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<p>Hi William,</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Yay, I must be at least a little better at communicating, after
so long, as you guys (and more of you) are starting to ask great
questions.<br>
</p>
<p>But, again, I must first ask you a question about what you mean
by "the perception part". As there are still multiple competing
theories out about what all perception includes, for which there
hasn't yet been sufficient evidence to falsify those theories for
their supporters. I'll give you an answer using my favorite
"materialist" theory (happens to be the simplest one that I know
of), and how it will be verified or falsified via demonstrable
science using these effing of the ineffable techniques, and if
your theory is similar, my job will be done. If your theory is
different, I'll describe the much more complex way which the
theory will be verified / falsified by demonstrable science using
this same correct qualitative interpretation method.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>We might as well start at the beginning of the perception
process, for completeness (and this will be required to see and
prove what is the neural correlate of redness in our brain). The
perception of a strawberry starts with the target of perception or
the surface of the strawberry having a set of physical qualities,
(it's ability to reflect something like 650 NM light) that we
think of or interpret as being "red". There is the causally
downstream set of physical qualities which are very different from
the set of physical qualities the surface of the strawberry has.
This is the 650 NM light. Then, there is a translation mechanism
(the retina) which translate the physical qualities of the light
into a different set of physical qualities (the red and green
signal traveling down your optic nerve). Again, these are all
very different physical qualities, we think of, or interpret all
of them as if they were "red". The correctly functioning retina,
is what correctly translates one different set of physical
qualities to the other, in a way that allows us to abstract away
from the particular different physical representations, and think
of both of them in a functionally optimized way: "We think of or
interpret all them all as if they were all red". Note: if you add
something in this causal perception Chanel, such as a fMRI camera
and video sensing system such as might be used to target and
perceived the quality of knowledge inside our brain, that also
represents what we think of as "red" or at this point the
"redness" (which will be inverted for the duplicated person). All
these diverse representations also will all have very different
sets of physical qualities we only think of as if they were all
the same "red". Every one of these sets of physical
representations we all think of as being "red" (or abstracted
different physical representations we all think of as ones and
zeros in the computer portion of the channel) require a correct
qualitative translation mechanism that translates from one
physical set of qualities, to the next different one, in a way
that allows us to think of all of them in a simplified way - as if
they were all "red".<br>
</p>
<p>So far, in our duplicated person, we haven't changed anything
yet. And this much of the causal "Perception Chanel" is
identical. There is further neural processing, such as that
required to recognize the edges of the strawberry in the 2 two D
representations of the strawberry coming down our optical nerve.
And there is the part that converts these 2D images into 3D voxel
elements again representing the 3D strawberry with a completely
different set of physical qualities which are nothing like any of
the up channel physical qualities. Again, up until this point
things remain physically identical in our duplicated person. Now,
after all this neural processing, there is yet another final
translation mechanism in the perception Chanel which translates
to yet another completely different set of physical qualities.
(Again, none of these physical qualities, including the qualities
of the surface of the strawberry are anything like each other.)
Where before the duplication, the translation mechanism would
translate to voxel knowledge of the surface of the strawberry
having a redness set of physical qualities we can experience,
while in the duplicate the final translation mechanism translates
to physical knowledge that has a set of physical qualities we
experience as having a greenness quality.<br>
</p>
So, how this particular theory will be proven correct, or falsified
for everyone in competing theory camps, is via the weak stronger and
strongest form of effing the ineffable I've been describing and also
described in this video:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a> and via this method
finding whatever the particular neural correlates are of each of our
redness and greenness... conscious experiences. This is the
"materialist" theory that falsifiably predicts that without the
right material, no redness. Other theories include "functionalist"
theories, and various other "emergent" theories (what seems to be
the current leading expert consensus set of theories because of the
fallacious neural substitution argument), "quantum" theories,
"relational" theories, "Higher order" theories, neither world
"spiritual" or various dualistic religious theories such as
Cartesian dualism (these are the naive most popular theories), even
elimanativests theories with no qualia at all, and lots more that
are all much more complex and problematic than this simple theory.
One of these theories is about to be proven true, while all the rest
falsified, by simply correctly interpreting the physical qualities
representing what we are detecting or "effing the ineffable".<br>
<br>
<p>Is your theory of what the conscious "perception part" is
anything like this materialist one? Which theory do you all bet
is going to soon turn out to be "The One"?<br>
</p>
<br>
Brent Allsop<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/1/2017 10:04 AM, William Flynn
Wallace wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAO+xQEZYyEOmGgGZS2O3-QfYf9sVsBT=QVfLzctVPUc=BwKwpQ@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)">For
the most part, I don't belong in this discussion but I'd like
to know the meaning of</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">"You
completely swap the new persons redness knowledge with their
greenness knowledge." </span><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">Are
you talking about rewiring the optical sensory system or the
perception part?</span></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">bill
w</span></div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Jan 1, 2017 at 10:49 AM, Brent
Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Hi Jason,<br>
</p>
<p>Good question. Let me first ask you a question, then
based on your answer, I will be able to better answer
your questions.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Let's say you duplicate a person, possibly with a Star
Trek like transporter. Except you make one minor
change. You completely swap the new persons redness
knowledge with their greenness knowledge. I would say
you have still successfully transported them, that you
have achieved multiple-realizability and functionally
they will be identical. But, the new person represents
knowledge of strawberries with a greenness quality. Do
these before and after people have "identical mental
states"?<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
</font></span></p>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<p>Brent<br>
</p>
</font></span>
<div>
<div class="h5"> <br>
<div class="m_-1712693100872867830moz-cite-prefix">On
12/31/2016 4:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Brent,
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thank you, the video cleared it up for me
then. So do you have no objection to
multiple-realizability (the idea that different
physical materials could in theory be used to
construct minds that have identical mental
states)?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Jason<br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Dec 30, 2016
at 4:53 PM, Brent Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com"
target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
Hi Jason,<br>
<br>
</div>
I'm just talking in simplified
qualitative terms to make
communication easier to model what
is and isn't important. that is
the only reason I used the term
grue to represent all the 99
million or whatever new colors
that any particular tetrachromat
can experience (surely they are
not all the same).<br>
<br>
</div>
Also, when i say that glutamate has
the redness quality and glycene has
the grenness quality, this too, is
just simplified. I am describing
what it would be like in a
hypothetical world that only has 3
colors - red (glutamate),
green(glycene), and
white(aspartate). (see: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s"
target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?<wbr>v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s</a>)
I simply describe in that video that
if there was such a world, how could
the people in that world correctly
see that in their simplified world
that glutamate was the neural
correlate of red (and not think it
was white since glutamate reflects
white light).<br>
<br>
</div>
Then once a person can understand how
this general correct qualitative
interpretation theory works in the
simplified world, they can use the
same proper qualitative interpretation
of abstracted data, in the real world
- to finally not be qualia blind and
finally discover what really has all
the redness qualities any one of us
can experience.<span
class="m_-1712693100872867830HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"><br>
<br>
</font></span></div>
<span
class="m_-1712693100872867830HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888">Brent<br>
<div>
<div><br>
<br>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</font></span></div>
<div class="m_-1712693100872867830HOEnZb">
<div class="m_-1712693100872867830h5">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Dec
30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Jason Resch <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jasonresch@gmail.com"
target="_blank">jasonresch@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote"><span>On
Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at
4:15 PM, Brent Allsop <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">I, like most people, am a mere tetra
chromate – I
experience the
world with 3
primary colors.<span>
</span>But some
people are
tetrachromats, and
do it with 4
primary colors.<span>
</span>Let’s call
this 4<sup>th</sup>
color “grue”.<span>
</span>Obviously,
all us tri
chromats can hear
the person say
things like: “No
that is Grue, not
one of the primary
colors, as you
claim” and we can
observe what is
causing the 4<sup>th</sup>
primary color,
including it’s
neural correlate
in their brains.<span>
</span>In other
words, like Frank
Jackson’s
brilliant color
scientist raised
in a black and
what room, us
trichromats can
learn everything
about grue, and
see that it is not
in our heads, but
we can see when
the neurarl
correlate of grue
is in the head of
a tetrachromat.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">In other words, all of us normal
trichromatic
people are grue
zombies.<span> </span>We
can know and
communicate
everything about
them.<span> </span>In
fact, we might
even be able to be
trained to call
the right things
grue, just like
the tetrachromat
does, and lie
about it, and
convince everyone
else that we might
be a tetrachromat.<span>
</span>(until you
observe my brain)<span>
</span>So, until
we enhance our
primary visual
cortext and give
it what has the
grue color, we
will never know
how the
tetrachromat
qualitatively
interprets the
word “grue”.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">Now, some people think of a “p-zombie” as
something that is
atomically
identical to us,
but just doesn’t
have the
qualitative
experience of
consciousness –
which of course is
very absurd, and
very different
than the grue type
of zombie, I am,
who simply isn’t
yet capable of
producing the grue
neural correlate
in my brain.<span>
</span>But I can
represent grue
with anything else
that is in my
brain, and talk
about it as if it
was grue, in a
grue zombie way.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>But no new
neurotransmitters are
required to experience
grue.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Moreover,
tretrachromats don't
just see 1 new type of
color, they can see 99
million new colors that
us trichromats cannot
see. This is because we
can sense about 100
independent relative
brightnesses for red
green and blue colors,
which allows 100x100x100
possible resulting
colors (1 million
colors). Tetrachromats
get to see
100x100x100x100 or 100
million colors.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>How can so many new
colors come about if the
neurocorolates are
somehow dependent on
specific chemicals in
the brain? Tetrachromats
don't have 100 times as
many chemicals in their
brain as trichromats
have, yet they get to
perceive 100 times as
many qualia.</div>
<div>
<div
class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808h5">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Jason</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div
class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442HOEnZb">
<div
class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442h5">
<div
class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div
class="gmail_quote">On
Fri, Dec 30,
2016 at 12:30
PM, Jason
Resch <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:jasonresch@gmail.com"
target="_blank">jasonresch@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">Reminds
me a bit of
"An
Unfortunate
Dualist":
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://themindi.blogspot.com/2007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-dualist.html"
target="_blank">http://themindi.blogspot.com/2<wbr>007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-<wbr>dualist.html</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As to
your puzzle,
if Fred is
unable to
detect any
effects from
conscious
people
(including
their
reflections),
then he should
not be able
to see his own
reflection,
but then he
also shouldn't
be able to
hear his own
thoughts
either. Which
might be your
definition of
a zombie,
making him
visible, etc.
"Russell's
reflection".
However,
Fred's own
voice might
still be heard
if Fred's
consciousness
is an
epiphenomenon,
but I think
practically
speaking I
think
epiphenomenalism can
be ruled out,
together with
the notion of
p-zombies.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>See
Daniel
Dennett's "The
Unimagined
Preposterousness
of Zombies": <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm"
target="_blank">https://ase.tufts.ed<wbr>u/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzom<wbr>bie.htm</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<blockquote
style="margin:0px
0px 0px
40px;border:none;padding:0px">
<div><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">Dennett
argues that
"when
philosophers
claim that
zombies are
conceivable,
they
invariably
underestimate
the task of
conception (or
imagination),
and end up
imagining
something that
violates their
own
definition".</span><sup
id="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-Dennett1991_3-1"
class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1991-3"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[3]</a></sup><sup
id="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-Dennett1995_4-1"
class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[4]</a></sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> He
coined the
term "zimboes"
– p-zombies
that have </span><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_logic"
title="Second-order logic"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"
target="_blank">second-order beliefs</a><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> –
to argue that
the idea of a
p-zombie is
incoherent;</span><sup
id="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-12"
class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-12"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[12]</a></sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> "Zimboes
think</span><sup
style="line-height:1;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif">Z</sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> they
are conscious,
think</span><sup
style="line-height:1;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif">Z</sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> they
have qualia,
think</span><sup
style="line-height:1;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif">Z</sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> they
suffer pains –
they are just
'wrong'
(according to
this
lamentable
tradition), in
ways that
neither they
nor we could
ever
discover!".</span><sup
id="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-Dennett1995_4-2"
class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[4]</a></sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> </span><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I'm not
sure, however,
whether your
thought
experiment
sheds any new
light on the
concepts of
consciousness
or zombies. It
seems like it
may be only a
reformulation
of the "Barber
Paradox",
where the self
reflexivity is
a "power to
detect only
non-consciousness
things", aimed
at one's own
consciousness.</div>
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class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Jason</div>
</font></span></div>
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class="m_-1712693100872867830m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215HOEnZb">
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<div
class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div
class="gmail_quote">On
Fri, Dec 30,
2016 at 11:13
AM, Stuart
LaForge <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:avant@sollegro.com" target="_blank">avant@sollegro.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Jason
Resch wrote:<br>
<Therefore,
if the brain
is a machine,
and is finite,
then an<br>
appropriately
programmed
computer can
perfectly
emulate any of
its<br>
behaviors.
Philosophers
generally fall
into one os
three camps,
on the<br>
question of
consciousness
and the
computational
theory of
mind:<br>
Non-computable
physicists [.
. .]Weak AI
proponents [.
. .]<br>
Computationalists.<br>
<br>
Which camp do
you consider
yourself
in?><br>
------------------------------<wbr>-------------<br>
<br>
As a general
rule, I prefer
not to go
camping with
philosophers
as I<br>
prefer the
rigor of
science and
mathematics.
But if I must
camp in that<br>
neck of the
woods, I would
set up my own
camp. I would
call it the<br>
Godelian camp
after Kurt
Godel. Since I
am a scientist
and not a<br>
philosopher, I
will explain
my views with
a thought
experiment
instead of<br>
an argument.<br>
<br>
Imagine if you
will a
solipsist.
Let's call him
Fred. Fred is
solopsist<br>
because he has
every reason
to believe he
lives alone in
a world of<br>
P-zombies.<br>
<br>
For the
uninitiated,
P-zombies are
philosophical
zombies.
Horrid beings<br>
that talk,
move, and act
like normal
folks but lack
any real
consciousness<br>
or
self-awareness.
They just go
through the
motions of
being
conscious but<br>
are not really
so.<br>
<br>
So ever since
Fred could
remember,
wherever he
looked, all he
could see<br>
were those
pesky
P-zombies.
They were
everywhere. He
could talk to
them,<br>
he could
interact with
them, and he
even married
one. And
because they
all<br>
act perfectly
conscious,
they would
fool most
anyone but
certainly not<br>
Fred.<br>
<br>
This was
because Fred
had, whether
you would
regard it as a
gift or curse,<br>
an unusual
ability. He
could always
see and
otherwise
sense
P-zombies but<br>
never normal
folk. Normal
folk were
always
invisible to
him and he
never<br>
could sense a
single one. So
he, being a
perfect
P-zombie
detector, came<br>
to believe
that he was
the only
normal person
on a planet
populated by<br>
P-zombies.<br>
<br>
Then one day
by chance he
happened to
glance in a
mirror . . .<br>
<br>
Does he see
himself?<br>
<br>
I want to hear
what the list
has to say
about this
before I give
my answer<br>
and my
interpretation
of what this
means for
strong AI and
the<br>
computational
theory of
mind.<br>
<br>
Stuart LaForge<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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