<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18/09/2012 11:39, Stefano Vaj wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAPoR7a6eRD3QP65Srcu54f+67744EFxid7VvTd5G5urD8xSusg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<meta http-equiv="Context-Type" content="text/html;
charset=ISO-8859-1">
One prob is that even, say, on the Italian H+ list resistance to
animal experimentation is growing. So, either we start using
humans directly and contribute to the universe's happiness by
sparing innumerable mice and monkeys, or we risk to be restricted
to simulations...<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Well, please tell the list that in order to get simulations worth
anything, we will have to do a lot more animal experimentation. In
the long run it will of course mean just a finite number of animals
are used before we all run simulations, but in practice calibrating
simulations takes a lot of experimental data, so in the short term
there will be much animal use.<br>
<br>
And if you are an uploader, using too advanced sims is of course
just as unacceptable as using real animals. There are some curious
issues, since you can resurrect killed animals, but if suffering is
the issue then good simulations are not acceptable. Which leaves the
problem of telling when a reduced or partial simulation produces
relevant data, or produces enough of a mind/consciousness/whatever
to lead to ethical quandaries. (I work on a paper on this)<br>
<br>
<br>
I wonder, suppose the only way we could truly improve the human
condition long-term involved an unavoidable quantity of suffering of
innocents. What amount of suffering would then morally preclude
attempting this improvement? Deontological systems might have a
rather firm answer on that, likely concluding that it is
impermissible to become posthuman, no matter how good that state is,
if it requires impermissible acts. Total utilitarians are fine with
any finite amount of suffering if we can get super-benefits that
outweigh it. The really weird things happen if you start considering
war ethics, where people analyse how you should act if you are
thrust into a situation where acting immorally is unavoidable: could
this kind of reasoning apply to the current human condition (we are
being killed by the world, and our physiology forces us to subsist
on living beings), and imply that one should "fight" ones way out of
it as morally as possible?<br>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Anders Sandberg,
Future of Humanity Institute
Oxford Martin School
Faculty of Philosophy
Oxford University </pre>
</body>
</html>