.
This is where you<br>
err. This is why you are frustrated: you insist that
these things are only that<br>
which exists in one moment in time - but they are not.
They exist in all four<br>
dimensions. They are collections of things *and* their
coherence through time,<br>
which allows the parts to be gradually replaced - and, by
the same token, does<br>
not allow all the parts to be replaced at once.<br>
<br>
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</blockquote>
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