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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 13/06/13 21:38, Adrian Tymes wrote:<br>
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<blockquote
cite="mid:CALAdGNT7U6XgTJkLPbaTf26nJ5HO+XTk5jrH-hXyXH8L6PC-Ng@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p><br>
On Jun 13, 2013 6:30 AM, "Gregory Lewis" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:gjlewis37@gmail.com">gjlewis37@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
> Sure. When given certain lifespan gambles (would you rather
P=1 of 40 years or P=0.5 of 80 years and P=0.5 of death right
now?) we tend to be risk averse. There are a variety of
debunking explanations one can offer (scope insensitivity,
status quo bias, the intuitions seem a bit unstable if we change
the magnitude of the gambles), but at least one account of our
apparent time discounting is that life has decreasing marginal
value, so twice as much is not quite twice as good.</p>
<p>So, you believe that just because most people<br>
believe, based on historical evidence, that<br>
later years = lesser years, this must inevitably<br>
be the case for everyone always?</p>
<p>That is a logical fallacy, and a slightly<br>
offensive one if you have indeed been lurking<br>
this list and thus seen the counterexamples<br>
we come up with.</p>
</blockquote>
As I said above, I believe the fact most (myself included) are
intuitively risk adverse with these gambles is evidence for us
putting diminishing marginal value in lifespan (although there are
other possible accounts). I don't see the logical fallacy, just an
application of something like the equal weight view of disagreement
epistemology. <br>
<br>
I haven't lurked long, so I might have missed something on the list.
But I should note the fact we can come up with counter-examples
where either more life is worth more - or where are intuitions here
are mistaken - doesn't significantly undercut the principle unless
we think some collection of counter-example circusmtances is
probably the case.<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALAdGNT7U6XgTJkLPbaTf26nJ5HO+XTk5jrH-hXyXH8L6PC-Ng@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p>> Another reason for decreasing marginal value (at least
locally) would be that, if we're rational, we'll prioritize the
most valuable things to do with our lives first, so we tend to
do less valuable projects later on. So there's diminishing
marginal value as it becomes harder work to realize value as we
live longer.</p>
<p>Ha! You assume we even KNOW all the things<br>
we'll want to do early on. This is laughably<br>
absurd for all but the smallest, most limited<br>
lives. I, for one, don't know what project I<br>
may work on 5 to 10 years from now, as is<br>
the case for nearly all adults that I know.<br>
(Children get a pass only because grade<br>
school & college is a well established pattern,<br>
but even they can't predict their<br>
extracirriculars that far in advance.)</p>
</blockquote>
Most of us make choices about how to spend our lives, and so
implicitly judge what we'd find most valuable. (E.g. I'm currently
training to be a doctor, but I would also have liked to have been a
philosopher, a scientist, or a writer). Although our estimates are
error prone, I think they're better than chance. If so, if spent my
'next few livespans' on life-extension doing some philosophy,
science and writing, this would generally accrue less value per unit
time than medicine. Mutatis Mutandis relationships, hobbies, and
however else we spend our time.<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALAdGNT7U6XgTJkLPbaTf26nJ5HO+XTk5jrH-hXyXH8L6PC-Ng@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">Of course, not all of them could exist at once,<br>
<p>
and there's the flaw in caring about those who<br>
might have existed: for any one person to exist,<br>
a (practically) infinite number of alternates can<br>
not. The only way to be at all fair is to deny<br>
any of them the chance to exist - emulating<br>
several current Republican arguments in<br>
Congress, with similarly unproductive results.</p>
</blockquote>
I don't think that is true. Imagine a parliament of souls which have
a (small) chance to be embodied in a life on earth. Grant (arguendo)
the choice is to divide lifespan into N 800 year 'lifespan tickets',
versus 10N 80 year 'lifespan tickets'. I think our parliament, if
behind a veil of ignorance about whether they'd 'win' or not on
either lottery, would prefer the second distribution, as they have a
much better chance of existing at all. That said, if you don't trust
your decision function at very low probabilities, you might do
something else (see Carl Shulman here: <a
href="http://reflectivedisequilibrium.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/rawls-original-position-potential.html">http://reflectivedisequilibrium.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/rawls-original-position-potential.html</a>)<br>
<br>
(Aside: there are some theoretical reasons to disprefer 'not caring
about people who could exist or not' from the population ethics
literature. Most importantly, if you only care about people who do
exist, you can get caught in various intransitivities when offered
choices between worlds with differing 'overlaps' of people who could
exist in each.) <br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALAdGNT7U6XgTJkLPbaTf26nJ5HO+XTk5jrH-hXyXH8L6PC-Ng@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p>> maybe some lives, if extended, will increase this bound by
an amount greater than their life extension 'takes away', making
it a good deal even for prioritarians.</p>
<p>And if enough do that another person-year<br>
for any person results, on average, in more<br>
than a person-year's worth of capacity<br>
added? (Which is arguably analogous to<br>
what's happened on Earth over the past<br>
century or two.)</p>
</blockquote>
If so, then great! However, I'm doubtful that will be generally
true, even if granting rejuvenation and superintelligence. I'm also
unsure the 19-20th C earth has this property - and if it did, I
don't think it will carry into the immediate future: although
lifeexp rose in step with general person-year capacity, this gain
has been predominantly in the period where people are sick and
economically unproductive (at least in the developed world). <br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALAdGNT7U6XgTJkLPbaTf26nJ5HO+XTk5jrH-hXyXH8L6PC-Ng@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p>> if 10x life extension is widespread, then a lot of people
who would exist will not.</p>
<p>And many who would not have existed,<br>
will. Quite possibly many, many more.</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
Possibly. But it requires a lot of externalities to line up in the
right way to get to the happy conclusion that life extension gets
both *longer* and *more* lives. Given some upper bound (on lifespan,
negentropy, whatever) which doesn't happily rise in step with
life-extension tech, ultimately others taking more mean there is
less for the rest, and if we all occupy our 'person-slot' in the
universe for 10x longer, there will be about 10x fewer people over
history.<br>
<br>
Bw,<br>
Gregory<br>
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