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</p>
<p>Hi Jason,<br>
</p>
<p>Good question. Let me first ask you a question, then based on
your answer, I will be able to better answer your questions.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Let's say you duplicate a person, possibly with a Star Trek like
transporter. Except you make one minor change. You completely
swap the new persons redness knowledge with their greenness
knowledge. I would say you have still successfully transported
them, that you have achieved multiple-realizability and
functionally they will be identical. But, the new person
represents knowledge of strawberries with a greenness quality. Do
these before and after people have "identical mental states"?<br>
</p>
<p>Brent<br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/31/2016 4:44 PM, Jason Resch
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CA+BCJUh+acVALyAKQhEc4MFsgRtgxGtwJo4szgFGi=j+Hc5OQg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Brent,
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thank you, the video cleared it up for me then. So do you
have no objection to multiple-realizability (the idea that
different physical materials could in theory be used to
construct minds that have identical mental states)?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Jason<br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 4:53 PM,
Brent Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
Hi Jason,<br>
<br>
</div>
I'm just talking in simplified qualitative terms
to make communication easier to model what is
and isn't important. that is the only reason I
used the term grue to represent all the 99
million or whatever new colors that any
particular tetrachromat can experience (surely
they are not all the same).<br>
<br>
</div>
Also, when i say that glutamate has the redness
quality and glycene has the grenness quality, this
too, is just simplified. I am describing what it
would be like in a hypothetical world that only
has 3 colors - red (glutamate), green(glycene),
and white(aspartate). (see: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s"
target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?<wbr>v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s</a>)
I simply describe in that video that if there was
such a world, how could the people in that world
correctly see that in their simplified world that
glutamate was the neural correlate of red (and not
think it was white since glutamate reflects white
light).<br>
<br>
</div>
Then once a person can understand how this general
correct qualitative interpretation theory works in
the simplified world, they can use the same proper
qualitative interpretation of abstracted data, in
the real world - to finally not be qualia blind and
finally discover what really has all the redness
qualities any one of us can experience.<span
class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br>
</font></span></div>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">Brent<br>
<div>
<div><br>
<br>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</font></span></div>
<div class="HOEnZb">
<div class="h5">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at
3:29 PM, Jason Resch <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jasonresch@gmail.com"
target="_blank">jasonresch@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote"><span>On Fri, Dec
30, 2016 at 4:15 PM, Brent Allsop <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com"
target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">I,
like most
people, am a mere tetra chromate
– I experience the world with 3
primary
colors.<span> </span>But some
people are
tetrachromats, and do it with 4
primary colors.<span>
</span>Let’s call this 4<sup>th</sup>
color “grue”.<span> </span>Obviously,
all us tri chromats can hear the
person say things like: “No that
is Grue, not one of the primary
colors, as you
claim” and we can observe what
is causing the 4<sup>th</sup>
primary color,
including it’s neural correlate
in their brains.<span> </span>In
other words, like Frank
Jackson’s
brilliant color scientist raised
in a black and what room, us
trichromats can
learn everything about grue, and
see that it is not in our heads,
but we can
see when the neurarl correlate
of grue is in the head of a
tetrachromat.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">In
other
words, all of us normal
trichromatic people are grue
zombies.<span> </span>We can
know and communicate everything
about
them.<span> </span>In fact, we
might even be able to
be trained to call the right
things grue, just like the
tetrachromat does, and
lie about it, and convince
everyone else that we might be a
tetrachromat.<span> </span>(until
you observe my
brain)<span> </span>So, until
we enhance our primary
visual cortext and give it what
has the grue color, we will
never know how the
tetrachromat qualitatively
interprets the word “grue”.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">Now,
some
people think of a “p-zombie” as
something that is atomically
identical to us,
but just doesn’t have the
qualitative experience of
consciousness – which of
course is very absurd, and very
different than the grue type of
zombie, I am,
who simply isn’t yet capable of
producing the grue neural
correlate in my brain.<span> </span>But
I can represent grue with
anything else
that is in my brain, and talk
about it as if it was grue, in a
grue zombie way.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>But no new neurotransmitters are
required to experience grue.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Moreover, tretrachromats don't just
see 1 new type of color, they can see
99 million new colors that us
trichromats cannot see. This is
because we can sense about 100
independent relative brightnesses for
red green and blue colors, which
allows 100x100x100 possible resulting
colors (1 million colors).
Tetrachromats get to see
100x100x100x100 or 100 million colors.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>How can so many new colors come
about if the neurocorolates are
somehow dependent on specific
chemicals in the brain? Tetrachromats
don't have 100 times as many chemicals
in their brain as trichromats have,
yet they get to perceive 100 times as
many qualia.</div>
<div>
<div class="m_-502044300747996808h5">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Jason</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
</div>
<div
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442HOEnZb">
<div
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442h5">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On
Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 12:30
PM, Jason Resch <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jasonresch@gmail.com" target="_blank">jasonresch@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">Reminds
me a bit of "An
Unfortunate Dualist":
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://themindi.blogspot.com/2007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-dualist.html"
target="_blank">http://themindi.blogspot.com/2<wbr>007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-<wbr>dualist.html</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As to your
puzzle, if Fred is
unable to detect any
effects from
conscious people
(including their
reflections), then
he should not be
able to see his own
reflection, but then
he also shouldn't be
able to hear his own
thoughts either.
Which might be your
definition of a
zombie, making him
visible, etc.
"Russell's
reflection".
However, Fred's own
voice might still be
heard if Fred's
consciousness is an
epiphenomenon, but I
think practically
speaking I think
epiphenomenalism can
be ruled out,
together with the
notion of p-zombies.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>See Daniel
Dennett's "The
Unimagined
Preposterousness of
Zombies": <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm"
target="_blank">https://ase.tufts.ed<wbr>u/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzom<wbr>bie.htm</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<blockquote
style="margin:0px
0px 0px
40px;border:none;padding:0px">
<div><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">Dennett
argues that
"when
philosophers
claim that
zombies are
conceivable,
they
invariably
underestimate
the task of
conception (or
imagination),
and end up
imagining
something that
violates their
own
definition".</span><sup
id="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-Dennett1991_3-1"
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1991-3"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[3]</a></sup><sup
id="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-Dennett1995_4-1"
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[4]</a></sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> He
coined the
term "zimboes"
– p-zombies
that have </span><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_logic"
title="Second-order logic"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"
target="_blank">second-order beliefs</a><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> –
to argue that
the idea of a
p-zombie is
incoherent;</span><sup
id="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-12"
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-12"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[12]</a></sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> "Zimboes
think</span><sup
style="line-height:1;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif">Z</sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> they
are conscious,
think</span><sup
style="line-height:1;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif">Z</sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> they
have qualia,
think</span><sup
style="line-height:1;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif">Z</sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> they
suffer pains –
they are just
'wrong'
(according to
this
lamentable
tradition), in
ways that
neither they
nor we could
ever
discover!".</span><sup
id="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-cite_ref-Dennett1995_4-2"
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215m_1977091709976841212gmail-reference"
style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:isolate;white-space:nowrap;font-size:11.2px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(11,0,128);background-image:none;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial;background-color:initial"
target="_blank">[4]</a></sup><span
style="color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"> </span><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I'm not sure,
however, whether
your thought
experiment sheds any
new light on the
concepts of
consciousness or
zombies. It seems
like it may be only
a reformulation of
the "Barber
Paradox", where the
self reflexivity is
a "power to detect
only
non-consciousness
things", aimed at
one's own
consciousness.</div>
<span
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Jason</div>
</font></span></div>
<div
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215HOEnZb">
<div
class="m_-502044300747996808m_-7144455735653961442m_-3864089206699251215h5">
<div
class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div
class="gmail_quote">On
Fri, Dec 30,
2016 at 11:13
AM, Stuart
LaForge <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:avant@sollegro.com" target="_blank">avant@sollegro.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Jason
Resch wrote:<br>
<Therefore,
if the brain
is a machine,
and is finite,
then an<br>
appropriately
programmed
computer can
perfectly
emulate any of
its<br>
behaviors.
Philosophers
generally fall
into one os
three camps,
on the<br>
question of
consciousness
and the
computational
theory of
mind:<br>
Non-computable
physicists [.
. .]Weak AI
proponents [.
. .]<br>
Computationalists.<br>
<br>
Which camp do
you consider
yourself
in?><br>
------------------------------<wbr>-------------<br>
<br>
As a general
rule, I prefer
not to go
camping with
philosophers
as I<br>
prefer the
rigor of
science and
mathematics.
But if I must
camp in that<br>
neck of the
woods, I would
set up my own
camp. I would
call it the<br>
Godelian camp
after Kurt
Godel. Since I
am a scientist
and not a<br>
philosopher, I
will explain
my views with
a thought
experiment
instead of<br>
an argument.<br>
<br>
Imagine if you
will a
solipsist.
Let's call him
Fred. Fred is
solopsist<br>
because he has
every reason
to believe he
lives alone in
a world of<br>
P-zombies.<br>
<br>
For the
uninitiated,
P-zombies are
philosophical
zombies.
Horrid beings<br>
that talk,
move, and act
like normal
folks but lack
any real
consciousness<br>
or
self-awareness.
They just go
through the
motions of
being
conscious but<br>
are not really
so.<br>
<br>
So ever since
Fred could
remember,
wherever he
looked, all he
could see<br>
were those
pesky
P-zombies.
They were
everywhere. He
could talk to
them,<br>
he could
interact with
them, and he
even married
one. And
because they
all<br>
act perfectly
conscious,
they would
fool most
anyone but
certainly not<br>
Fred.<br>
<br>
This was
because Fred
had, whether
you would
regard it as a
gift or curse,<br>
an unusual
ability. He
could always
see and
otherwise
sense
P-zombies but<br>
never normal
folk. Normal
folk were
always
invisible to
him and he
never<br>
could sense a
single one. So
he, being a
perfect
P-zombie
detector, came<br>
to believe
that he was
the only
normal person
on a planet
populated by<br>
P-zombies.<br>
<br>
Then one day
by chance he
happened to
glance in a
mirror . . .<br>
<br>
Does he see
himself?<br>
<br>
I want to hear
what the list
has to say
about this
before I give
my answer<br>
and my
interpretation
of what this
means for
strong AI and
the<br>
computational
theory of
mind.<br>
<br>
Stuart LaForge<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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