<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div><br></div><div><br>On 28/04/2013, at 6:03 AM, Brent Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@canonizer.com">brent.allsop@canonizer.com</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite">
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/27/2013 2:02 AM, Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:<br>
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On 27/04/2013, at 3:46 AM, Brent Allsop <<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:brent.allsop@canonizer.com">brent.allsop@canonizer.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
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<div dir="ltr">Hi Stathis,<br>
<br>
<<<<br>
The argument does not assume any theory of consciousness. Of
course,<br>
if the argument is valid and a theory predicts that
computers cannot<br>
be conscious then that theory is wrong. What you have to do
is show<br>
that either the premises of the argument are wrong or the
reasoning is<br>
invalid.<br>
>>><br>
<br>
It’s frustrating that you can’t see any more than this from
what I’m trying to say. I have shown exactly how the
argument is wrong and how the reasoning is invalid, in that
the argument is completely missing a set of very real
theoretical possibilities.</div>
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An argument has premises, or assumptions, and a conclusion. If you
challenge the argument you can challenge the premises or you can
challenge the logical process by which the conclusion is reached.
If the conclusion follows logically from the premises then the
argument is VALID, whether or not the premises are true. If the
argument is valid and the premises are true then the argument is
said to be SOUND.
<div><br>
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<div>It would help if you could follow this and specify exactly
where you see the problem, but it seems that you're not
challenging the validity of the argument, but the truth of the
premises. And the only premise is that the externally observable
behaviour of the brain is computable. So, you must believe that
the observable behaviour of the brain is NOT computable. In
other words, there is something about the chemistry in the brain
that cannot be modelled by a computer, no matter how good the
model and no matter how powerful the computer. Is that what you
believe?<br>
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<br>
I guess I fail to even understand why you think his fading / dancing
quale paper is any kind of 'proof' that computers can be conscious.<br>
<br>
Chalmers points out in that paper that there are two predicted
possibilities when we do the neuro substitution experiment. One is
that there will be some kind of unavoidable fading quale, as you do
the substitution one neuron at a time, and the other is that you
will be able to find some way to replace all the neurons with
abstracted representations of such, and that during the entire
experience, you'll still experience all of the same phenomenal
consciousness, no fading quale of any kind. I guess, if you assume
that it will be the latter as one of your premises, as Chalmers
argues is only the most likely case, in his mind, then, yes, one
might consider the rest to be a proof, and I would agree with that.
But even Chalmers admits there is a 25% chance, in his mind, that
there will be some kind of fading quale or that Material Property
Dualism (He calls it "type F monism") will be demonstrated to be
true by science. He more or less states this in that paper, and he
told me the specific 25% number, personally.<br>
<br>
Obviously, if science proves this fading quale to be the case, as
predicted, it will be quite falsifying for anyone that thinks such
has been proven not possible? Do you not agree with this?<br></blockquote><br><div>As I have explained, it is not fading qualia as such that is the problem. Qualia would fade and disappear with progressive brain damage. The problem is fading qualia that you cannot notice and that bring about no change in behaviour. Chalmers says this is one of the three possibilities, the other two being that the qualia do not fade and that the qualia fade, you notice but are unable to behave differently.</div><div><br></div><div>If the qualia fade but you there is no external evidence of this then by definition no scientific experiment will be able to show it. </div><div><br></div><div>The more serious problem, however, is what it would mean if your qualia can fade and disappear without you noticing. Your visual cortex could be replaced with an artificial one you would declare that you could see normally, describe scenes normally, watch films and are laugh at the funny parts and be scared at the scary parts. Essentially, this would mean qualia do not exist, as they make neither a subjective or objective difference. Would you be happy with that conclusion?</div><div><br></div><div>Even weirder would be if your behaviour was unchanged but you did notice your qualia had changed. You would desperately be trying to tell everyone you were blind but your vocal cords would not obey you, and you would observe helplessly as they said everything was fine and describe perfectly things you could not see. Would you be happy with that conclusion?</div></body></html>