<div dir="ltr"><br><div>Sorry, I accidentally hit the send button long before that last e-mail was completed. Here is what it should have been:</div><div><br></div><div><p style="font-size:12.8px">I'm saying that when you experience a redness qualia, there must be something in the brain that has, or is the neural correlate of that redness experience. And also when you experience a greenness qualia, there is something detectably different that has this different qualia. And both of these things can interact with a binding system that enables us to be aware of both of these qualities at the same time. Our ability to be aware of the redness and greenness quality at the same time, enables us to do various computational tasks, like exclusive or, consciously. Introspectively, we all know what is going on and how it does an exclusive or operation, how and why our conscious awareness is qualitatively involved, and what it is like.</p><p style="font-size:12.8px"><br></p><p style="font-size:12.8px">You are talking about the only computational unit in the brain being neurons firing, in one way, due to sufficient ion channels in synapses opening. But there is a the possibility that it is more than just this. Also, I refer to the binding system as a single neuron, only because this simplifies the argument I'm trying to make about what happens when this is replaced during the substitution process. The same qualitative argument will similarly apply to whatever binding system is used, no matter how complex, and no matter how many neurons are involved. It seems kind of doubtful to me that if you could replace glutamate with carbon nanotubes, and that if this could result in identical neural behavior - that it would be glutamate that has a redness quale - we just don't know. Also, there is the possibility that both glutamate and carbon nanotubes can both have the "redness quality" just as it is possible for many physically diverse surfaces to reflect "red" light. So, either case, there must be something that has the redness quale, and there must be some binding mechanism. I don't see how this could be possible from just a simple neurons firing in the simple way you are describing. So, my prediction is that if what you say is possible, it is likely something else that is the neural correlate of redness, and there is some other way for these all to be bound, consciously together. And whatever mechanism you provide, which will enable something to be a redness quale, and something different to be a different quale, and also some mechanism to bind all these together, I will then be able to describe to you how the neural behavior will change, unless whatever it is that has the redness quality is physically the same (in such a way that it will be impossible to simulate it with something that does not have the physical redness quality).</p><p style="font-size:12.8px"><br></p><p style="font-size:12.8px">So, it seems to me that you and James' argument is relying on the assumption that it is simple neurons firing in a single way that is the only thing producing conscious awareness and qualia, in which the 3 key elements (<span style="font-size:12.8px">redness, greenness, and an awareness binding system) </span><span style="font-size:12.8px">aren't possible. So my assumption is that there is something more going on to achieve the 3 elemental primary requirements of qualitative awareness. If you can provide to me any way to achieve these 3 elemental requirements with whatever you think is all that is required in neural activity, my claim is that how the neural behavior will change, or not change, when you replace one set of physical redness quale with something else that does not have it. And remember, you must be able to ask the system something like: 'what is redness like for you', and it must be able to be consciously aware of the answer, like we are, and it must be able to using a binding system like process to do the strong form of effing the ineffable between brains, like we do between hemispheres.</span></p><p style="font-size:12.8px"><br></p><p style="font-size:12.8px"><br></p><p style="font-size:12.8px"><br></p><div class="gmail-yj6qo gmail-ajU" style="font-size:12.8px"><div id="gmail-:s9" class="gmail-ajR" tabindex="0"><img class="gmail-ajT" src="https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v1/icons/mail/images/cleardot.gif" style="opacity: 0.3;"></div></div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 11:10 AM, Brent Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
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</p>
<p>I'm saying that when you experience a redness qualia, there must
be something in the brain that has, or is the neural correlate of
that redness experience. And also when you experience a greenness qualia,
there is something detectably different that has this different
qualia. And both of these things can interact with a binding
system that enables us to be aware of both of these qualities at
the same time. Our ability to be aware of the redness and
greenness quality at the same time, enables us to do various
computational tasks, like exclusive or, consciously.
Introspectively, we all know what is going on and how it does an exclusive or operation, how and why our conscious awareness is qualitatively involved, and what it is like.</p>
<p><br>
</p><p>You are talking about the only computational unit in the brain being neurons firing, in one way, due to sufficient ion channels in synapses opening. But there is a the possibility that it is more than just this. Also, I refer to the binding system as a single neuron, only because this simplifies the argument I'm trying to make about what happens when this is replaced during the substitution process. The same qualitative argument will similarly apply to whatever binding system is used, no matter how complex, and no matter how many neurons are involved. It seems kind of doubtful to me that if you could replace glutamate with carbon nanotubes, and that if this could result in identical neural behavior - that it would be glutamate that has a redness quale - we just don't know. Also, there is the possibility that both glutamate and carbon nanotubes can both have the "redness quality" just as it is possible for many physically diverse surfaces to reflect "red" light. So, either case, there must be something that has the redness quale, and there must be some binding mechanism. I don't see how this could be possible from just a simple neuron firing in a single way. So, my prediction is that if what you say is possible, it is likely something else that is the neural corelate of redness, and there is some other way for these all to be bound, consciously together. And whatever mechanism you provide, which will enable something to be a redness quale, and something different to be a different quale, and also some mechanism to bind all these together, I will then be able to describe to you how the neural behavior will change, unless whatever it is that has the redness quality is physically the same (in such a way that it will be impossible to simulate it with something that does not have the physical redness quality).</p><p><br></p><p>So, it seems to me that you and James' argi,emt is relying on the assumption that it is simple neurons firing in a single way that is the only thing producing conscious awareness and qualia. </p><div><div class="h5"><p><br></p><p><br></p><p><br></p>
<br>
<div class="m_1115672348864022278m_2482331461377374498m_839671463194454007moz-cite-prefix">On 12/28/2016 10:49 PM, Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite" style="font-size:12.8px">Stathis:
<<I'm
having
difficulty
following what
you're saying.
I'm simply
proposing
replacing any
component of a
neurone, or
any collection
of neurones,
with a machine
that does the
same job.
There is a
type of
glutamate
receptor that
changes its
shape when
glutamate
molecules
bind, creating
a channel for
sodium and
potassium ions
to pass
through the
membrane, and
triggering an
action
potential. We
could imagine
nanomachines
in the place
of these
receptors that
monitor
glutamate and
open and close
ion channels
in the same
way as the
natural
receptors, but
are made from
different
materials;
perhaps from
carbon
nanotubules
rather than
proteins. The
engineering
problem would
be to ensure
that these
nanomachines
perform their
task of
detecting
glutamate and
opening ion
channels just
like the
naturally
occurring
receptors. Do
you think it
is in theory
possible to do
this? Do you
see that if it
is possible,
then neurons
modified with
these
receptors
*must* behave
just like the
original
neurones?>> <br>
</blockquote>
<span style="font-size:12.8px"></span></div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"><br>
Brent:
<Good
example – that
helps me to
understand
more clearly.
Yes, I see
that if
neuron’s are
modified
[using carbon
nanotubes to
open and close
ion channels
in the same
way that
glutamate
does] they
*must* behave
just like the
original
neurons. I
really
appreciate you
and James
sticking with
me and
pointing out
all my
admittedly
sloppy
mistakes.
I've spent
much time
rewriting this
response,
after thinking
about all this
for many
years, and I
hope I've
improved and
am not making
as many sloppy
mistakes with
this reply.<br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">I still see and theoretically predict
that there
must be some
level, for
which it can
be said that
something
“has” the
redness
quality we can
experience in
a bound
together way
with other
diverse
qualities. Of
note is that
something
having a
redness
quality is
different than
some mechanism
that can
detect this
redness
quality by
being aware of
it together
with other
qualities.
And that is
the purpose of
the binding
neuron in my
example that
you are
replacing. It
does not have
the quality,
but only
detects, by
being aware of
the glutamate
quality vs
other physical
qualities.
So, the
binding
neuron,
itself, does
not have the
glutamate
quality, but
only allows
such qualities
to be bound
together into
unified
awareness of
all diverse
qualities. As
for the
behavior of a
regular not
exclusive or
gate, how the
not exclusive
or
functionality
is implemented
is irrelevant
and hardware
independent –
as long as the
output is the
same. But for
this binding
neuron, the
diverse
qualities it
can be aware
of at the same
time is
critically
important to
its conscious
intelligence.
And when you
replace this
functionality
with an
abstracted not
exclusive or
gate, you are
obviously
doing this
same function
without being
aware of nor
comparing any
real physical
glutamate
qualities.><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">I'm still confused as to your position.
You agree that
replacing a
component of a
neurone with a
different, but
functionally
equivalent,
component will
not change
that neurone's
behaviour. But
you are also
saying (if I
understand
correctly)
that the
experience,
such as a
redness
quality, does
not come from
the functional
relationships
between brain
components. So
swapping some
components in
the brain with
functional
equivalents
might change
the redness
experience,
but not change
the behaviour
of the
neurones or
the behaviour
of the person,
which is
determined by
the neorones.
Is this what
you believe
would happen? </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">Stathis Papaioannou</p>
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