<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div><div><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">On Friday, September 26, 2014 7:41 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" x-apple-data-detectors="true" x-apple-data-detectors-type="link" x-apple-data-detectors-result="1">stathisp@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Possibility implies necessity if all possible worlds exist.<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">This has interesting implications. For example, if being<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">raised from cryinic sleep has only a 1/10^100 probability,<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">then in a multiverse where all possibilities are realised<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">you will definitely find yourself waking from cryinic sleep.</span></font></blockquote><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br>There's not only the problem of whether possibility implies necessity, but of how an instance in one possible world is related to an instance in another. The relationship you're holding is it's one of identity: the object in one world is the same as the object in another. But that seems debatable. Might it not be that the two objects are related but not the same? For instance, I'm me in this world, but in other worlds there are Dan Usts who are not me. We don't share anything more than that they play the role in those worlds as I do in this one? Also, in many of those worlds, presumably, I don't exist, so whilst in some worlds I might be king, in others peasant, in still others there might be nothing filling the role I play (perhaps I was never born, vertebrates never evolved, stars never formed, the fine structure constant is zero, etc.). So, this is all speculative and there seems to me to be no strong reason to accept the view that any of us is identical with our counterparts, if possible worlds actually exist.<br><br>Also, to add another wrinkle, even if there's a multiverse, no reason to believe different universes in it are related in the possible worlds fashion to each other in a way that helps us here. It's kind of like saying this instance of you is all well and fine come what may simply because there are other beings like you somewhere. But just as other universes aren't this one, the other beings like you aren't really you. Your extinction, if it comes about and sad as it would be, would still mean you're gone for good. (Of course, this is just one possible way of interpreting this, but merely positing a multiverse doesn't entail, IMO, all you believe it does.)<br><br>Regards,<br><br>Dan<br> My latest Kindle book, "Born With Teeth," can now be previewed at:<br><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00N72FBA2" x-apple-data-detectors="true" x-apple-data-detectors-type="link" x-apple-data-detectors-result="2">http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00N72FBA2</a> </span></div></div></body></html>