<div dir="ltr"><br>Hi James<br><br>Thanks for this educational response, and for pointing out the typo. I was really troubling over understanding that, till I started thinking it might be a typo, and finally saw your post that it was a typo.<br>
<br>Some of this was surprising, and it's frustrating that you work so hard to try escape from the theoretical cage I'm trying to box you in with, in order to show there is no hard problem here. It seems that instead of trying to understand what I'm saying, you just try to find some way (sometimes mistaken ways, as I'll attempt to show) to squeeze out of some not yet rigorously defined term, or something, and thereby attempt to justify your theory or assertion that there is a hard problem here.<br>
<br>From what you've said, we still obviously need to further simplify, and more rigorously define, what we/I mean by this "binding neuron". I tried to point out that it was likely much more than just one neuron, but this seemed to be completely missed, so how about we call it a "binding system", instead of "binding neuron"? What I'm trying to illustrate is that leaving out the entire binding systems in this substitution experiment is thinking about it at the wrong level, and what makes this thought experiment a fallacy. You fail to see the forest, but only the trees.<br>
<br>So let's just limit this binding systems mechanistic functionality to be indicating whether the reference knowledge is qualitatively the same as the sample knowledge. An additional requirement is that it make this determination only when the knowledge being compared both have qualitative properties AND that the qualitative properties (or causal or informational properties of the qualities) are the same. If something doesn't meet these requirements, it is not what is important, by definition.<br>
<br>You said:<br><br><<<<<br>Let me see if I can break this down for you. Here are the neurons you have:<br>>>>><br><br>Then you started out great, but as soon as you got to the important part, you jumped to the fading quale case, presenting a "1" or a "0" to the abstracted or simulated version of the binding system. Then, as if it mattered, you correctly concluded:<br>
<br><<<<<br>Now, if we assume MPD is true, then we have a problem, because this new system should have no real qualia, but it CLAIMS that it is experiencing real qualia the entire time, as its neurons were slowly replaced with simulations. And the result is a theory where the qualia is epiphenomenal.<br>
>>>><br><br>I fully admit, and agree with you, that once the entire binding system is replaced with an abstracted version that it can be thought of as acting like the "1" is real glutamate, and the redness quality. But the conclusion you are drawing from this is entirely missing the point of what I'm talking about.<br>
<br>By definition, a "1", and a "0", do not have qualities (Why I didn't color them red and green like you did). By definition, they are not glutamate, nor are they any kind of "functional isomorphs" or any other theoretical thing that anyone may propose could theoretically have the quality we are trying to test for. So, by definition, the virtualized replacement of the binding system, is not doing what we want it to do, and is only being thought of as doing it. All it is, is some configuration of some arbitrary matter, which, by design, doesn't matter if it has qualities or not, but is only being thought of, whatever arbitrary thing it is, as being a comparator of a "1" and "0", which by definition do not have a redness or greenness quality. You could invert or replace the abstract machinery, in an infinitely many different ways that can be thought of as behaving the same way, which were all very different, and regardless of what you were using, and regardless of how inverted the fundamental stuff was, as long as you thought of its current particular arbitrary configuration, as a comparator between a "1" and a "0", that is all it would be, is something you are thinking of as if it were something qualitatively, very different from what it really is.<br>
<br>In other words, the fallacy in the substitution argument is, when you, in one single step, replace the very thing that is dong the detection, binding, and comparison of the phenomenal qualities; (i.e. the binding system) with something that by definition and design has nothing to do with qualities, even though you can think of the resulting abstracted behavior as the behavior you want, you are completely bypassing and ignoring what is important.<br>
<br>Also, as you've pointed out, it might be possible for some religious person to theorize about the state of things, once you are way passed any of the fading/dancing quale partially replaced states, and the entire binding system has been replaced with something that has none of that and is only being thought of as having it. It might then be possible to theorize that a qualitative experience is still occurring. The problem is, as you correctly point out, this could never be validated, or proven, since there is, by definition, no causal evidence for any such 'epiphenomena'. Your conclusion is true, but only about this kind of non causal epiphenomena, and has nothing to do with what this theory is predicting.<br>
<br>This theory is predicting that real glutamate (or some real functionally active pattern, or whatever) which, if it is demonstrated to be what has a redness quality, that will be reliably qualitatively demonstrable to all such real "binding systems" in all brains in various never failing week and strong causal ways.<br>
<br>In other words, if the demonstrable science performs qualitatively and causally, as is being predicted here, the fallacy making people think there is an epiphenomena hard problem can be demonstrably exposed, and it can be reliably demonstrated that qualities really do have detectable causality which can be objectively shared, in various week and strong ways that aren't so hard after all.<br>
<br>Brent Allsop<br><br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 12:29 PM, James Carroll <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jlcarroll@gmail.com" target="_blank">jlcarroll@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="im">On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Brent Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@canonizer.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@canonizer.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
</div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">But Stathis and James are still providing no evidence that
they are getting it at all.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Obviously, I think that it is clearly you who aren't getting it at all. </div><div><br></div><div>
<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">...For you guys that still aren’t getting it, let’s make this so
elementary it is impossible to miss.<span> </span>Let’s
make an even more simplified theoretical model, and hand hold you through every
single step of the transmigration process, including a final resulting
simulated system that can behave the same.<span>
</span></span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Which is funny, since you clearly didn't get it, even in this simplified handheld case. </div><div class="im"><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><p><span style="font-size:12pt">All of these millions of voxel neurons are sending their
color neurotransmitters to the single large ‘binding’ neuron.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">This single large binding neuron is a very complicated
system, as it enables all these isolated color voxel elements to be bound
together into one unified phenomenal experience.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">In other words, it is doing lots more than
just sending the signal that this red thing is the one we want.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">It is also aware </span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>HOW is it "aware" of anything. It is just one neuron. How does it "represent" this awareness internally? Yes it GETs one transmitter or another as input, but how does it INTERNALLY represent all these things that you claim that this one neuron is "aware" of?</div>
<div class="im">
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p><span style="font-size:12pt">of the qualitative nature of
this knowledge and all of their differences and qualitative diversity, and enables the system to talk about and think about all this phenomenal diversity.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>
<div>
How does it experience phenomenal anything, when its internal state is ONLY impacted by the CAUSAL properties of <font color="#ff0000">glutamate </font>or <font color="#00ff00">dopamine</font>? </div><div class="im"><div>
<br></div><div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p><span style="font-size:12pt">So, the first neuron we want to transmigrate is of course
the sample pixel neuron.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">Obviously,
since the binding neuron is like a high fidelity </span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt"> detector, nothing but real
</span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt">
will make it say, “yes that is qualitatively the same as the reference pixel”,
because of the fact that it has the causal properties of redness.</span><br></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"></span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div>With you so far....</div><div class="im"><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><p><span style="font-size:12pt">The dancing quale case is quite simple, because we want to
replace a pixel neuron firing with </span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt">, with one that is firing with </span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt">.
</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">Or, if you are a functionalist, you will
be replacing the “functional isomorph” or “functionally active patter” that has
the causal properties of redness with a “functional isomorph” that has the causal
properties of a greenness quality.</span><br></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">The transmigration process describes providing a transducer,
which when it detects something with a greenness property, sends real <b><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b>
to the binding neuron, so the binding neuron can say: yes that has a redness
quality.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div>Yes. Again, with you so far. You now have a neuron with dopamine, that causes your binding neuron to think it is seeing glutamate, through a translation (intperpretation) layer, that replaces the dopamine with glutamate for the binding neuron... excellent. </div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>But where you fail to take the leap, is when you replace the proposed binding neuron itself. Then, the middleware translation layer can disappear, and you can invert the outputs of the binding neuron itself instead. That is where your example falls down. You don't think carefully enough about what happens when you replace your theoretical "binding" neuron itself with a simulation, or with an inverted system. If you do that, then you have a binding neuron, that is experiencing <font color="#00ff00">dopamine</font>, but that causes you to ACT as if the original binding neuron had seen <font color="#ff0000">glutamate</font>. </div>
<div class="im">
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> I</span><span style="font-size:12pt">n the fading quale case, we are going to use a binary “1”
to represent </span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt">,
and a “0” to represent </span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt">.</span><span style="font-size:12pt">
</span><span style="font-size:12pt">Functionalists tend to miss a particular fact that they must pay close attention
to here.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">You must be very clear about
the fact that this “1” which is representing something that is a “functional
isomorph” by definition does not have the same quality the “functional isomorh”
has.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">The “1” is only something being
interpreted as abstracted information, which in turn can be interpreted as
representing the </span><b style="font-size:12pt"><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b><span style="font-size:12pt">, or the functionally isomorphic pattern or whatever
it is that actually has the redness quality.</span><span style="font-size:12pt">
</span><span style="font-size:12pt">Obviously, the transduction layer in this case, must be something for
which no matter what it is that is representing the one as input, when it sees
this “1” it produces real glutamate, so the binding neuron will give the signal:
“yes that has a redness quality”.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div>Again, correct when you simulate (and appropriately translate) the behavior of the sample neuron. You do this part right. </div>
<div class="im">
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">OK, so now that the sample neuron has been replaced, and we
can switch back and forth between them with no change, we can now move on to
the binding neuron.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">But keep in mind
that this one sample neuron could be expanded to include millions of 3D voxel
elements.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">All of them are firing with
diverse sets of neurotransmitters which can be mapped to every possible color
we can experience.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">And keep in mind the
big job this binding neuron has to do, to bind all this, so it call all be
experienced, qualitatively, at the same time.</span><br></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">In the dancing quale case, we now have to provide the transduction
between the reference neuron, which is still firing with <b><span style="color:red">glutamate</span></b>, with something that
converts this to <b><span style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b>.<span> </span>So, when
the system sees <b><span style="color:rgb(0,176,80)">dopamine</span></b>
on both sample, and the reference, it is going to finally say: “Yes, these are
qualitatively the same” and it should finally be blatantly obvious to everyone,
how different this system is when we switch them back and forth, and even
though some naive person may be tempted to believe both of the “yes they are the
same”, before and after the switch, are talking about ‘red’ knowledge.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div>No Brent, it's not obvious at all, and this is where you make your most obvious mistake. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Let me see if I can break this down for you. Here are the neurons you have:<br><br>Sample<br>Reference<br>Binding<br>Downsream (where downstream refers to the neurons that the binding neuron talks to, and tells about its experiences). <br>
<br>The connections between these neurons are as follows:<br><br>S:B sample to binding<br>R:B reference to binding<br>B:D binding to downstream...<br><br>Ok, so, you started inverting things, and you inverted the sample. You had to then translate between S:B, obviously, so that B still got glutamate instead of dopamine. The pattern here, is that you must translate between every inverted neuron, and every neuron it talks to.<br>
<br>Next, you propose inverting the binding neuron. But what you seem to have missed is that when you do that, you have to translate between the inverted parts, and the non inverted parts.<br><br>Sample (inverted)<br>Reference (inverted)<br>
Binding<br>Downsream (where downstream refers to the neurons that the binding neuron talks to, and tells about its experiences). <br></div><div><br></div><div>S:B sample to binding (must be translated)<br>R:B reference to binding (can be left alone)<br>
B:D binding to downstream... (must be translated)<br></div><div><br></div><div>NOW, it's not at ALL obvious that the individual actually experiences anything different, after all, because of the translation between the binding neuron and the downstream neurons, the person SAYS that their experiences haven't changed at all. But you are proposing that their experiences really HAVE changed... thus, you are proposing a theory that results in epiphenomenal qualia, whether you know it or not. </div>
<div class="im">
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">The fading quale case is similar.</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt">There is a “1” present on both the sample and
now on the reference, thanks to a new transduction layer between the pixel
producing real glutamate, which enables the virtual neuron to send a signal
that can be thought of as “these are qualitatively the same” even though
everyone should be clear that this is just a lie, or at best an incorrect interpretation
of what the signal really qualitatively means.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Ummm, no... let's let blue = natural, and black = simulated/translated.<br><br>Step 1, no simulation:<br><br><div>
<span style="background-color:rgb(243,243,243)"><font color="#0000ff">Sample <br>Reference <br>Binding<br>Downsream </font></span><br></div><div><font color="#0000ff"><br></font></div><div><font color="#0000ff">S:B sample to binding<br>
R:B reference to binding <br>B:D binding to downstream... </font><br><br>Step 2, simulate sample neuron:<br><br><div>Sample (simulated)<br><font color="#0000ff">Reference <br>Binding<br>Downsream <br></font></div><div><font color="#0000ff"><br>
</font></div><div><font color="#000000">S:B (translated)<br></font><font color="#0000ff">R:B </font><br><font color="#0000ff">B:D </font></div></div><br></div><div>The translation at this point is simple, when the S sends a <font color="#ff0000">1</font>, the translation sends <font color="#ff0000">glutamate </font>to B, when S sends a <font color="#00ff00">0</font>, the translation layer sends <font color="#00ff00">dopamine </font>to B. So far so good, right? B behaves JUST as it did before, because it is unaware of the simulation happening downstream, so it sends all the same signals upstream... with me so far?<br>
<br>Ok, so,now, let's simulate S and B, ok?<br><br>Step 3, simulate Sample and Binding Neurons.<br><br><div>Sample (simulated)<br><font color="#0000ff">Reference </font><br><font color="#000000">Binding</font><br><font color="#0000ff">Downsream </font><br>
</div><div><font color="#0000ff"><br></font></div><div><font color="#000000">S:B (un translated, but simulated)<br>R:B (translated)<br>B:D (translated)</font></div></div><div><br></div><div>Now, notice, that the S:B link is no longer translated, it is just simulated such that the simulation of B does the right thing depending on what S was. But the R:B link must be translated. This translation goes much like the S:B link did when we simulated S. But now the natural neuron is on the other side of the translation, so it simply goes the other direction. When the R neuron sends <font color="#ff0000">glutamate </font>to B, a detector detects the <font color="#ff0000">glutamate</font>, and sends a <font color="#ff0000">1</font> to the simulated B, which then behaves (in simulation) just as it would if it had seen real <font color="#ff0000">glutamate</font>. When the R neuron tries to send <font color="#00ff00">dopamine </font>to B, a detector picks up the <font color="#00ff00">dopamine</font>, and sends a <font color="#00ff00">0</font> to the simulated B, which then behaves (in simulation) exactly like the natural B would have if it had seen real <font color="#00ff00">dopamine </font>coming from R. All that is left is to describe the B:D simulation layer, which is hard to do since you didn't describe how B talks downstream, but however it does it, you simulate what it does, and then translate, so all the downstream neurons see the same real neurotransmitters that they saw before. <br>
<br>Now, if you simulated R too, you end up with a system with no glutamate or dopamine in this part of the system, but that CLAIMS to still be experiencing qualia, and why? Because the downstream neurons all behave exactly as they did before the swap. <br>
<br>Now, if we assume MPD is true, then we have a problem, because this new system should have no real qualia, but it CLAIMS that it is experiencing real qualia the entire time, as its neurons were slowly replaced with simulations. And the result is a theory where the qualia is epiphenomenal.<br>
<br>Thus, MPD is dead. </div><div class="im"><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">So, please return and report, and let me know if I can fall
to my knees and weep yet?</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div>I sincerely hope so. I hope that you have finally got it. </div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><div><br></div><div>
James</div><div><br></div>
</font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">-- <br>Web: <a href="http://james.jlcarroll.net" target="_blank">http://james.jlcarroll.net</a>
</font></span></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>