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<p>Hi Stathis,</p>
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<p>Thanks for expressing all this so concisely. I hope I can be as
concise so we can make progress with this. I think the key point
in our misunderstanding is captured by you with this:<br>
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<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/14/2017 5:02 AM, Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:CAH=2ypXrqYqMn7keGMe3ojzKTND3bJT+p3Wj36JTi3APUZH5xA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
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<div class="gmail_msg">You're missing the point when you talk
about "qualitative representation". *Observable behaviour* is
the only thing necessary to consider in order to replicate
*observable behaviour*. The argument is that if you ignore
qualia and just replicate *observable behaviour* then the
qualia will also necessarily be replicated. I gave an example
of this which I believe is clear (tell me if not) with the
glutamate/glycine swap.</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_extra gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
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<br>
Yes, your answer was very clear. I agree with most of what you are
saying, but we both believe that the other is missing the point.
You first want to focus on: "If you ignore qualia and just replicate
*observable behavior* then the qualia will also necessarily be
replicated." But even if I do agree with this, from how I see
things, it is still missing or removing some important
functionality. In the past you never want to move beyond this,
because or until this has been settled. The problem is, I can't
point out the required functionality being removed, until you first
understand and agree with some other things in the qualitative
theory. So, this time, could you move beyond that, at least for a
bit and digest this initial description, then given that
understanding (if you agree), I'll be able to point out the reasons
I can't yet accept this functionalist way of doing neuro
substitution.<br>
<br>
Let's start on the subjective side of things, again, with our simple
3 element system. The system is experiencing both redness and
greenness as a unified composite qualitative experience. So, there
are two qualitative representations of knowledge and there is a 3rd
part of the system that is binding the two different representations
into one composite experience. The fact that the system is aware of
both of these qualitative representations at the same time, is the
critical base functionality on which the comparison system is
derived - outputting an indicator that could lead to one saying they
are consciously aware that they are qualitatively the same or not.<br>
<br>
So, given that we subjectively know that, would you agree with the
following? There must be something that is performing the
functionality of the redness experience, and there is something that
is performing the functionality of the greenness, and there is a 3rd
element that is performing the function of binding these two
representations of information together to make a composite
experience - enabling the 3rd awareness/comparison neuron to
indicate whether they are the same or not.<br>
<br>
You seem loath to want to go there, instead, first, wanting to first
focus on: "If you ignore qualia and just replicate *observable
behavior* then the qualia will also necessarily be replicated." But
this ignoring of qualia is the problem, and you end up removing the
most important parts of the functionality we want to observe as we
neuro substitute.<br>
<br>
Let's compare this subjective way of observing things to the
objective way of observing things, and for the time being assume it
is glutamate that has or performs the redness experience
functionality, and it is glycene that performs the greenness
experience functionality. Given that, with subjective observation,
we would experience a redness detector and with objective
observation we would see a glutamate detector. So, what the 3rd
part of the system (we are assuming it is a single neuron for
simplicity's sake) is basically an objective and subjective
comparison system - outputting an indicator as to whether the two
representations of knowledge are functioning the same or not. This
functionality derived from the way it binds together awareness of
the two representations of knowledge to make one composite
qualitative experience.<br>
<br>
Now, when you say you replace glutamate with glycene, and you
replace the glutamate receptor with a glycene receptor, then assert
that the comparison neuron will behave the same, you are removing
the important comparison functionality, or simply falsifying the
theory that it is only glutamate that reliably performs the redness
function (if so, necessitating that it be something else, yet to be
discovered, that is reliably performing the redness functionality we
know so well). Both representations of knowledge are now the same
qualitative glycene (or the greenness functionality), yet you are
asserting that the output is still indicating that the two are
different. This removal of the correct functionality as you do the
neuro substitution, is why I can't accept your line of reasoning,
along with it being the source of all the "hard" problems.<br>
<br>
If you assume the qualia experience functionality will arise or
emerge in some other way or some other abstracted level, then it is
this other abstracted location of qualia that can't be ignored, and
must be able to be reliably compared via composite awareness. I am
talking about doing a neuro substitution at this level, with the
required qualia comparison functionality, not the level you are
talking about, where the qualia being compared is being removed. If
you are going to claim that a comparison functionality can be
constructed out of this simplistic lower level (I don't see how this
could be done), then provide at least one theoretically possible
description of such (as I have done with glutamate, glycene, and a
binder neuron to make a composite experience), and with that,
whatever it is, it will be obvious what happens, and why, as the
neural substitution occurs.<br>
<br>
If you do the neural substitutuion on a system that, instead of
ignoring and removing qualia comparison, you provide any testable
theoretical method of really doing the function of qualitative
comparison, it can be obvious what is going on during the neural
substitution. Let's do this by having two sets of such identical 3
element qualitative comparison systems, one that doesn't change and
is for constant reference comparison purposes, and the other one is
the one we will perform the neuro substitution on. We will bind
these two systems with the same provided binding system in a meta
comparison functioning system which will monitor and compare all the
qualities, as the neural substitution takes place on one of the
systems, so you can prove to everyone, both objectively and
subjectively, exactly what it is going on, and why both of the 3
element systems are always indicating: "It is red" even though one
is the qualia invert of the other after one of the neuro
substitution steps. If you duplicate all this *observable
behavior*, including the meta awareness of what is going on with
both systems, there will be no hard problems when it is neuro
substituted since you are not removing the most important
*observable behavior*.<br>
<br>
Does that help?<br>
<br>
Brent Allsop<br>
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