<br><br>On Tuesday, May 7, 2013, Brent Allsop wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">Hi Stathis,</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">I hear you saying that you have proven, at least in your mind,
that there is a hard problem with no solution.<span>
</span>Is this necessity not the most absurd and faithless necessity in your
model?<span> </span>It’s just a chunk of grey matter,
and we can quite reliably produce a redness experience and a greenness experience
and so on.<span> </span>Why is it that you hold on to
such questionable rational so tightly, thinking it has been proven, and all
that.<span> </span>Yet have no qualm at all at
accepting that there is such a ‘hard problem’ and that “it is impossible to
make such a device” and so on?</span></p><p></p></div></blockquote><div>I said nothing about the hard problem. I said that it is impossible to make a device that replicates the behaviour of a brain component, as a spare part in any machine would replicate the behaviour of the original part, but doesn't replicate the consciousness. In other words, if you made such a part, it would necessarily replicate the consciousness. This means that consciousness cannot be substrate dependent. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p></p>
<p><span style="font-size:12pt">If your logic is proving that something is impossible, which
we know more than anything – that it is not impossible, wouldn’t it be better
to assume you have a problem, somewhere else in your logic, than thinking there
is such a hard problem with regular old consciousness?</span></p><p></p></div></blockquote><div>Again, I say nothing about the hard problem. I start with the assumption that consciousness is substrate dependent and show that this leads to absurdity; therefore, it can't be right.<span></span> </div>
<br><br>-- <br>Stathis Papaioannou<br>