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<p>Hi Stathis.</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Dang, not quite communicating yet. You keep saying this over and
over again. I, also, over and over again in reply, try to
describe the many problems that I see with this. Thanks to all
your help, I'm hopefully getting better each time. But you never
provide any evidence that you are trying to understand the
problems I'm trying to describe. All you seem to do is repeat
over and over again with your overly simplistic system that A: the
brain is a system made of parts, that B: each part interacts with
neighboring parts, and finally C: if you replace one part with a
different part that interacts with its neighbors in the same way,
then the system as a whole will behave in the same way.<br>
</p>
<p>In addition to all the "hard" (as in impossible) problems that
result with your insufficient swapping steps, there is this: I
know I (there I didn't say "we", are you happy John?) can be
conscious of 1: redness and 2: greenness at the same time, as a
composite experience. And 3: using this composite awareness of
each of these qualitatively different functionalities express that
they are different. With the system that you describe, and the
simplistic way you do the do the neural substitution on "parts"
with minimal interactions with their neighbors, it isn't possible
to do the 3 above described functionalities without completely
ignoring them. You must do a substitution on some kind of system
that has a reasonable chance of modeling the 3 mentioned
functionalities adequately to be able to make any kind of claim
that you know what is going on, phenomenally, with the neural
substitution. Plain and simple, your system is completely qualia
blind, like all the experimental neuro science being done today
that I know of.<br>
</p>
<p>If you do a neuro substitution on any system which does have
sufficient detail to at least model these 3 necessary functions
(my simplified glutamate theory for example), there will be no
"hard problems", and everything we subjectively know about how we
can be aware of diverse composite qualitative experiences, will be
sufficiently modeled. We will be able to understand why the
simplistic neural substitution of your system is qualia blind and
leads some to think there are "hard problems". We will be able to
say we understand how these composite subjective experiences work
and why, both subjectively and objectively, as the neuro
substitution progresses.<br>
</p>
<p>Brent</p>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/17/2017 10:21 AM, Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAH=2ypWhA4iqxZyhh3GhM9KoGp9JmSSCGCP2JhdkD=-X_O+X9Q@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 17 February 2017 at 16:04, Brent
Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p><br>
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<p>Hi Stathis,</p>
<p>You obviously know more than I know about how neuro
transmitters work. Thanks for helping me to better
understand this type of stuff.</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>As I said, if what you say is true, then it merely
falsifies the prediction that glutamate is what
performs the redness quality we experience.</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>It falsifies the theory that *any* particular substrate
or physics is necessary for the redness quality, or any
other quale. The general argument is this: <br>
<br>
A. The brain is a system made of parts.<br>
</div>
<div>B. Each part interacts with neighbouring parts.<br>
</div>
<div>C. If you replace one part with a different part that
interacts with its neighbours in the same way, then the
system as a whole will behave in the same way.<br>
</div>
<div>D. If the part you replaced were essential for qualia,
then the qualia would change but the behaviour would not.<br>
</div>
<div>E. Think about what it would mean if (D) were true.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Note that this does not say anything about whether
qualia can be detected - only that qualia cannot be due to
a particular substrate or physics.<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<p>That is why I always resort to talking about the
"simplified theoretical world". In the simplified
world, there are only 3 colors: red, green and white.
And in that simplified world, glutamate has the
redness quality, glycene has the greenness quality,
aspartate that has the whiteness quality, and it is
one neuron that binds them all together, so you can be
aware of them all at once. And for Ben's sake: in
this simplified world there are "red and green signals
in the optic nerve" that can be easily inverted.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>The goal is to make a very hard topic a little more
simple. If one can understand the qualitative theory
I'm trying to describe, and how neuro substitutuion
works with no "hard" problems, and how people in such
a simplified world can "eff the ineffable" by properly
qualitatively interpreting abstracted observation
knowledge - then they should be able to apply the same
qualitative theory in the more complex real world.
All that is required is to test for, and find,
experimentally, in the real world, what it is that
takes the place of glutamate, glycene, aspartate, and
the single neuron binding system. That job is for the
experimentalists to do, once they understand how to
test for it by no longer being qualia blind (by miss
interpreting abstracted observation information as
they all do now) and effing the ineffable by
interpreting what they are observing, qualitatively
correctly.</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Ben, I don't know if it will help, but I describe the
"simplified theoretical world" in more detail, in this
talk: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="m_-8405532388119358252moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4"
target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?<wbr>v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a>
. But it may not help if you believe there are not
elemental qualities out of which our brain builds or
paints composite qualitative experiences with. It
sounds like you and John Clark agree on this? Do you
also, like John, believe that effing the ineffable is
impossible, and thereby, qualia will forever not be
approachable via objective or sharable science?<span
class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
</font></span></p>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"> <br>
<p>Brent<br>
</p>
</font></span></div>
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