<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
Hi James,<br>
<br>
This is just amazing. Let me try putting it yet another way. Can
you at least try, for a minute, and think that there may be some
other way to think about it, than the way you are? You seem to be
unable or unwilling to think in any way, other than a redness
quality must arise from some function, and that it is the function
that is prior to the quality. But just for a second, try to
imaging that there could be a different theoretical possibility,
where it is the quale, that is prior, and that things are behaving
or functioning the way they are, because of the phenomenal
qualities. Instead of trying to find some way to impose your view
on what I'm saying. Try to find some other way, in what I'm
saying that has what is fundamental, inverted from the way you are
used to demanding it must be. For a moment, have some hope that
there could be a real solution to the 'hard problem' you are so
instantiate exists.<br>
<br>
On multiple occasions, you accused me of "assuming [my]
conclusion", and I understand what you are saying, but all I'm
doing is defining (not assuming) a theoretical possibility that is
making testable predictions that could possibly be demonstrated,
or falsified by science. And that if science behaves as the
theory predicts, it wall falsify the definitions, or assumptions
you are making, which are required before your so called 'proof'
that there is a hard problem.<br>
<br>
It seems to me, you are assuming, or defining, that it isn't
possible for anything which has causal properties, to have
qualitative properties responsible for those qualities, and it
can't be behaving the way it is, because of these qualities, by
definition. Can you tell me what the causal properties of a
redness quality are? And if those causal properties of redness,
whatever they are, are reflecting white light, and you thereby
'interpret' them as if they have a whiteness quality (or worse
assume the causal properties have nothing to do with the redness
quality explaining them) are you not just miss interpreting what
the white light is detecting?<br>
<br>
<div><<<<<br>
</div>
<div style="">How do you demonstrate that? How do you KNOW that it
is not JUST the causal properties of glutamate that has the
redness quality?<br>
</div>
>>>><br>
<br>
I see a very clear answer to this How question, and this entire
conversation has been an attempt to answer exactly this. The fact
that you are asking this is proving you have no understanding
about anything I've been saying.<br>
<br>
To me, it is you who are assuming your conclusion, and basically
saying no causal properties can be behaving the way they are,
because of a redness quality. You think it isn't possible,
because you assume the transmigration argument is valid, when it
is swapping out the binding system and not understanding it's
effing capabilities to detect not just causal properties, but the
qualitative reason for why they are behaving the way they do, and
you don't understand what you are giving up, when you swap this
out for something that is very different. Again, all this is
assuming your conclusion, which can be demonstrated to be false,
if reality behaves differently than you are assuming/predicting.<br>
<br>
As I've said many times, when we have something with a redness
quality, in the right hemisphere of our brain, and something with
greenness qualities in our left hemisphere, there necessarily is
some kind of 'binding system' that enables us to be aware of the
qualitative nature responsible for whatever the correlated causal
properties of each are.<br>
<br>
And when we swap out this binding system, for something inverted
like white light, reflecting off of whatever it is that is
behaving the way it is, because of it's redness quality, and then
if we thereby assume that this thing with a redness quality, is
behaving the way it is, because of it's whitness qualities, or
worse, think of it in a fading way (because of some thought
experiement that leaves out the very mechanism that can compare
something and the way it is behaving, because of it's phenomenal
qualities) and there by insist that those redness qualities, can't
be behaving the way they are, because of any qualitative property
- you are just describing a model, and making a bunch of
predictions that predict there is a 'hard problem' that could all
be blown out of the water by real effing demonstrably science that
proves the problem isn't that hard after all.<br>
<br>
Brent Allsop<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 5/1/2013 4:13 PM, James Carroll wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALbjWnf=NonoW8Vz7JE3sV1sVzKZjJZ8ABw78of+Gp1s4ARh_A@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 2:07 PM, Brent Allsop <span
dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@canonizer.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@canonizer.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">I tried to point out that it was likely
much more than just one neuron, but this seemed to be
completely missed, so how about we call it a "binding
system", instead of "binding neuron"? </div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">Fine, but it makes no difference whatsoever.
So long as the "interpretation" layer is placed between
those neurons that are simulated, and those that are not,
you can work your way across these many neurons of the
binding system, and you have the same problem. In fact,
things are worse for your case if there are more than one
neuron in the binding layer, because now I can slowly FADE
my way across these many neurons. And any qualia that
actually fades is epiphenomenal. Since MPD predicts that
something will fade, MPD predicts epiphenomenal qualia,
even though you swear that it does not. <br>
<br>
QED. It's that simple Brent. You are making it harder than
it needs to be, and missing this rather obvious
conclusion. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">So let's just limit this binding systems
mechanistic functionality to be indicating whether the
reference knowledge is qualitatively the same as the
sample knowledge. An additional requirement is that it
make this determination only when the knowledge being
compared both have qualitative properties AND that the
qualitative properties (or causal or informational
properties of the qualities) are the same. </div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">What do you mean by "have qualitative
properties"? Do you mean "have phenomenal properties", and
if so, how do you detect that, since ALL you can detect
are the causal properties. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">I fully admit, and agree with you, that
once the entire binding system is replaced with an
abstracted version that it can be thought of as acting
like the "1" is real glutamate, and the redness
quality. But the conclusion you are drawing from this
is entirely missing the point of what I'm talking about.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">is it, or are YOU entirely missing the point
of what I am talking about Brent?</div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<div style=""> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">By definition, a "1", and a "0", do not
have qualities (Why I didn't color them red and green
like you did). </div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">You are assuming your conclusion here. That is
the very question that is in dispute here. I don't think
that an isolated 1 or a 0 has phenomenal qualities either,
but they do when they are embedded within a functional
pattern that produces behavior... as illustrated by this
thought experiment. You can't just assume your conclusion
in order to make your point. Part of the problem here is
that you appear to think that phenomenal qualities happen
in individual neurons, interacting with certain chemicals,
in some magical way. While I think that phenomenal
qualities happen over larger systems of interacting
functional patterns. So, naturally, when I use your few
neurons example, I end up with something mind numbingly
simply, like a 1 or a 0. But that is a function of your
messed up initial setup of a reference neuron, and a
sample neuron, and a single binding system/neuron. But if
you expand the binding system to multiple neurons, you end
up with a complex and large functional pattern of 1's and
0's floating around in the binding system. That would be
closer to how I think that qualia happen. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">By definition, they are not glutamate, nor
are they any kind of "functional isomorphs" or any other
theoretical thing that anyone may propose could
theoretically have the quality we are trying to test
for. </div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">True, but we take one side of the causal
chain, convert it to a 1 or a 0 that represents whether or
not glutamate was detected in the synapse, and then we
have a simulation of the binding neuron that does the
right complex thing with this 1 or 0, namely, a simulation
of what the binding neuron (or system) would do if it were
to come in contact with real glutamate, thus INTERPRETING
the 1 or 0 as glutamate, as part of its simulation.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">So, by definition, the virtualized
replacement of the binding system, is not doing what we
want it to do, </div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">Again, you are assuming your conclusion here.
I think that it IS doing what we want it to do, as
evidenced by the fact that it produces the right BEHAVIOR
(the system claims to have real qualia), and if any qualia
faded during our replacement with the simulation, those
qualia that faded MUST be epiphenomenal. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">and is only being thought of as doing it.
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">No, it is not just being THOUGHT of as doing
it... it is DOING it, as evidenced by the behavior of the
system when it claims to have real qualia. Any abstraction
in the information inside of it, is interpreted by the
translation layers that rap around the inputs and the
outputs of the system. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">All it is, is some configuration of some
arbitrary matter, which, by design, doesn't matter if it
has qualities or not, but is only being thought of,
whatever arbitrary thing it is, as being a comparator of
a "1" and "0", which by definition do not have a redness
or greenness quality. </div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">Only by YOUR definition. Again, you are
assuming your conclusion to prove your conclusion. Because
*I* think that it DOES have a redness or a greenness
quality, and that is the HEART of our disagreement! </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"> You could invert or replace the abstract
machinery, in an infinitely many different ways that can
be thought of as behaving the same way, which were all
very different, and regardless of what you were using,
and regardless of how inverted the fundamental stuff
was, as long as you thought of its current particular
arbitrary configuration, as a comparator between a "1"
and a "0", that is all it would be, is something you are
thinking of as if it were something qualitatively, very
different from what it really is.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">Any internal inversion in the simulated
section would have to be met by an equivalent inversion in
the translation layer that would undo the inversion in
order for the system to maintain the same behavior, and
thus, in order to maintain the same functional pattern. In
fact, what you are claiming here is EXACTLY what those of
us who believe in functional equivalence believe, namely,
that you can change HOW you do the calculation all you
want, and, so long as it produces the same results, it has
the same qualia. <br>
<br>
All your internal changing of how it works, all your
inversions, is met with an equivalent change in the
translation layer, providing the same behavior, and THUS,
the same qualia. Otherwise you believe in dancing qualia,
where your qualia change from red to green, but you still
say "I see red" the entire time... aka. if you don't
believe this, you believe in a property of qualia that
leads to qualia being epiphenomenal. <br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">In other words, the fallacy in the
substitution argument is, when you, in one single step,
replace the very thing that is dong the detection,
binding, and comparison of the phenomenal qualities;
(i.e. the binding system) with something that by
definition and design has nothing to do with qualities,
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">You assumed the conclusion again. I think that
it DOES have to do with qualities, when properly
interpreted by the translation layer. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">even though you can think of the resulting
abstracted behavior as the behavior you want, you are
completely bypassing and ignoring what is important.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">IF there is something "important" in there
that I am ignoring, I can PROVE that this "important"
thing is epiphenomenal, by the fading and dancing qualia
thought experiment. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> <br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<br>
Also, as you've pointed out, it might be possible for
some religious person to theorize about the state of
things, once you are way passed any of the
fading/dancing quale partially replaced states, and the
entire binding system has been replaced with something
that has none of that and is only being thought of as
having it. It might then be possible to theorize that a
qualitative experience is still occurring. The problem
is, as you correctly point out, this could never be
validated, or proven, since there is, by definition, no
causal evidence for any such 'epiphenomena'. Your
conclusion is true, but only about this kind of non
causal epiphenomena, and has nothing to do with what
this theory is predicting.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">True. But, as I already pointed out, your
theory is predicting non-epiphenomenal qualia together
with some beliefs that REQUIRE epiphenomenal qualia, as
can be shown with the fading and dancing qualia thought
experiments. Thus, your theory contains an internal
contradiction. </div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">This theory is predicting that real
glutamate (or some real functionally active pattern, or
whatever) which, if it is demonstrated to be what has a
redness quality, </div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="">How do you demonstrate that? How do you KNOW
that it is not JUST the causal properties of glutamate
that has the redness quality? Because if it is JUST the
causal properties of glutamate, then I can simulate those
properties, and my simulation will have qualia without the
real glutamate. Furthermore, I can show that if there is
anything ELSE in there, that this extra thing is
epiphenomenal.... which you don't believe in... therefore,
you need to accept the principle of functional
equivalence. It is the only way to escape believing in
epiphenomenal qualia. </div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<div style="">James</div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<div style=""><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div style=""><span style="color:rgb(80,0,80)">On Tue, Apr
30, 2013 at 12:29 PM, James Carroll </span><span
dir="ltr" style="color:rgb(80,0,80)"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jlcarroll@gmail.com" target="_blank">jlcarroll@gmail.com</a>></span><span
style="color:rgb(80,0,80)"> wrote:</span><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<div class="h5">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Brent
Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@canonizer.com"
target="_blank">brent.allsop@canonizer.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">But
Stathis and James are still
providing no evidence that
they are getting it at all.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>Obviously, I think that it is clearly
you who aren't getting it at all. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">...For
you guys that still aren’t getting
it, let’s make this so
elementary it is impossible to
miss.<span> </span>Let’s
make an even more simplified
theoretical model, and hand hold
you through every
single step of the transmigration
process, including a final
resulting
simulated system that can behave
the same.<span>
</span></span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Which is funny, since you clearly
didn't get it, even in this simplified
handheld case. </div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">All
of these millions of voxel
neurons are sending their
color neurotransmitters to the
single large ‘binding’ neuron.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">This
single large binding neuron is a
very complicated
system, as it enables all these
isolated color voxel elements to
be bound
together into one unified
phenomenal experience.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">In other
words, it is doing lots more
than
just sending the signal that
this red thing is the one we
want.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">It is
also aware </span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>HOW is it "aware" of anything. It is
just one neuron. How does it "represent"
this awareness internally? Yes it GETs
one transmitter or another as input, but
how does it INTERNALLY represent all
these things that you claim that this
one neuron is "aware" of?</div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">of
the qualitative nature of
this knowledge and all of their
differences and qualitative
diversity, and enables the
system to talk about and think
about all this phenomenal
diversity.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>
How does it experience phenomenal
anything, when its internal state is
ONLY impacted by the CAUSAL properties
of <font color="#ff0000">glutamate </font>or
<font color="#00ff00">dopamine</font>? </div>
<div>
<div>
<br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">So,
the first neuron we want to
transmigrate is of course
the sample pixel neuron.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">Obviously,
since
the binding neuron is like a
high fidelity </span><b
style="font-size:12pt"><span
style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span
style="font-size:12pt">
detector, nothing but real
</span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span
style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span
style="font-size:12pt">
will make it say, “yes that is
qualitatively the same as the
reference pixel”,
because of the fact that it has
the causal properties of
redness.</span><br>
</p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"></span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>With you so far....</div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">The
dancing quale case is quite
simple, because we want to
replace a pixel neuron firing
with </span><b
style="font-size:12pt"><span
style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span
style="font-size:12pt">, with
one that is firing with </span><b
style="font-size:12pt"><span
style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b><span
style="font-size:12pt">.
</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">Or, if
you are a functionalist, you
will
be replacing the “functional
isomorph” or “functionally
active patter” that has
the causal properties of redness
with a “functional isomorph”
that has the causal
properties of a greenness
quality.</span><br>
</p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">The
transmigration process describes
providing a transducer,
which when it detects something
with a greenness property, sends
real <b><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b>
to the binding neuron, so the
binding neuron can say: yes that
has a redness
quality.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>Yes. Again, with you so far. You now
have a neuron with dopamine, that causes
your binding neuron to think it is
seeing glutamate, through a translation
(intperpretation) layer, that replaces
the dopamine with glutamate for the
binding neuron... excellent. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>But where you fail to take the leap,
is when you replace the proposed binding
neuron itself. Then, the middleware
translation layer can disappear, and you
can invert the outputs of the binding
neuron itself instead. That is where
your example falls down. You don't think
carefully enough about what happens when
you replace your theoretical "binding"
neuron itself with a simulation, or with
an inverted system. If you do that, then
you have a binding neuron, that is
experiencing <font color="#00ff00">dopamine</font>,
but that causes you to ACT as if the
original binding neuron had seen <font
color="#ff0000">glutamate</font>. </div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> I</span><span
style="font-size:12pt">n the
fading quale case, we are going
to use a binary “1”
to represent </span><b
style="font-size:12pt"><span
style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span
style="font-size:12pt">,
and a “0” to represent </span><b
style="font-size:12pt"><span
style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b><span
style="font-size:12pt">.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt">
</span><span
style="font-size:12pt">Functionalists
tend to miss a particular fact
that they must pay close
attention
to here.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">You must
be very clear about
the fact that this “1” which is
representing something that is a
“functional
isomorph” by definition does not
have the same quality the
“functional isomorh”
has.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">The “1”
is only something being
interpreted as abstracted
information, which in turn can
be interpreted as
representing the </span><b
style="font-size:12pt"><span
style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span
style="font-size:12pt">, or the
functionally isomorphic pattern
or whatever
it is that actually has the
redness quality.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt">
</span><span
style="font-size:12pt">Obviously,
the transduction layer in this
case, must be something for
which no matter what it is that
is representing the one as
input, when it sees
this “1” it produces real
glutamate, so the binding neuron
will give the signal:
“yes that has a redness
quality”.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>Again, correct when you simulate (and
appropriately translate) the behavior of
the sample neuron. You do this part
right. </div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">OK,
so now that the sample neuron
has been replaced, and we
can switch back and forth
between them with no change, we
can now move on to
the binding neuron.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">But keep
in mind
that this one sample neuron
could be expanded to include
millions of 3D voxel
elements.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">All of
them are firing with
diverse sets of
neurotransmitters which can be
mapped to every possible color
we can experience.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">And keep
in mind the
big job this binding neuron has
to do, to bind all this, so it
call all be
experienced, qualitatively, at
the same time.</span><br>
</p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">In
the dancing quale case, we now
have to provide the transduction
between the reference neuron,
which is still firing with <b><span
style="color:red">glutamate</span></b>,
with something that
converts this to <b><span
style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b>.<span>
</span>So, when
the system sees <b><span
style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b>
on both sample, and the
reference, it is going to
finally say: “Yes, these are
qualitatively the same” and it
should finally be blatantly
obvious to everyone,
how different this system is
when we switch them back and
forth, and even
though some naive person may be
tempted to believe both of the
“yes they are the
same”, before and after the
switch, are talking about ‘red’
knowledge.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>No Brent, it's not obvious at all,
and this is where you make your most
obvious mistake. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Let me see if I can break this down
for you. Here are the neurons you have:<br>
<br>
Sample<br>
Reference<br>
Binding<br>
Downsream (where downstream refers to
the neurons that the binding neuron
talks to, and tells about its
experiences). <br>
<br>
The connections between these neurons
are as follows:<br>
<br>
S:B sample to binding<br>
R:B reference to binding<br>
B:D binding to downstream...<br>
<br>
Ok, so, you started inverting things,
and you inverted the sample. You had to
then translate between S:B, obviously,
so that B still got glutamate instead of
dopamine. The pattern here, is that you
must translate between every inverted
neuron, and every neuron it talks to.<br>
<br>
Next, you propose inverting the binding
neuron. But what you seem to have missed
is that when you do that, you have to
translate between the inverted parts,
and the non inverted parts.<br>
<br>
Sample (inverted)<br>
Reference (inverted)<br>
Binding<br>
Downsream (where downstream refers to
the neurons that the binding neuron
talks to, and tells about its
experiences). <br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>S:B sample to binding (must be
translated)<br>
R:B reference to binding (can be left
alone)<br>
B:D binding to downstream... (must be
translated)<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>NOW, it's not at ALL obvious that the
individual actually experiences anything
different, after all, because of the
translation between the binding neuron
and the downstream neurons, the person
SAYS that their experiences haven't
changed at all. But you are proposing
that their experiences really HAVE
changed... thus, you are proposing a
theory that results in epiphenomenal
qualia, whether you know it or not. </div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">The
fading quale case is similar.</span><span
style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span
style="font-size:12pt">There is
a “1” present on both the sample
and
now on the reference, thanks to
a new transduction layer between
the pixel
producing real glutamate, which
enables the virtual neuron to
send a signal
that can be thought of as “these
are qualitatively the same” even
though
everyone should be clear that
this is just a lie, or at best
an incorrect interpretation
of what the signal really
qualitatively means.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>Ummm, no... let's let blue = natural,
and black = simulated/translated.<br>
<br>
Step 1, no simulation:<br>
<br>
<div>
<span
style="background-color:rgb(243,243,243)"><font
color="#0000ff">Sample <br>
Reference <br>
Binding<br>
Downsream </font></span><br>
</div>
<div><font color="#0000ff"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font color="#0000ff">S:B sample to
binding<br>
R:B reference to binding <br>
B:D binding to downstream... </font><br>
<br>
Step 2, simulate sample neuron:<br>
<br>
<div>Sample (simulated)<br>
<font color="#0000ff">Reference <br>
Binding<br>
Downsream <br>
</font></div>
<div><font color="#0000ff"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font color="#000000">S:B
(translated)<br>
</font><font color="#0000ff">R:B </font><br>
<font color="#0000ff">B:D </font></div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<div>The translation at this point is
simple, when the S sends a <font
color="#ff0000">1</font>, the
translation sends <font color="#ff0000">glutamate
</font>to B, when S sends a <font
color="#00ff00">0</font>, the
translation layer sends <font
color="#00ff00">dopamine </font>to B.
So far so good, right? B behaves JUST as
it did before, because it is unaware of
the simulation happening downstream, so
it sends all the same signals
upstream... with me so far?<br>
<br>
Ok, so,now, let's simulate S and B, ok?<br>
<br>
Step 3, simulate Sample and Binding
Neurons.<br>
<br>
<div>Sample (simulated)<br>
<font color="#0000ff">Reference </font><br>
<font color="#000000">Binding</font><br>
<font color="#0000ff">Downsream </font><br>
</div>
<div><font color="#0000ff"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font color="#000000">S:B (un
translated, but simulated)<br>
R:B (translated)<br>
B:D (translated)</font></div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Now, notice, that the S:B link is no
longer translated, it is just simulated
such that the simulation of B does the
right thing depending on what S was. But
the R:B link must be translated. This
translation goes much like the S:B link
did when we simulated S. But now the
natural neuron is on the other side of
the translation, so it simply goes the
other direction. When the R neuron sends
<font color="#ff0000">glutamate </font>to
B, a detector detects the <font
color="#ff0000">glutamate</font>, and
sends a <font color="#ff0000">1</font>
to the simulated B, which then behaves
(in simulation) just as it would if it
had seen real <font color="#ff0000">glutamate</font>.
When the R neuron tries to send <font
color="#00ff00">dopamine </font>to B,
a detector picks up the <font
color="#00ff00">dopamine</font>, and
sends a <font color="#00ff00">0</font>
to the simulated B, which then behaves
(in simulation) exactly like the natural
B would have if it had seen real <font
color="#00ff00">dopamine </font>coming
from R. All that is left is to describe
the B:D simulation layer, which is hard
to do since you didn't describe how B
talks downstream, but however it does
it, you simulate what it does, and then
translate, so all the downstream neurons
see the same real neurotransmitters that
they saw before. <br>
<br>
Now, if you simulated R too, you end up
with a system with no glutamate or
dopamine in this part of the system, but
that CLAIMS to still be experiencing
qualia, and why? Because the downstream
neurons all behave exactly as they did
before the swap. <br>
<br>
Now, if we assume MPD is true, then we
have a problem, because this new system
should have no real qualia, but it
CLAIMS that it is experiencing real
qualia the entire time, as its neurons
were slowly replaced with simulations.
And the result is a theory where the
qualia is epiphenomenal.<br>
<br>
Thus, MPD is dead. </div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">So,
please return and report, and
let me know if I can fall
to my knees and weep yet?</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>I sincerely hope so. I hope that you
have finally got it. </div>
<span><font color="#888888">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
James</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</font></span></div>
<span><font color="#888888">-- <br>
Web: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://james.jlcarroll.net"
target="_blank">http://james.jlcarroll.net</a>
</font></span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<br clear="all">
<div><br>
</div>
-- <br>
Web: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://james.jlcarroll.net" target="_blank">http://james.jlcarroll.net</a>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>