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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/19/2016 8:41 PM, John Clark
wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:CAJPayv1Ahf3VWyMB++PPfhwGuRt6x6G5SBAg3ciO4dSL2uarrg@mail.gmail.com"
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<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font size="4">it
seems to me that subjectivity, like experiencing a red or
green quale, would require some minimum amount of
complexity, and a molecule is just too simple for that. </font></div>
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and<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/19/2016 8:41 PM, John Clark
wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:CAJPayv1Ahf3VWyMB++PPfhwGuRt6x6G5SBAg3ciO4dSL2uarrg@mail.gmail.com"
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<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font size="4">I
conclude consciousness must be a byproduct of
intelligence just as a spandrel is the byproduct of an
arch.</font></div>
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<br>
With these, and other things you've said, I think I'm starting to
understand more about your theory, and how to test for it, unless...
(see below) Let me see if I can restate it?<br>
<br>
So if your theory is proven true, you will be able to take a
sufficiently complex set of bits and organize them in the right way,
put them in the right (red) context and wala, a redness quality will
be experienced by you. And potentially all you need to do to change
this same set of bits into your greenness qualia, is put them in
your different (green) context?<br>
<br>
But what do you mean by "byproduct of"? Certainly that at least
implies a causal relationship from the physics to the qualia - but
are you saying the reverse isn't true? - that the quality of your
experience that is the byproduct of physics has no detectable causal
effect on physical reality? (This is why I stated, unless - above)<br>
<br>
Certainly, when I'm picking strawberries, it can be said that the
initial cause of me picking a strawberry (and avoiding the green
things) is the causal properties of a redness quality of my
knowledge of the strawberry. If you observe or represent this
physical process with abstracted data, it will look like the causal
properties of the neural correlate. In my case, you would observe
that the causal property causing me to pick the strawberry would be
simply the causal properties of glutamate since they are the same
causal properties of the redness I can experience. In your case the
initial causal property causing you to pick the strawberry would be
be the correctly organized set of bits put in the red context.
Certainly, this could be considered the neural correlate of your
theory - that can be considered the initial cause of you picking the
strawberry? And if this is true, you could detect your neural
correlates for red and green (based on whether they were in the red
or green context?), and know or be able to detect if someone else
had inverted qualia - or not - from you right? - because the other
person's set of bits representing "red" were in the different
context which you reliably experience as greenness.?<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/19/2016 8:41 PM, John Clark
wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:CAJPayv1Ahf3VWyMB++PPfhwGuRt6x6G5SBAg3ciO4dSL2uarrg@mail.gmail.com"
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<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif">On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at
8:23 PM, Brent Allsop </span><span dir="ltr"
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span><span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif"> wrote:</span><br>
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The behavior of the neural correlate and it's quality
are one and the same.</div>
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<div class="gmail_default" style="display:inline"><font
face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">I'm not certain
what you mean by that. Behavior and qualia are not
the same but if Darwin was right then one is the
inevitable consequence of the other.</font></div>
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<br>
Again, are you implying that your redness quality has no physical
causal properties?<br>
<br>
I'm predicting that my redness quality must have detectable physical
causal properties (Else, what would be the initial cause of me
picking the strawberry?). And if my theory is proven true, these
would be one and the same as the the causal properties of
glutamate. If your theory is proven true, wouldn't the causal
properties causing you to pick the strawberry be one and the same as
the causal properties of the correct set of bits in the right
context that is your redness?<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/20/2016 7:05 PM, John Clark
wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:CAJPayv31i1V93gcFGMv7z9MeEZ_ta7WMDkZb3O597+Xb7cJwPA@mail.gmail.com"
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<div dir="ltr"><font size="4">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;display:inline">The
ASCII sequence "red" can not differentiate between red light
and green light even if it has access to testing equipment,
but a suitably written program stored in a digital computer
can. </div>
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<br>
Aren't you saying that "<font size="4">a suitably written program
stored in a digital computer"</font><br>
does have something for which to interpret the abstracted word "red"
as - which is the neural correlate of your redness? With all
current computers that I know of nobody has done anything to
represent red with the correct set of organized bits in the right
context (i.e what you mean by suitably written?). If your theory
turns out to be true, we will be able to organize computers that do
represent "red" with the correct set of bits, in the red context, so
we can predict that they do represent redness like you do. But, as
I said, this would be very different than one of today's simple
digital computers which are not in any way what you call "suitably
written" - The initial cause of you picking that strawberry is the
right set of bits in a red context - while the initial cause of a
simple digital computer picking the strawberry is just any physical
representation some piece of hardware is interpreting or
transduceing to the next downstream representation or motor neuron,
as if it was the word "red" - without anything like the right set of
bits in your red context.<br>
<br>
Brent Allsop<br>
<br>
<br>
P.S. John, thank you so much for sticking with all this for so
long!! You are the first person that thinks anything like you that
has persisted with me for anything like this long.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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