<div dir="ltr">
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt">Hi Stathis,</span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt">I hear you saying that you have proven, at least in your mind,
that there is a hard problem with no solution.<span style>
</span>Is this necessity not the most absurd and faithless necessity in your
model?<span style> </span>It’s just a chunk of grey matter,
and we can quite reliably produce a redness experience and a greenness experience
and so on.<span style> </span>Why is it that you hold on to
such questionable rational so tightly, thinking it has been proven, and all
that.<span style> </span>Yet have no qualm at all at
accepting that there is such a ‘hard problem’ and that “it is impossible to
make such a device” and so on?</span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt">If your logic is proving that something is impossible, which
we know more than anything – that it is not impossible, wouldn’t it be better
to assume you have a problem, somewhere else in your logic, than thinking there
is such a hard problem with regular old consciousness?</span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt">Brent Allsop</span></p>
<p class=""><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
</div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" target="_blank">stathisp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 5:41 PM, Gordon <<a>gts_2000@yahoo.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> Stathis Papaioannou <<a>stathisp@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
>>The inputs and outputs I'm talking about are action potentials which<br>
>>trigger neurotransmitter release at synapses. The neurons in the NCC<br>
>>receive inputs from other neurons that connect with them and send<br>
>>output to other neurons via their axon.<br>
><br>
> Just third-person descriptions in the language of physics.<br>
><br>
>> In the process, qualia may somehow be produced, but qualia are neither<br>
>> inputs nor outputs so are<br>
>> excluded from this part of the analysis.<br>
><br>
> Yes, qualia "may somehow be produced." Actually, I think are produced. lol.<br>
> How does that happen?<br>
><br>
> Consider for a moment that the world might not be fully understandable in<br>
> the third-person language of physics. Perhaps there is something that we<br>
> might call first-person ontology. As science-minded people, we want to<br>
> describe everything in the world in the objective language of physics. But<br>
> perhaps the world is both subjective and objective.<br>
><br>
> Toothaches are not the same thing as the physics that describe them. They<br>
> really hurt!<br>
<br>
A motor neuron controlling your vocal cords will only fire if the neurons connected to it fire, and those neurons will in turn only fire if the upstream neurons fire. There is to be sure a very complex network of neurons between the sensory organ and the motor neuron, but each component of the network follows a relatively simple set of rules. The neurons of the NCC also follow these rules, and it is the timing and amplitude of their output (action potential propagating down the axon) which determines if the downstream neurons fire. So if these NCC neurons are replaced with artificial neurons that replicate their pattern of firing in response to upstream stimuli, the downstream neurons must respond in the same way and the subject must behave in the same way as with the original brain. Is there any part if this that you don't agree with?<br>
<br>
>> If the artificial NCC neuron reproduces the outputs given certain inputs,<br>
>> then all<br>
>> the downstream neurons to which it connects behave normally. This is<br>
>> irrespective of<br>
>> any qualia it may or may not have, since as you admitted qualia are<br>
>> not outputs.<br>
><br>
> No, I wrote that qualia might be inputs or outputs, or something else<br>
> entirely.<br>
><br>
> I notice that you did not respond to my criticism of functionalism and<br>
> multiple realizability, which I consider very important. You quoted it below<br>
> but did not answer.<br>
><br>
>>> Here is my more general issue with functionalism and multiple<br>
>>> realizability<br>
>>>.as they relate to strong AI on digital computers:<br>
><br>
>>><br>
>>> I have a ceiling fan in my home. The blades are made of wood. I've seen<br>
>>> other ceiling fans with metal blades, and still others with stained-glass<br>
>>> blades. They all function as fans, and so along with functionalists I'm<br>
>>> happy to call them all fans. I've also seen hammers made of iron and<br>
>>> others<br>
>>> made of steel. Again, both hammers. Fans are realizable in wood, metal<br>
>>> and<br>
>>> glass; hammers are realizable in iron and steel. Only the functions are<br>
>>> important. The substrates make no difference. All well and good.<br>
>><br>
>>> But things get muddled when we begin to talk about the supposed multiple<br>
>>> realizability of brains in both organic materials and software/hardware<br>
>>> platforms. A digital computer is not in the same class of things as fans<br>
>>> and<br>
>>> hammers. With fans and hammers, we are looking purely at the direct<br>
>>> physical<br>
>>> effects of one substrate on another. Fans are defined as those physical<br>
>>> things that directly circulate physical air, hammers are defined as those<br>
>>> physical things that directly drive physical nails. A computer program,<br>
>>> by<br>
>>> contrast, is defined by functionalists as anything that admits of<br>
>>> abstract<br>
>>> 1's and 0's (or ons and offs, however you want to think of it) and the<br>
>>> brain<br>
>>> (like everything else in the world) does admit to such an interpretation.<br>
>>> This is why they say brains are multiply realized on computers. But those<br>
>>> syntactical abstractions are not actually *intrinsic* to the physics of<br>
>>> the<br>
>>> organic brain. Functionalists and computationalists merely assign them to<br>
>>> the physics.<br><br>My conviction that functionalism is correct does not come from considerations like yours. I agree that it is not immediately obvious that a computer could be conscious. But if a device (computer or otherwise) could <span></span>reproduce the observable behaviour of a neuron without the consciousness that would lead to absurdity, as I have explained repeatedly, and this leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to make such a device.<br>
<br>
<br>
--<br>
Stathis Papaioannou<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br><br>-- <br>Stathis Papaioannou<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>