<div dir="ltr"><div class=""><img class="" id=":1i8" tabindex="0" src="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/images/cleardot.gif" alt=""></div><div>Hi Stathis,<br><br></div><div>(And Kelly Anderson, tell me if given what we've covered, does the below make sense to you?)<br>
</div><div><br>It
is not a 'proof' that abstracted computers can be conscious. It
completely ignores many theoretical possible realities. For example
Material Property Dualism is one of many possible theories that proves
this is not a 'proof".<br>
<br></div>There is now an "idealized effing theory" world described in the Macro Material Property Dualism camp: <a href="http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/36" target="_blank">http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/36</a> .<br>
<div>
<br></div><div>In that theoretically possible world, it is the
neurotransmitter glutamate that has the element redness quality. In
this theoretical world Glutamate causally behaves the way it does,
because of it's redness quality. Yet this causal behavior reflects
'white' light, and this is why we think of it has having a 'whiteness'
quality. But of course, that is the classic example of the quale
interpretation problem (see: <a href="http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/28" target="_blank">http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/28</a>
). If we interpret the causal properties of something with a redness
quality to it, and represent our knowledge of such with something that
is qualitatively very different, we are missing and blind to what is
important about the qualitative nature of glutamate, and why it behaves
the way it does.<br>
<br></div><div>So, let's just forget about the redness quality for a
bit, and just talk about the real fundamental causal properties of
glutamate in this theoretical idealizing effing world. In this world,
the brain is essentially a high fidelity detector of real glutamate.
The only time the brain will say: "Yes, that is my redness quality" is
when real glutamate, with it's real causal properties are detected.
Nothing else will produce that answer, except real fundamental
glutamate.<br>
<br>Of course, as described in Chalmers' paper, you can also replace the
system that is detecting the real glutamate, with an abstracted system
that has appropriate hardware translation levels for everything that is
being interpreted as being real causal properties of real glutamate, so
once you do this, this system, no matter what hardware it is running on,
can be thought of, or interpreted as acting like it is detecting real
glutamate. But, of course, that is precisely the problem, and how this
idea is completely missing what is important. And this theory is
falsifiably predicting the alternate possibility he describes in that
paper. it is predicting you'll have some type of 'fading quale', at
least until you replace all of what is required, to interpret something
very different than real consciousness, as consciousness.<br>
<br></div><div>It is certainly theoretically possible, that the real
causal properties of glutamate are behaving the way they do, because of
it's redness quality. And that anything else that is being interpreted
as the same, can be interpreted as such - but that's all it will be. An
interpretation of something that is fundamentally, and possibly
qualitatively, very different than real glutamate.<br>
<br></div>This one theoretical possibility, thereby, proves
Chalmers' idea isn't a proof that abstracted computers have these
phenomenal qualities, only that they can be thought of, or interpreted
as having them.<div class=""><div id=":1ho" class="" tabindex="0"><img class="" src="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/images/cleardot.gif"></div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 9:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" target="_blank">stathisp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5">On Thu, Apr 25, 2013 at 2:11 AM, Brent Allsop<br>
<<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@canonizer.com">brent.allsop@canonizer.com</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
> Oh and Stathis said:<br>
><br>
> <<<<<br>
> There is an argument from David Chalmers which proves that computers<br>
> can be conscious assuming only that (a) consciousness is due to the<br>
> brain and (b) the observable behaviour of the brain is computable.<br>
> Consciousness need not be defined for the purpose of the argument<br>
> other than vaguely: you know it if you have it. This makes the<br>
> argument robust, not dependent on any particular philosophy of mind or<br>
> other assumptions. The argument assumes that consciousness is NOT<br>
> reproducible by a computer and shows that this leads to absurdity. As<br>
> far as I am aware no-one has successfully challenged the validity of<br>
> the argument.<br>
><br>
> <a href="http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html" target="_blank">http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html</a><br>
>>>><br>
><br>
> Stathis, I think we’ve made much progress on this issue, since you’ve lat<br>
> been involved in the conversation. I’m looking forward to see if we can now<br>
> convince you that we have, and that there is a real possibility of a<br>
> solution to the Chalmers’ conundrum you believe still exists.<br>
><br>
> I, for one, am in the camp that believes there is an obvious problem with<br>
> Chalmer’s “fading dancing’ qualia argument, and once you understand this,<br>
> the solution to the ‘hard problem’, objectively, simulatably, sharably (as<br>
> in effing of the ineffable) goes away, no fuss, no muss, all falsifiably or<br>
> scientifically demonstrably (to the convincing of all experts) so. Having<br>
> an experience like: “oh THAT is what your redness is like – I’ve never<br>
> experienced anything like that before in my life, and was a that kind of<br>
> ‘redness zombie’ before now.” Will certainly falsify most bad theories out<br>
> there today, especially all the ones that predict that kind of sharing or<br>
> effing of the ineffable will never be possible.<br>
<br>
</div></div>The paper cited has nothing to do with the "Hard Problem" or the<br>
possibility of sharing experiences. It is just a proof that computers<br>
can be conscious.<br>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br>
--<br>
Stathis Papaioannou<br>
</font></span><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
extropy-chat mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br>
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>