<div dir="ltr">Couple of books:<div><br></div><div>Stansfield Turner was Director of the CIA. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Burn-Before-Reading-Presidents-Intelligence-ebook/dp/B000FCKIFK">Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence</a>.</div><div><br></div><div>Christopher Andrew, historian. <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Presidents-Eyes-Only-Intelligence-Presidency/dp/0060921781">For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush</a>.</div><div><br></div><div>Given the nature of the system, studies on it are often classified themselves. I know someone and will ask.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards</div><div><br></div><div>John</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 12:23 PM, John Tracy Cunningham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:johntc@gmail.com" target="_blank">johntc@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">Anders<div><br></div><div>I was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, later a defense contractor, and spent about 35 years with security clearances. I offer the following as background information, from a US perspective.</div><div><br></div><div>The first question is, is there information (or objects) that need to be protected from disclosure to potential enemies, because of the damage that an enemy might be able to do in peace or war? For example, I worked for years on the plans that NATO would have used had the Warsaw Pact ever come across the inter-German border. There were many aspects of these plans that were classified, as people thought that the Pact knowing would be bad for NATO.</div><div><br></div><div>There are Security Classification Guides that describe what is or is not to be classified, and at what level - Confidential, Secret, Top Secret. (There is also For Official Use Only, which means don't release to the public, but don't protect in other ways.) There is also Sensitive Compartmented Information for the stuff that needs the strongest protection; one doesn't even know that a compartment exists until one is invited into it.</div><div><br></div><div>There is a list of generally high-ranking people who can classify something from scratch; this is Original Classification Authority. All else is derivative classification.</div><div><br></div><div>Once classified information exists, the question becomes, who can see it? There will be people who need to see it to make plans, perform day-to-day operations, or execute military operations; to do their jobs. They have Need To Know. A person so identified is background checked via a Single Scope Background Investigation. The investigators gather information from many sources. The investigatee identifies three or five long-time friends, and the investigators talk to them. The investigators then ask them for contacts, and they talk to them too. Eventually they make a recommendation to the person who can grant clearances.</div><div><br></div><div>The investigatee receives security training and signs nondisclosure agreements, perhaps the Espionage Act, receives the clearances, and goes to work. There is regular recurring training and constant reminders in the form of newsletters, posters, etc. There are procedures for storing and mailing information; with the advent of IT, everything has become more complicated. All of this is prescribed by law and supplemented with various regulations.</div><div><br></div><div>Ultimately, we trust people to classify information properly; to investigate properly; to grant clearances properly; to use and protect information properly. People being people, turns out not everyone is always careful, and some people break the rules intentionally. We punish them if we can. There is a problem with courts; often the Government is asked to confirm that the information disclosed was genuine, and they don't want to confirm that in public.</div><div><br></div><div>A couple of observations on recent cases:</div><div><br></div><div>Edward Snowden went through all of this and intentionally broke the rules in a major way. While many may approve, he broke the law. If the US ever gets hold of him, he will go to jail forever.</div><div><br></div><div>Hillary Clinton was a Senator and Secretary of State. Many Senators have clearances, and the Secretary certainly does. (Although sometimes the holders of classified info don't trust certain elected/appointed officials, and don't send stuff to them.) She put classified information on unclassified computers, or caused that to be done. That is illegal. Were she not Hillary Clinton, she would have been punished when the breach was discovered. Were the laws equally applied, as they're supposed to be, she would be punished.</div><div><br></div><div>This is an extremely large area, and I've only touched on basics. Would be glad to go into more detail.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards</div><div><br></div><div>John</div><div>Dubai</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div><div class="h5">On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 10:05 AM, Anders Sandberg <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:anders@aleph.se" target="_blank">anders@aleph.se</a>></span> wrote:<br></div></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class="h5">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
Since I will be working on information hazards this summer, I am
curious about the world of security clearances. How do they
*actually* work?<br>
<br>
Practically, it seems to be a combination of (1) getting people to
acknowledge that they will deal with Important Stuff and are
responsible (a psychological effect), (2) creating a cultural
environment where information flow is shaped (a social effect), (3)
creating penalties for doing things wrong (an incentive effect). I
assume there is also an assumed (4): that cleared people are less
likely to leak or mishandle information (a selection effect). Does
anybody know if there have been any proper studies of how well 1-4
actually work?<br>
<br>
Bringing this into the transhuman world, we may consider what
happens if we get really good at these things. <br>
<br>
On 2016-05-10 22:49, spike wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u>Ja.
When the security people hear a credible rumor, they can
call the clearance holder in for an interview, without even
telling why. If the holder refuses, clearance is
suspended. If the holder accepts and confesses everything,
then the holder is in trouble for not coming forth earlier
before he was caught, but might hold on to the clearance if
the investigation decides national security was not
compromised. If they find the holder intentionally tried to
cover his tracks, or if the other participant wasn’t cleared
at the same level, or they want to make an example of the
guy, or if the ranking official is in a bad mood that day,
or any number of other factors, the holder gets his
clearance suspended or revoked.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Any
big aerospace company is populated with straight-arrow
law-abiding types, which is how they qualified for those
clearances to start with. If any high-up leader has a
clearance suspended, word quickly gets around why it
happened, and that guy can no longer effectively lead that
crowd: they have no respect for him. This is what happened
to the LM second in command a few years ago.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Funny
aside: a long time ago, I was in a proposal group where we
were trying to find civilian uses for a whole bunch of
surplus military stuff we could buy for about a nickel on
the dollar, stuff that was idled by a treaty that took
effect right at the tail end of Bush41’s term. It included
rocket motors, guidance systems, not the nukes of course but
all kinds of cool rocket stuff, originally designed to carry
nukes but now all of it surplus and ready to haul rich
people to space, that kinda thing.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">In
that building where we were generating proposals, we had a
soundproof meeting room. It was seldom used for anything:
it was a pain in the ass to even get there, since it was a
structure within a structure, kinda like a massive
refrigerator inside a building, and you had to code in, etc,
so they could archive who went in and when. We decided to
find out if it really was sound proof. We had exactly one
woman in that group, mid thirties, fun sense of humor type.
We said “Hey Lurleen, go in there and close up, then scream
like you are being murdered or something.”<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Leave
it to her to respond, “Or something, OK.” <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">{8^D<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Took
us several minutes to stop laughing. Then, she went in
there, closed up, screamed. We couldn’t hear it. The
structure worked as advertised.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">We
didn’t need Lurleen to point out to us what that facility
enabled. I don’t know if anyone ever used it for that
purpose, but I wouldn’t be a bit surprised. If they did
that and self-reported, the security people probably
wouldn’t tell the company (I wouldn’t think (they would have
nothing to gain by telling.))<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">In
any case, the security people make it clear during initial
training and all subsequent periodic updates: they get it
that people are not saints. They understand. They are not
your priest. But they do need to know what you did, so they
can watch out for negative consequences. If you cross them,
they can hurt you. If you lie to them, this is a bad thing.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">spike<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<br><span><font color="#888888">
</font></span></div><span><font color="#888888">
</font></span></blockquote><span><font color="#888888">
<br>
<pre cols="72">--
Anders Sandberg
Future of Humanity Institute
Oxford Martin School
Oxford University</pre>
</font></span></div>
<br></div></div><span class="">_______________________________________________<br>
extropy-chat mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br>
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a><br>
<br></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>