<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;"></div><div><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">On Tuesday, September 30, 2014 5:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" x-apple-data-detectors="true" x-apple-data-detectors-type="link" x-apple-data-detectors-result="1">stathisp@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">The other copies are not the you, now, in this world, but<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">your past self is not the you, now in this world either.<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">The copy of you that wakes up from cryonic sleep in a<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">minority of worlds bears the same relationship to you,<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">now as you, now bear to your past self.</span></font></blockquote><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br>This relies on a certain view of persistence, which in itself is not uncontreversial. I'm sure you've heard of endurance, exdurance, and perdurance (or whatever other theory might be cooked up here) with regard to persistence. It's unclear to me which is the correct view to take here. And, again, I don't postulating one view is correct simply to make the solution you want is the way to go here. (The same goes for personal identity beyond temporal issues. The idea that self is an illusion is not settled and not without serious (in my mind) problems.) <br><br></span><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">If you're blind or disfigured that is a real deficit and makes a real<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">difference. If you die every night in your sleep and a different<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">person wakes up in your bed with your memories every morning that is </span></font><font color="#000000"><span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">indistinguishable from ordinary life. In fact, it is arguable that </span></font><span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">that is what actually happens.</span></blockquote><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br>It's true that the deficit is one you know about via memory: you recall that previous you didn't have said deficit and now you have it. (I was going to quip: But what if you really were already blind or disfigured and it's just your memory (and all other testimony) of not being so that's wrong here?) But my point is knowing you die every night is something that the new you would get used to -- or maybe not, but what could you do about it?<br><br>But this doesn't clear up the matter of whether this is actually is the case or whether it clears up anything about possible worlds or a multiverse. That you couldn't tell any difference from the inside or out in the case of dying every night doesn't mean that this applies to supposed yous in other possible worlds or other universes. You're still trading on the idea that those other yous are somehow you rather than instances of you in another universe or possible world. And internally or externally, in many of these cases, they'd be distinguishable. The you that is here now exchanging emails with me is distinguishable from the you that's in another possible world who's never exchanged emails with me, for instance.<br><br>You could argue there are possible worlds or universes so close that you couldn't tell. Maybe, but it still doesn't answer whether they're the same you. Also, there are ones that are not so close where they are distinguishable, outside and in. Again, the problem is whether and how the yous (said in strong Cockney accent;) in different possible worlds or different universes are part of an overall you -- presuming either of these exist. That's not clear here. All of this seems like postulating a just so story on possible worlds or a multiverse to get the optimistic answer you want. (And we're not even getting into all the other possible worlds or universes where you life is far worse or nonexistent. Why just focus on the ones where you exist in a better state?)<br><br></span><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Also, these are epistemic issues that don't really clear up what<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">is the case. You might not know (or now know, considering that<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">the problem might be tackled in the future) how to resolve these<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">issues, but lacking a resolution doesn't erase the problem. Nor<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">does merely adopting a resolution that seems<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">uber-optimistic: no one really dies or needs to worry.<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">This also doesn't really resolve the issue of whether strong AI<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">is possible. I doubt it, but one conceive of it being the case<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">that they are necessarily ruled out (in our world, or, if<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">you please, in all possible worlds). Thus, fantasizing it<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">might be different elsewhere doesn't guarantee just how it's<br></span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">different -- regardless of our ability to know.</span></font></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">No, it doesn't have a direct bearing on the possibility of<br></span></font></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><font color="#000000"><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">strong AI.</span></font></blockquote><span style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br>At least in the actual world, we're in agreement on that. :)<br><br>Regards,<br><br>Dan<br> My latest Kindle book, "Born With Teeth," can be previewed at:<br><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00N72FBA2" x-apple-data-detectors="true" x-apple-data-detectors-type="link" x-apple-data-detectors-result="2">http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00N72FBA2</a><br> (It doesn't deal with strong AI or possible worlds, AFAIK.:)</span></div></body></html>