<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div></div><div><br></div><div><br>On 2 Jan. 2017, at 2:33 pm, Rafal Smigrodzki <<a href="mailto:rafal.smigrodzki@gmail.com">rafal.smigrodzki@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Jan 1, 2017 at 9:41 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" target="_blank">stathisp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><span class=""><div><br></div></span><div>I've said what I think happens if a digital simulation is repeated multiple times, but either way I don't understand why you think it makes any difference to the validity of computationalism</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>### Sorry, I missed your answer to that question. Can you briefly recapitulate it?</div></div></div></div></blockquote><br><div>I think if there is an exact duplication of a mental state it counts as only one mental state, which I tried to show with the example of parallel circuitry - if it is impossible to tell that there is a subjective difference, then there is no subjective difference. But in your original post on this you suggested that you thought that the ability to duplicate computations might be a mark against computationalism if exact duplication were impossible in biological brains due to continuum physics.</div></body></html>