There is an inherent and maddening inconsistency in people that are resistant to transhumanist ideas.<div><br></div><div>When I discuss these topics with these people they are appalled by the idea that a transhumanist would not mind to have an non biological or cyborg-like body if having this body would extend life and give enhanced capabilities. </div>
<div><br></div><div>They seem to be attached to their physical bodies as essential part of their identity (which body is the question because most of these body-luddite would not mind to rejuvenate for example) .</div><div>
<br></div><div>At the same time they are against life-extension through a new embodiment in a non biological form because they think somehow that the "soul" would be trapped in a mechanical box (as if the biological box is less of a cage).</div>
<div><br></div><div>The same person that argues about the existence of the soul, in fact declaring how fundamental the soul is in terms of its immortality and essential qualities in comparison with the mortal and corruptible flesh, would have a fit in proposing discarding the limited biological body in favor of a more perfected and lasting one. </div>
<div><br></div><div>If the soul is more fundamental, if the soul leaves the body behind why so much attachment to which form or material the body would have?</div><div><br></div><div>This apparent contradiction can be resolved by realizing that this cognitive approach, this world view is highly "disembodied" (in terms of what has been discussed in this thread). </div>
<div><br></div><div>At first it seems that in this cognitive attitude (that is but away, in different variants the most commonly adopted by people) the body is very important per se and preserving the biological form is essential because it is somehow the most natural way for the soul to express itself in the material world. </div>
<div>But notice how the body is in this way a subordinate to the soul, it is an external manifestation of the immaterial, incorruptible soul, that has in fact a shape and a form but is not in itself embodied. It uses a body but it is not the body. </div>
<div><br></div><div>The resistance to the idea of changing radically the nature of the body, making more powerful, less limited, more resistance and durable, in fact more changeable, more expressive and communicative gives the expression to the biological-body luddite that the body would not need a soul anymore, in effect unifying the soul and the body. And this why transhumanism becomes a threat for anybody that believes in a soul. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Transhumanism liberates from the dichotomy of body and soul making the soul the body and the body the soul. It is not a fixed body, it can change, transform in radical ways, but it does in a way that is under control of the individual, it can be plasmed and improved to embody, literally, in a more directed way the essence of the individual in a way that a biological body cannot do. And in being able to extend the life of the individual indefinitely a non-biological transhumanist body has also the other fundamental characteristic of the soul, its immortality. It is not an immortality in a ethereal other word, but it lives in the material world and on the way of transcending its limitations as a limited life span, disease, pain.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So my answer is that transhumanism is more embodied than the alternative world view because the emphasis is in expressing individuality and existence through a body, not a particular one but one that is changing, transforming, adapting whatever form, material, shape is useful or necessary. But then the body is the object and the subject at the same time. The transhumanism vision in freeing us from a biological body allows the mind to transform the body to express itself more directly, powerfully and freely and the body being more free and less limited influence and inform the mind with new diverse and capable senses, possibilities and ranges of experiences. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Transhumanism then really frees us from the Cartesian dichotomy, not just recognizing the body and mind are one (as modern science has already done) but creatively, through technology, making mind and body one and the same. </div>
<div><br></div><div> Giovanni</div><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/1/28 Stefano Vaj <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stefano.vaj@gmail.com">stefano.vaj@gmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="im"><div class="gmail_quote">On 28 January 2012 15:10, Natasha Vita-More <span dir="ltr"><natasha@natasha.cc></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
"Another issue is whether life (or, for that matter, everything) is<br><div>
computation.<br>
<br>
</div>Marguis seemed to think it is, as did La Mettrie (1747), Fedorov<br>
(1828-1903), Finot (1856-1922).<br clear="all"></blockquote></div><br></div>Yes, this goes back after a fashion more than we usually think,<br><br>My most immediate references were in fact Wolfran and Seth Lloyd, but I think that Turing himself philosophised on the subject, or did he?<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br>-- <br>Stefano Vaj<br>
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