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On 13/06/13 01:17, Adrian Tymes wrote:<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALAdGNRxays83EBU5hbiPTAZ4VACPD3h_2UeRKZfNd7kFdHU6g@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p>On Jun 12, 2013 5:04 PM, "Gregory Lewis" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:gjlewis37@gmail.com">gjlewis37@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
> 1. Given we time discount, and possible 'low hanging fruit'
concerns, lifespan may have decreasing marginal value.</p>
<p>You're going to have to explain that premise, as<br>
it is not obvious.</p>
</blockquote>
Sure. When given certain lifespan gambles (would you rather P=1 of
40 years or P=0.5 of 80 years and P=0.5 of death right now?) we tend
to be risk averse. There are a variety of debunking explanations one
can offer (scope insensitivity, status quo bias, the intuitions seem
a bit unstable if we change the magnitude of the gambles), but at
least one account of our apparent time discounting is that life has
decreasing marginal value, so twice as much is not quite twice as
good.<br>
<br>
Another reason for decreasing marginal value (at least locally)
would be that, if we're rational, we'll prioritize the most valuable
things to do with our lives first, so we tend to do less valuable
projects later on. So there's diminishing marginal value as it
becomes harder work to realize value as we live longer.<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALAdGNRxays83EBU5hbiPTAZ4VACPD3h_2UeRKZfNd7kFdHU6g@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p>> 2. If you're a prioritarian (hold that a given increment
of value is better given to someone with less value than someone
with more, all else equal; or that the welfare to value function
is concave), then you might prefer many shorter lives over one
long one even at the expense of some total value. It might be
generally fairer/better to package lifespan in many small
packets than one large one, so fewer potential people 'miss out'
on the goods of having existed at all.</p>
<p>There are an infinite number of those who might<br>
have existed. Further, people can help make the<br>
world better: existence is not zero-sum, or even<br>
readily convertible between different people.</p>
<p>If one's continued existence leads, however<br>
incrementally, toward a world in which birth<br>
rates may be higher (including "birth" of AIs),<br>
wouldn't your argument suggest one should<br>
attempt to live as long as possible?</p>
</blockquote>
I don't think there are infinite possible future people (although it
will be very large). Also, the relevant decision cases we have to
make will be between finite numbers of counter factual people (e.g.
if I opt to extend my life 10x over, there will be 9 people squeezed
out of the earths carrying capacity who would have existed - veil of
ignorance concerns etc. would therefore favour me not extending my
life, and those 8 people having a short go too).<br>
<br>
I agree there are various externalities which are not accounted for:
although carrying capacity across universe's future has an upper
bound, maybe some lives, if extended, will increase this bound by an
amount greater than their life extension 'takes away', making it a
good deal even for prioritarians. But one could note empirical
concerns going the other way (maybe cycling through more people
increases the chances of getting the requisite number of geniuses
needed for a safe posthuman future, etc. etc.) It is also false to
imply that we have a fully fungible blob of lifespan to distribute
between people wholly elastically. But it seems this granularity
becomes less of a big deal when lots of people are extending their
lives: if 10x life extension is widespread, then a lot of people who
would exist will not.<br>
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