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<p>Hi John,<br>
</p>
<p>I think I see how to make progress here with what you are
saying. I'm going to explain how I hear what you are saying, and
you can let me know what I'm still missing. Let me restate my
position more concisely and point out the falsifiable predictions
being made by my theory, and then see if I can concisely state
what your not quite falsifiable position is and how it differs?</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>I believe there is an emerging consensus around the idea that
there is a consistent neural correlate to a redness quality and a
consistently observably different neural correlate for a greenness
quality. This theory could be proven, if we find these, and with
that can reliably predict (i.e. demonstrably never fails or is
never falsified) at observing such differing correlates in other's
brains, letting us reliably know whether any brain is using
redness or greenness to represent an abstracted word like red.
The only problem is, currently, when we observe something in the
brain, our senses give us abstracted information, like the word
"red" to describe what we are detecting, and this information does
not have any quality to it - and is only meant to represent such,
given the correct interpretation. At best, we interpret the words
like red as if it was representing the quality of the surface of
the strawberry, or the initial source of the perception process
(why we think it is the same for all people, even if what we
observe in the brain is different and needs to be "corrected").
Worst case, we are interpreting the abstracted information we are
detecting about what is in the brain as if it had no quality at
all. For an example of both of these types of errors, see this
current article "The color of consciousness" recently published in
"The New York Review of Books<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/12/08/color-of-consciousness/. Theysayboththatthephysicalbrainisjust">"
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/12/08/color-of-consciousness/ .
They say both that the physical brain is just "</a>grey matter" and
also that it has no color at all and just think there is a "hard"
problem or a conundrum because of these miss interpretations.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>So, I'm making the demonstrable prediction that the neural
correlate of redness is more than just the "neural correlate" it
is what actually has the redness quality we experience and that
this consistent relationship, once found, will never fail at
predicting when someone is experiencing redness or greenness. I'm
describing week, stronger and strongest methods for achieving this
knowledge (see my video:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a>) You seem to be
unwilling to say that is possible as you claim that even if
something in the brain is the neural correlate of redness, the
actual mindful experience is separated from this physical reality,
and you seem to be claiming that a mindful redness quality has no
demonstrably reliable relationship to physical reality and isn't
approachable via science. You seem to say that with: "<font
size="4">there is no way they could know if my subjective
experience of those colors was inverted from their own."</font></p>
<p><font size="4"><br>
</font></p>
<p>So, at best you seem to be leaning towards Cartesian dualism,
where there is a neither "spirit" world which is not approachable
via science and that this unknowable neither world is the realm of
your mindful experiences. It's just that instead of admitting
that your view is Descartes dualism, you are simply claiming it is
in the mind. Even though you say that "the mind is what the brain
does" this seems to contradict your assertion that "there is no
way they could know...", implying there might be (as in never say
never fails) a complete lack of relationship between physical
detectable reality and what is in any "mind"?</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Brent Allsop</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/15/2016 12:56 PM, John Clark
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAJPayv0NjB_FBQsYK6QFjeszKu4QvuF+nfcRJqcfOFoX+QdUdQ@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
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<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 1:35 PM,
Brent Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
0px 0px
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<div
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">>>
</div>
I would agree that red is a
subjective experience and "red" is
just an ASCII sequence. </div>
</font></div>
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</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
<font size="4">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">>
</div>
So you agree that there is a significant
qualitative difference between your experience
of redness and any abstracted representation of
red like an ASCII sequence. In other words,
would you agree that it could be that my brain
interprets the word "red" as being your
greenness experience or something. (i.e. I could
have red green inverted qualia from you.)<br>
</font></div>
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<div><font size="4">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">Certainly
I agree.</div>
</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div><font size="4">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">>
</div>
Do you believe that something in your brain has
your redness quality,</font></div>
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<div><br>
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<div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline"><font
size="4">It </font></div>
<font size="4">would be more accurate to say
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">
</div>
something in
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">my</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">mind</div>
has
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">my</div>
redness quality
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">.
Mind is what the brain does and sometimes my brain
does red.</div>
</font><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div><font size="4">
<div class="gmail_default"
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</div>
and could anyone else besides you detect this
stuff </font><font size="4"><font size="4">that
has your redness quality while you are
experiencing it</font>, with any advanced
detection system, and could they, using these
same detection systems, do things like
distinguish this quality from whatever it is
that has your greenness quality when you
experience that, instead...?
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">
</div>
</font><span style="font-size:large">In other
words, by making such observations on others,
and on themselves, they could tell if someone
else has red green inverted qualia from
themselves?</span></div>
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</blockquote>
<div> </div>
<div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font
size="4">No. They could theoretically tell that I am
experiencing the color I associate with tomatoes and
stoplights and not the color I associate with spinach
and golights, but there is no way they could know if
my subjective experience of those colors was inverted
from their own. I don't know what it would feel like
to be a bat and I never will; the only way would be
for me to become a bat but then I still wouldn't know
because I wouldn't be I anymore, I'd be a bat. </font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font
size="4"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font
size="4">John K Clark </font></div>
<br>
</div>
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