<div dir="ltr">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Hi all you thankfully very persistent, and patiently helpful people,</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>James is probably going to hate me for this, but I've again CCed
him in this conversation, as I again think that after dozens of
more iterations here since he was last CCed, we might have achieved a breakthrough (and
this time I'm more sure than the last 100 or so times I thought this! ;) and I couldn't have done it without
all your help. If you guys think you've told me your ever improving arguments
too many times, James has given me Stathis' nero substitution argument what seems to be
hundreds of times in ever improving ways over the span of many years. Via James continued prodding he helped me realize that from the subjective side, you need to
do something like distinguish redness from greenness, and on the objective side, the
same thing will appear to be something like distinguishing between the qualitative nature of something physical like (not, see below) glutamate and
(not, see below) glycene neuro transmitters. On the subjective side, all we know of not glutamate, is
it's redness quality. So thanks, everyone, for all your patient
help over so many years with all this.</p><p><br></p><p>Oh, and I've CCed the brilliant Steven Lehar, as I think he'll get a kick out of this. He was the first person that helped me understand how all this knowledge in the brain stuff could work back in the 80s. He may have some better proposed theories about what qualitative not glutamate and not glycene may be, including what the binding neuron could be. Steve, for more context, you may want to watch this 15 minute video to know what I mean by the simplified theoretical world that only has 3 colors: redness(glutamate) grenness(glycene) and whitness(aspartate): <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?<wbr>v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a> where I describe how to eff the ineffable in the simplest (as far as I know) possible theoretical way.</p><p><br>
</p>
<p>"<i>The most certain way to succeed is always to try just one
more time.</i>" Thomas A. Edison</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Ben is definitely getting close with this realization he described below, but he
doesn't quite have it all. The external behavior, that is the
ability to verbally report (as in outside the black box behavior)
qualitative differences inside the black box is possible and
important too.</p>
<br>
So, let me more rigorously define what I mean by qualitative
discern-ability function (which includes something that could lead to verbal report ability). To reproduce qualitative discern-ability in any theoretical testable way, there needs to be at
least 2 qualitative representation of knowledge or knowing. When
you talk to me, you should use simple words like glutamate(redness) and glycene(greenness) to represent this objective and subjective qualitative functionality representing knowledge (because I'm not too smart, and need a simplified (though evidently this particular example theory is already falsified in some people's minds) way to comprehend this kind of qualitative theory).
But when you talk to Ben and John, Ben describes it this way:<br>
<br>
<i><<<<</i><i><br>
</i><i>Not some/thing/.
</i><i><br>
</i><i>
</i><i><br>
</i><i>I don't think knowledge is a 'thing', it's a process. As John
K Clark would put it, knowledge isn't a noun, it's more like a
verb or an adjective. This means that there is no such thing as 'a
knowledge', but there is such a thing as 'knowing'.
</i><i><br>
</i><i>
</i><i><br>
</i><i>More conventionally put, knowledge (and experience) is an
information-process.
</i><i><br>
</i><i>
</i><i><br>
</i><i>So your statement above could be reworded: "If you know
something, there must be an information process that is that
knowing".
</i><i><br>
</i><i>
</i><i>>>>></i><br>
<br>
So, for others I'll call it "not glutamate". Ben should take "not
glutamate" to be a process of knowing redness, at least until the neuro scientists falsify his particular theory. And "Not glycene" is
the process of knowing greenness. It must be possible to know what
qualitative distinguishable functionality is with this, on the
detectable objective side, and it is important to have the ability to tell the qualitative difference between
redness and greenness on the subjective side. This qualitative discern-ability of the
knowledge process is what gives the system the ability to
objectively distinguish between knowledge of strawberries and knowledge of
leaves (and to verbally report qualitative difference). For Ben, the redness functionality is the process of knowing redness which is
objectively detect-ably different than the process of knowing
greenness. This can be true, even if it isn't possible to truly
eff the difference - John would probably say you must change from Ben or John to know all
the subtle differences between redness and greenness, and you must
become Brent, to fully detect Brent's redness and greenness. While this particular theory is harder, it's not objectively detect-ably impossible.<br>
<br>
And finally, you need a third function which can be testibly
proposed to be some kind of binding system or maybe a binding neuron. Or maybe, if you must maybe call it a binding -
not a neuron. Whatever it is test-ably theoretically proposed to be,
it is the ability for the system to be aware of and report, or fire, only when
at least 2 different objective and subjective things are qualitatively different. It has the ability to combine simple or elemental qualia to produce the diversely complex composite qualia or conscious knowledge required for powerful natural intelligence.<br>
<br>
I'm not quite sure what Stathis and James, or anyone that champions "functionality" based qualia because of the neuro substitutuion argument, should think of "not
glutamate" as. They will always assert that it will "arise" some
place at some "functional" level, outside of wherever you propose to do the physical substitution test. They have a little trick that will always enable them to neuro substitute out any proposed physical theoretical claim of qualitative and physical discern-ability, no matter where you propose to test for it in the system. As far as I can see, the only possibility they have is that it "arises" in some impossible to objectively detect (else they will swap it out using this little trick) "magic" or inconceivably "hard" way.<br><br>Stathis gave me the idea of how to describe and point out
this little trick, when he used a glutamate receptor, combined with
glutamate, to keep the "binding neuron from functioning the same"
before and after substituting glutamate (and it's glutamate
receptor) with glycene (and it's glycene receptor).<br>
<br>
So, you can start with a system that is detecting the qualitative difference between not glutamate and not glycene and the binding neuron is firing, indicating they are different. When Stathis does the neural substitutuion of not glutamate (and
a not glutamate receptor) with not glycene (and a not glycene
receptor), even though you now have not glycene chemically reacting in both of the
input synapses of the binding neuron, it is incorrectly doing the "same
observable behavior" and reporting that they are different, even
though they are both the same not glycene (and not glycene
receptor). The problem is, if this is true, you have removed the
necessary functional ability of the system to fire correctly and report qualitative
discernment of not glutamate and not glycene. If you preserve the
necessary qualitative discernible functionality (and the ability to
verbally report such) with your theory, the system must report the qualitative
difference between not glutamate and not glycene. Hence this little
"trick" is a functional fallacy since it is removing the very qualitative
discern-ability you need from the system, no matter where you propose it might testably physically resides. No matter what you theorize that
not glutamate and not glycene may be, and how it might be physically distinguished, Stathis and James will attempt to use some physical trick like not glutamate receptors and not glycene receptors to
remove the necessary objective qualitative discern-ability of the
system - resulting in all the "hard" problems and the removal of any objective ability to detect or discern it.<br>
<br>
Now, if you can preserve the correct qualitative discern-ability
function, theoretically possibly by physically or chemically coupling the two synapses in some way giving
the binding neuron's ability to be aware of when one synapse has the
reference quality key like not glycene functionality and the lock like not glycene receptor functionality and the other synapse
has either the same or the not glutamate and a not glutamate
receptor, so the system can be aware of, and correctly report whether they lock and key like functionality are qualitatively different, then notice that by preserving the qualitative discern-ability function and firing correctly when they are different, and not firing when they are the same the "hard" problems go away -
and you can now objectively detect not glutamate, and distinguish
this from not glycene and there by objectively eff the ineffable - if science is able to prove your proposed not glutamate and not glycene, to be the real reliable for everyone and every subjective computer thing. Proving which theory is THE ONE, will be left to the experimental neuroscientists, who will be able to finally know how to effingly test for this stuff, once they understand this qualitative theory, how to properly qualitatively interpret what they are observing, to know how to not be qualia blind as most of them now do simply because they are miss interpreting the abstracted information about what they are observing, and be able to eff the ineffable. I bet this will happen relatively rapidly, once experimentalists understand this kind of qualitative discern ability theory, and how to properly qualitatively interpret what they are observing.<br></div><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<br>
<br>
So, does this help? Any questions? Do we need to keep going? Is there any simpler way to describe any of this kind of qualitative discern-ability theory so that more neuro scientists can more easily relate to it?<br>
<br>
<br>
Brent Allsop<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_2371438666313423721moz-cite-prefix">On 2/20/2017 1:59 PM, Ben wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">John K
Clark wrote:
<br>
<br>
"if internal changes to a part produce no changes in the way that
part interacts with other parts then they make no change to the
overall behaviour of the system"
<br>
<br>
Aha, I think I see now where the difference of opinion lies.
<br>
<br>
He can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Brent is of the
opinion that it /does/ matter what goes on inside the black boxes
of interacting parts, whereas the rest of us don't, as long as the
interactions remain the same.
<br>
<br>
I hope I'm right, because this suddenly makes sense of what Brent
has been saying.
<br>
<br>
Not that it's correct, I think it's profoundly incorrect, and I
think there are very good logical and empirical reasons for
thinking this, but at least it's understandable now.
<br>
<br>
Thanks, John.
<br>
<br>
<br>
Ben Zaiboc
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________
<br>
extropy-chat mailing list
<br>
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<br>
<a class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_2371438666313423721moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailm<wbr>an/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a>
<br>
<br><br><br><span class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-im">On 17 February 2017 at 16:04, Brent Allsop <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br></span><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Hi Stathis,</p>
<p>You obviously know more than I know about how neuro transmitters
work. Thanks for helping me to better understand this type of
stuff.</p><span class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-im">
<p><br>
</p>
<p>As I said, if what you say is true, then it merely falsifies the
prediction that glutamate is what performs the redness quality we
experience.</p></span></div></blockquote><div>It falsifies the
theory that *any* particular substrate or physics is necessary for the
redness quality, or any other quale. The general argument is this: <br><br>A. The brain is a system made of parts.<br></div><div>B. Each part interacts with neighbouring parts.<br></div><div>C.
If you replace one part with a different part that interacts with its
neighbours in the same way, then the system as a whole will behave in
the same way.<br></div><div>D. If the part you replaced were essential for qualia, then the qualia would change but the behaviour would not.<br></div><div>E. Think about what it would mean if (D) were true.<br><br></div><div>Note
that this does not say anything about whether qualia can be detected -
only that qualia cannot be due to a particular substrate or physics.<br></div>
<p>That is why I always resort to talking about the "simplified
theoretical world". In the simplified world, there are only 3
colors: red, green and white. And in that simplified world,
glutamate has the redness quality, glycene has the greenness
quality, aspartate that has the whiteness quality, and it is one
neuron that binds them all together, so you can be aware of them
all at once. And for Ben's sake: in this simplified world there
are "red and green signals in the optic nerve" that can be easily
inverted.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>The goal is to make a very hard topic a little more simple. If
one can understand the qualitative theory I'm trying to describe,
and how neuro substitutuion works with no "hard" problems, and how
people in such a simplified world can "eff the ineffable" by
properly qualitatively interpreting abstracted observation
knowledge - then they should be able to apply the same qualitative
theory in the more complex real world. All that is required is to
test for, and find, experimentally, in the real world, what it is
that takes the place of glutamate, glycene, aspartate, and the
single neuron binding system. That job is for the
experimentalists to do, once they understand how to test for it by
no longer being qualia blind (by miss interpreting abstracted
observation information as they all do now) and effing the
ineffable by interpreting what they are observing, qualitatively
correctly.</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Ben, I don't know if it will help, but I describe the "simplified
theoretical world" in more detail, in this talk:
<a class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?<wbr>v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a> . But it may not help
if you believe there are not elemental qualities out of which our
brain builds or paints composite qualitative experiences with. It
sounds like you and John Clark agree on this? Do you also, like
John, believe that effing the ineffable is impossible, and
thereby, qualia will forever not be approachable via objective or
sharable science?<span class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
</font></span></p><span class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<br>
<p>Brent</p></font></span>
<p><br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-cite-prefix">On 2/15/2017 8:23 PM, Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div>On Wed., 15 Feb. 2017 at 4:48 pm, Brent Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<p class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg"><br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">Hi
Stathis,</p>
<p class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg"><br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">Thanks
for expressing all this so concisely. I hope I can be as
concise so we can make progress with this. I think the
key point in our misunderstanding is captured by you
with this:<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
</p>
</div>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<div class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536m_6245842760609192653moz-cite-prefix m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">On
2/14/2017 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<div class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<div class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">You're
missing the point when you talk about "qualitative
representation". *Observable behaviour* is the only
thing necessary to consider in order to replicate
*observable behaviour*. The argument is that if you
ignore qualia and just replicate *observable
behaviour* then the qualia will also necessarily be
replicated. I gave an example of this which I
believe is clear (tell me if not) with the
glutamate/glycine swap.</div>
<div class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_extra m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<div class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg"><br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
</div>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
Yes, your answer was very clear. I agree with most of
what you are saying, but we both believe that the other is
missing the point. You first want to focus on: "If you
ignore qualia and just replicate *observable behavior*
then the qualia will also necessarily be replicated." But
even if I do agree with this, from how I see things, it is
still missing or removing some important functionality.
In the past you never want to move beyond this, because or
until this has been settled. The problem is, I can't
point out the required functionality being removed, until
you first understand and agree with some other things in
the qualitative theory. So, this time, could you move
beyond that, at least for a bit and digest this initial
description, then given that understanding (if you agree),
I'll be able to point out the reasons I can't yet accept
this functionalist way of doing neuro substitution.<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
Let's start on the subjective side of things, again, with
our simple 3 element system. The system is experiencing
both redness and greenness as a unified composite
qualitative experience. So, there are two qualitative
representations of knowledge and there is a 3rd part of
the system that is binding the two different
representations into one composite experience. The fact
that the system is aware of both of these qualitative
representations at the same time, is the critical base
functionality on which the comparison system is derived -
outputting an indicator that could lead to one saying they
are consciously aware that they are qualitatively the same
or not.<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
So, given that we subjectively know that, would you agree
with the following? There must be something that is
performing the functionality of the redness experience,
and there is something that is performing the
functionality of the greenness, and there is a 3rd element
that is performing the function of binding these two
representations of information together to make a
composite experience - enabling the 3rd
awareness/comparison neuron to indicate whether they are
the same or not.<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
You seem loath to want to go there, instead, first,
wanting to first focus on: "If you ignore qualia and just
replicate *observable behavior* then the qualia will also
necessarily be replicated." But this ignoring of qualia
is the problem, and you end up removing the most important
parts of the functionality we want to observe as we neuro
substitute.<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
Let's compare this subjective way of observing things to
the objective way of observing things, and for the time
being assume it is glutamate that has or performs the
redness experience functionality, and it is glycene that
performs the greenness experience functionality. Given
that, with subjective observation, we would experience a
redness detector and with objective observation we would
see a glutamate detector. So, what the 3rd part of the
system (we are assuming it is a single neuron for
simplicity's sake) is basically an objective and
subjective comparison system - outputting an indicator as
to whether the two representations of knowledge are
functioning the same or not. This functionality derived
from the way it binds together awareness of the two
representations of knowledge to make one composite
qualitative experience.<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
Now, when you say you replace glutamate with glycene, and
you replace the glutamate receptor with a glycene
receptor, then assert that the comparison neuron will
behave the same, you are removing the important comparison
functionality, or simply falsifying the theory that it is
only glutamate that reliably performs the redness function
(if so, necessitating that it be something else, yet to be
discovered, that is reliably performing the redness
functionality we know so well). Both representations of
knowledge are now the same qualitative glycene (or the
greenness functionality), yet you are asserting that the
output is still indicating that the two are different.
This removal of the correct functionality as you do the
neuro substitution, is why I can't accept your line of
reasoning, along with it being the source of all the
"hard" problems.</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I started answering point by point but I think it is best
to just respond to this point, because it seems that you are
ignoring what neurotransmitters actually do.
Neurotransmitters are small molecules that are released from
the presynaptic neuron and bind to the appropriate receptor
on the postsynaptic neuron. Receptors are proteins in the
cell membrane which have special sites to which
neurotransmitters attach non-covalently (without forming a
permanent chemical bond), sometimes described as being
analogous to a lock and key mechanism. As a result of this
interaction the receptor protein is pulled into a different
shape, leading to a cascade of events in the neuron. With
so-called ionotropic receptors the binding of the
neurotransmitter opens up channels in the receptor allowing
ions to move into and out of the neuron: sodium, potassium
or calcium ions. Since ions are charged entities, this
changes the voltage across the cell membrane, which can then
change the shape of transmembrane proteins called
voltage-gated ion channels, which can then cause a spike in
voltage to propagates down the axon of the neuron, and
ultimately to cause neurotransmitter release at the end of
the axon, triggering the next neuron in the chain.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Now, if we swap glutamate for glycine in this setup it
won't work - glycine will not bind to the glutamate
receptors. If we swap the glutamate receptors for glycine
receptors it won't work - glutamate will not bind to glycine
receptors. But if we swap glutamate for glycine and
glutamate receptors for glycine receptors, and the glycine
receptors otherwise have similar properties to the glutamate
receptors (open similar ion channels when glycine binds),
then the neuron will behave in the same way in regard to
when it will fire, and hence all the downstream neurons and
the muscles will behave in the same way, and the subject
will behave in the same way. "The subject will behave in the
same way" means, among other things, that the subject will
say in a before/after comparison that the strawberries look
red to him in exactly the same way as they did before. If
you don't agree with this, then please point out where in
the detailed chain of events I have described I have missed
something and explain how the glutamate/glycine swap
(leaving everything else in the brain the same) can possibly
lead to the subject saying that his qualia have changed.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
If you assume the qualia experience functionality will
arise or emerge in some other way or some other abstracted
level, then it is this other abstracted location of qualia
that can't be ignored, and must be able to be reliably
compared via composite awareness. I am talking about
doing a neuro substitution at this level, with the
required qualia comparison functionality, not the level
you are talking about, where the qualia being compared is
being removed. If you are going to claim that a
comparison functionality can be constructed out of this
simplistic lower level (I don't see how this could be
done), then provide at least one theoretically possible
description of such (as I have done with glutamate,
glycene, and a binder neuron to make a composite
experience), and with that, whatever it is, it will be
obvious what happens, and why, as the neural substitution
occurs.<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
If you do the neural substitutuion on a system that,
instead of ignoring and removing qualia comparison, you
provide any testable theoretical method of really doing
the function of qualitative comparison, it can be obvious
what is going on during the neural substitution. Let's do
this by having two sets of such identical 3 element
qualitative comparison systems, one that doesn't change
and is for constant reference comparison purposes, and the
other one is the one we will perform the neuro
substitution on. We will bind these two systems with the
same provided binding system in a meta comparison
functioning system which will monitor and compare all the
qualities, as the neural substitution takes place on one
of the systems, so you can prove to everyone, both
objectively and subjectively, exactly what it is going on,
and why both of the 3 element systems are always
indicating: "It is red" even though one is the qualia
invert of the other after one of the neuro substitution
steps. If you duplicate all this *observable behavior*,
including the meta awareness of what is going on with both
systems, there will be no hard problems when it is neuro
substituted since you are not removing the most important
*observable behavior*.<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
Does that help?</div>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg"><br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
Brent Allsop<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
<br class="m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
</div>
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