<div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">I feel like
we’re repeatedly saying many things back and forth, but filing to communicate.<span> </span>I’m talking about two types of speaking.<span> </span>There is qualia blind speaking, and there is
speaking that is not qualia blind.<span> </span>You
seem to be thinking that all the speaking I’m talking about is qualia blind speaking,
and not understanding what I mean by speaking that is not qualia blind.<span> </span>You are not understanding what might enable
someone to be able to make a statement like: “My knowledge of red is like your
knowledge of green” in a way that is demonstrably provable to everyone both
objectively and subjectively, by various effing of the ineffable techniques.<span> </span>Once we can use binding systems, and eff to
each other what our conscious knowledge is qualitatively like, in ways that are
demonstrable to all, in both subjective and objective ways...<span> </span>Once we can do this, qualia inverts and qualia
zombies (those with abstracted knowledge that is devoid of any qualia) will
talk in very different ways when talking about what their knowledge is
qualitatively like.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">Another part
of the communication problem is that you seem to not fully understand the
implication or function of the “binding system” and the function it performs during
neural substitution.<span> </span>Also, you don’t
seem to understand the implication of being able to connect two brains with
binding systems, enabling two brains to eff the ineffable in the strongest
undeniable way.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt">I talk about
a simplistic binding system that is binding two elemental qualitative
representations together. <span> </span>When you replace
half the representations of knowledge with something that is qualitatively
different, in order for the binding system to behave the same, you must map the
new qualitatively different representations back to the original, for the
binding system to behave the same.<span> </span>And
when you finally replace the binding system, you must then invert all the
representations of knowledge being feed to it, before it can behave the same.<span> </span>This simplistic system behaves exactly as we
both predict, during the neural substitution. <span> </span>You seem to miss the fact that when you scale
this binding system up to include all of our diverse qualitative knowledge, you
must replace all of the knowledge representations being fed to the binding
system at the same time you replace the entire binding system.<span> </span>Again, so that the system will behave exactly
as you and I agree will happen, as the neural substitution progresses.<span> </span>I see no evidence that you fully understand the
implications of what I’m trying to describe with all this.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt"> </p>
</div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 8, 2017 at 11:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" target="_blank">stathisp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><div><br></div></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span class=""><div>On Thu., 9 Feb. 2017 at 8:34 am, Brent Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div></span><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div>Hi Stathis,<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><span class="">You said: "You talk about a 'detectably different behaviour awareness' but you agreed above that the observable behaviour is the same." But I only said it would be the same for external behavior that can be qualia blind, like, picking strawberries. If you include the internal behavior or the qualitative behavior of the knowledge itself that is required when asking questions like: "Does your knowledge of red behave like my redness, or like my greenness?" the behavior will be opposite for the invert.</span></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You're contradicting yourself here because you previously agreed that the *observable behaviour* will be the same. Speaking is *observable behaviour*. This is why I have been labouring the point and emphasising it with asterisks! So the subject will not only pick the strawberries, he will also say the strawberries look red exactly as they did before the substitution, even if all or half of his visual qualia associated with the strawberries have turned green, or disappeared altogether leaving him blind.</div><div><div class="h5"><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">And since you will be able to tell the difference when half of the glutamate has been replaced with glycene, before replacing the single awareness neuron, all the glycene that has been substituted for glutamate will have to be interpreted back to glutamate to be fed to the not yet replaced binding neuron that binds all the knowledge together to make one composite experience be the same. As you said, you will not be able to replace any of the glutamate, being fed to the binding system (as you will be aware of the difference), until you replace the entire binding system with something that knows how to interpret glycerine, and behave as if it was glutamate.<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">If the binding system that enables you to experience all your diverse knowledge as one compositely experience is more complex than one neuron, describe whatever different way you will achieve the singular composite experience. With that we will be able to predict in a falsifiable way, exactly when the qualia will dance (until you correctly provide interpretation hardware that will interpret that which is not red, as if it was), and you will only be able to finally reproduce the same external behavior when the entire binding system has been substituted - resulting in a detectable (via whatever binding system you use) qualia invert.<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div>Brent<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></div><div class="gmail_extra m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></div><div class="gmail_extra m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">On Wed, Feb 8, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <span class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" target="_blank">stathisp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></div><div class="gmail_extra m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><span class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">On Thu., 9 Feb. 2017 at 4:25 am, Brent Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div>Hi Stathis,<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">You said:<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">"Anyway, these are peripheral considerations to the central argument. I
have asked you to state what you think would happen if a substitution
were made with a component that has the same *observable behaviour* as
the neural component you think is essential for particular qualia."</div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">I thought I have answered this many times, so thanks for letting me know that I'm still not communicating. Let me try to clearly answer this specific question:<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">Absolutely, yes, according to a qualitative blind definition of "*observable behaviour*" the behaviour would be the same. That is why I always talk about two people behaving identically (finding and picking strawberries), yet they have inverted red/green qualia. Since the "*observable behaviour*" is qualia blind, it sees the identical behaviour of the two people behaving the same, but it is blind to the different behaviors of the inverted qualitative awareness.</div></div></div></blockquote><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></span><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">If changing the glutamate receptors changes red qualia to green, then changing the receptors in half the brain should invert the qualia that half of the brain is responsible for. So if the subject sees a field of strawberries after the change, one half if the strawberries will look red and the other half will look green. Yet the subject will not notice a change, and will tell you that all the strawberries look red, just as before. Or to change the experiment slightly, as a result of some neural substitution all of the visual qualia disappear, but the subject doesn't notice, continues to describe red strawberries as before, and is able to pick the strawberries as before. Would you still insist that the qualia have been inverted or eliminated even though the subject can notice no internal difference and the experimenter can notice no external difference? In what sense is a change in qualia a change if there is neither a subjective nor objective difference?</div><span class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">When you include in the system, the behaviour that is the redness awareness, and the detectably different behaviour that is the greenness awareness - the external behaviour is the same, but they are finding the strawberry for inverted behavioural reasons or they are finding the strawberry for qualitatively inverted initial causal behaviours.</div></div></div></blockquote><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></span><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">You talk about a "detectably different behaviour awareness" but you agreed above that the observable behaviour is the same.</div><span class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">Again, what is required is some well defined or testable way to qualitatively eff ineffable qualities. What makes something ineffable is the fact that an abstracted representation like the word red, does not have a redness quality. So without having some kind of way to know how to interpret an abstracted representation to get back to the original quality of the composite knowledge being observed to know the intended qualitative meaning of a word like red, one remains qualia blind.<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">So, you must have some kind of minimal awareness behavioural requirements like including two qualitatively diverse representations of knowledge, and a way to bind them together to form a composite qualitative conscious awareness. This diverse composite qualitative awareness behaviour needs to be the behavioural mechanism that enables the system to answer questions like: "No, my qualitative knowledge of red is more like your qualitative knowledge of green."</div></div></div></blockquote><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></span><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">That would be difficult, if I can't even notice when my own qualia change or disappear!</div><span class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">There are many testable theoretical ways one might achieve this kind of detectably diverse qualitative composite awareness with materialist theories. I only use glutamate, because it is the simplest and most straight forward to understand. I've tried to find some functional way the behaviour of redness knowledge could have distinguishable from greenness behavioural properties, but not only can I not do it, it seems impossible. You said: "I don't see why you should consider this 'miraculous'". To me, if it is impossible to come up with any theoretically testable way to to do this kind of detectable effing of the ineffable within a functionalist theory, then the only conclusion a reasonable person can come to is that it is some kind of "miracle." In order for one to not think it is simply magic, someone must falsify the belief that it can't be done, by providing any kind of theoretically possible way to observe qualitatively diverse awareness behaviour in a detectable effing of the ineffable way.</div></div></div></blockquote><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></span><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">You've said you don't find it problematic that qualia might be associated with a substance but you do find it problematic that they might be associated with a process. I don't see why you would have this intuition.</div><span class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095HOEnZb m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><font class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" color="#888888"><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095m_1810488617786107973gmail_msg m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div></div></div></blockquote></font></span></div></div><span class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862m_-2817513297730353095HOEnZb m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><font class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" color="#888888"><div class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">-- <br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></div><div data-smartmail="gmail_signature" class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">Stathis Papaioannou</div>
</font></span><br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"></blockquote></div></div><div class="gmail_extra m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg"><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br class="m_-3233888783271018417m_3159009692097725862gmail_msg">
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