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    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Hi Stathis,</p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Dang, I really thought this iteration of the argument, if you
      fully understood it, would at least have some effect on your
      insistence that the neuro substitution argument is not completely
      flawed.<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>These statements of yours seem obviously completely wrong and
      indicate you still don't fully understand what I'm trying to say
      about qualitative discern-ability and how the binding neuron can't
      work the way you say describe, and how it must behave in the way I
      say it needs to - to achieve the necessary subjective or objective
      qualitative discern-ability functionality: <br>
    </p>
    <p><i>"the hypothesis is self-contradictory, since if it were true
        it would lead to a subject whose qualia could change in a gross
        way, but who would never be able to notice the change." </i><br>
    </p>
    <p>and</p>
    <p><i>"if you are right and qualia are due to a certain brain
        structure, then qualia do not exist"</i></p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Could you describe why you think these are in a little more
      detail, or provide an example, as I don't see how anyone could
      think either of these could be true?</p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>And could you tell me if the most recent description of my
      qualitative discern-ability theory had any effect, whatsoever, on
      the way you think about the neuro substitution and the qualitative
      nature of consciousness?  Do you understand what I mean by
      objective and subjective qualitative discern-ability are necessary
      given what we (I, sorry John) subjectively experience of
      qualitative knowledge?  If you don't understand it, probably
      nobody else will be able to understand it. :(  I guess we're not
      done, after all.  Oh well, thanks for still not giving up on
      trying to understand what I'm trying to say, and or helping me to
      better understand the way you think.  I sure don't want to have to
      resort to just waiting for the experimental neuroscientists to
      prove to us which of us closer to the true theory of the
      qualitative nature of consciousness.<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <p>Brent<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/21/2017 4:03 PM, Stathis
      Papaioannou wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAH=2ypUp_XY_scz1PvnuaJ0-7buBVsyNn4-yJFWU6fKqQ3_RhA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
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          <p><span style="font-size:small">On 22 February 2017 at 08:56,
              Brent Allsop </span><span dir="ltr"
              style="font-size:small"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span><span
              style="font-size:small"> wrote:</span><br>
          </p>
        </div>
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          <div class="gmail_quote">
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                  <p><br>
                  </p>
                  <p>Hi all you thankfully very persistent, and
                    patiently helpful people,</p>
                  <p><br>
                  </p>
                  <p>James is probably going to hate me for this, but
                    I've again CCed him in this conversation, as I again
                    think that after dozens of more iterations here
                    since he was last CCed, we might have achieved a
                    breakthrough (and this time I'm more sure than the
                    last 100 or so times I thought this! ;)  and I
                    couldn't have done it without all your help.  If you
                    guys think you've told me your ever improving
                    arguments too many times, James has given me
                    Stathis' nero substitution argument what seems to be
                    hundreds of times in ever improving ways over the
                    span of many years.  Via James continued prodding he
                    helped me realize that from the subjective side, you
                    need to do something like distinguish redness from
                    greenness, and on the objective side, the same thing
                    will appear to be something like distinguishing
                    between the qualitative nature of something physical
                    like (not, see below) glutamate and (not, see below)
                    glycene neuro transmitters.  On the subjective side,
                    all we know of not glutamate, is it's redness
                    quality.  So thanks, everyone, for all your patient
                    help over so many years with all this.</p>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div>Perhaps there is a problem here with the way you are
              arguing. I think you are proposing that glutamate has a
              redness quality (or if not glutamate, some other structure
              in the brain). It is OK to propose this as a hypothesis,
              but then in scientific discourse the hypothesis is
              challenged. My challenge is that the hypothesis is
              self-contradictory, since if it were true it would lead to
              a subject whose qualia could change in a gross way, but
              who would never be able to notice the change. This is
              self-contradictory because, whatever else we might say
              about qualia, being able to notice our own qualia and
              notice when they change is a necessary part of the qualia
              deal; if you get rid of this aspect of qualia then you may
              as well say that qualia do not exist. In other words, if
              you are right and qualia are due to a certain brain
              structure, then qualia do not exist. You say below that
              functionalism leads to the "hard problem" of
              consciousness, which you don't like. I don't see how it
              leads to the "hard problem" any more than
              structure-specific qualia, but even if it does, that's
              just too bad - because structure-specific qualia leads to
              the elimination of the qualia that you and I know we have.
              This argument is independent of any particular details of
              brain function; it could have validly been made in a
              bygone era before the existence of neurons was even
              suspected.</div>
            <div> </div>
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                  <p>Oh, and I've CCed the brilliant Steven Lehar, as I
                    think he'll get a kick out of this.  He was the
                    first person that helped me understand how all this
                    knowledge in the brain stuff could work back in the
                    80s.  He may have some better proposed theories
                    about what qualitative not glutamate and not glycene
                    may be, including what the binding neuron could be. 
                    Steve, for more context, you may want to watch this
                    15 minute video to know what I mean by the
                    simplified theoretical world that only has 3 colors:
                    redness(glutamate) grenness(glycene) and
                    whitness(aspartate): <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4"
                      target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?<wbr>v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a>
                    where I describe how to eff the ineffable in the
                    simplest (as far as I know) possible theoretical
                    way.</p>
                  <p><br>
                  </p>
                  <p>"<i>The most certain way to succeed is always to
                      try just one more time.</i>" Thomas A. Edison</p>
                  <p><br>
                  </p>
                  <p>Ben is definitely getting close with this
                    realization he described below, but he doesn't quite
                    have it all.  The external behavior, that is the
                    ability to verbally report (as in outside the black
                    box behavior) qualitative differences inside the
                    black box is possible and important too.</p>
                  <br>
                  So, let me more rigorously define what I mean by
                  qualitative discern-ability function (which includes
                  something that could lead to verbal report ability). 
                  To reproduce qualitative discern-ability in any
                  theoretical testable way, there needs to be at least 2
                  qualitative representation of knowledge or knowing. 
                  When you talk to me, you should use simple words like
                  glutamate(redness) and glycene(greenness) to represent
                  this objective and subjective qualitative
                  functionality representing knowledge (because I'm not
                  too smart, and need a simplified (though evidently
                  this particular example theory is already falsified in
                  some people's minds) way to comprehend this kind of
                  qualitative theory).  But when you talk to Ben and
                  John, Ben describes it this way:<br>
                  <br>
                  <i><<<<</i><i><br>
                  </i><i>Not some/thing/. </i><i><br>
                  </i><i> </i><i><br>
                  </i><i>I don't think knowledge is a 'thing', it's a
                    process. As John K Clark would put it, knowledge
                    isn't a noun, it's more like a verb or an adjective.
                    This means that there is no such thing as 'a
                    knowledge', but there is such a thing as 'knowing'.
                  </i><i><br>
                  </i><i> </i><i><br>
                  </i><i>More conventionally put, knowledge (and
                    experience) is an information-process. </i><i><br>
                  </i><i> </i><i><br>
                  </i><i>So your statement above could be reworded: "If
                    you know something, there must be an information
                    process that is that knowing". </i><i><br>
                  </i><i> </i><i>>>>></i><br>
                  <br>
                  So, for others I'll call it "not glutamate".  Ben
                  should take "not glutamate" to be a process of knowing
                  redness, at least until the neuro scientists falsify
                  his particular theory.  And "Not glycene" is the
                  process of knowing greenness.  It must be possible to
                  know what qualitative distinguishable functionality is
                  with this, on the
                  detectable objective side, and it is important to have
                  the ability to tell the qualitative difference between
                  redness and greenness on the subjective side.  This
                  qualitative discern-ability of the knowledge process
                  is what gives the system the ability to objectively
                  distinguish between knowledge of strawberries and
                  knowledge of leaves (and to verbally report
                  qualitative difference).  For Ben, the redness
                  functionality is the process of knowing redness which
                  is objectively detect-ably different than the process
                  of knowing greenness.  This can be true, even if it
                  isn't possible to truly
                  eff the difference -  John would probably say you must
                  change from Ben or John to know all the subtle
                  differences between redness and greenness, and you
                  must become Brent, to fully detect Brent's redness and
                  greenness.  While this particular theory is harder,
                  it's not objectively detect-ably impossible.<br>
                  <br>
                  And finally, you need a third function which can be
                  testibly proposed to be some kind of binding system or
                  maybe a binding neuron.   Or maybe, if you must maybe
                  call it a binding - not a neuron.  Whatever it is
                  test-ably theoretically proposed to be, it is the
                  ability for the system to be aware of and report, or
                  fire, only when
                  at least 2 different objective and subjective things
                  are qualitatively different.  It has the ability to
                  combine simple or elemental qualia to produce the
                  diversely complex composite qualia or conscious
                  knowledge required for powerful natural intelligence.<br>
                  <br>
                  I'm not quite sure what Stathis and James, or anyone
                  that champions "functionality" based qualia because of
                  the neuro substitutuion argument, should think of "not
                  glutamate" as.  They will always assert that it will
                  "arise" some place at some "functional" level, outside
                  of wherever you propose to do the physical
                  substitution test.  They have a little trick that will
                  always enable them to neuro substitute out any
                  proposed physical theoretical claim of qualitative and
                  physical discern-ability, no matter where you propose
                  to test for it in the system.  As far as I can see,
                  the only possibility they have is that it "arises" in
                  some impossible to objectively detect (else they will
                  swap it out using this little trick) "magic" or
                  inconceivably "hard" way.<br>
                  <br>
                  Stathis gave me the idea of how to describe and point
                  out this little trick, when he used a glutamate
                  receptor, combined with glutamate, to keep the
                  "binding neuron from functioning the same" before and
                  after substituting glutamate (and it's glutamate
                  receptor) with glycene (and it's glycene receptor).<br>
                  <br>
                  So, you can start with a system that is detecting the
                  qualitative difference between not glutamate and not
                  glycene and the binding neuron is firing, indicating
                  they are different.  When Stathis does the neural
                  substitutuion of not glutamate (and a not glutamate
                  receptor) with not glycene (and a not glycene
                  receptor), even though you now have not glycene
                  chemically reacting in both of the
                  input synapses of the binding neuron, it is
                  incorrectly doing the "same observable behavior" and
                  reporting that they are different, even though they
                  are both the same not glycene (and not glycene
                  receptor).  The problem is, if this is true, you have
                  removed the necessary functional ability of the system
                  to fire correctly and report qualitative discernment
                  of not glutamate and not glycene.  If you preserve the
                  necessary qualitative discernible functionality (and
                  the ability to verbally report such) with your theory,
                  the system must report the qualitative difference
                  between not glutamate and not glycene.  Hence this
                  little "trick" is a functional fallacy since it is
                  removing the very qualitative discern-ability you need
                  from the system, no matter where you propose it might
                  testably physically resides.  No matter what you
                  theorize that not glutamate and not glycene may be,
                  and how it might be physically distinguished, Stathis
                  and James will attempt to use some physical trick like
                  not glutamate receptors and not glycene receptors to
                  remove the necessary objective qualitative
                  discern-ability of the system - resulting in all the
                  "hard" problems and the removal of any objective
                  ability to detect or discern it.<br>
                  <br>
                  Now, if you can preserve the correct qualitative
                  discern-ability function, theoretically possibly by
                  physically or chemically coupling the two synapses in
                  some way giving the binding neuron's ability to be
                  aware of when one synapse has the reference quality
                  key like not glycene functionality and the lock like
                  not glycene receptor functionality and the other
                  synapse has either the same or the not glutamate and a
                  not glutamate receptor, so the system can be aware of,
                  and correctly report whether they lock and key like
                  functionality are qualitatively different, then notice
                  that by preserving the qualitative discern-ability 
                  function and firing correctly when they are different,
                  and not firing when they are the same the "hard"
                  problems go away - and you can now objectively detect
                  not glutamate, and distinguish this from not glycene
                  and there by objectively eff the ineffable - if
                  science is able to prove your proposed not glutamate
                  and not glycene, to be the real reliable for everyone
                  and every subjective computer thing.  Proving which
                  theory is THE ONE, will be left to the experimental
                  neuroscientists, who will be able to finally know how
                  to effingly test for this stuff, once they understand
                  this qualitative theory, how to properly qualitatively
                  interpret what they are observing, to know how to not
                  be qualia blind as most of them now do simply because
                  they are miss interpreting the abstracted information
                  about what they are observing, and be able to eff the
                  ineffable.  I bet this will happen relatively rapidly,
                  once experimentalists understand this kind of
                  qualitative discern ability theory, and how to
                  properly qualitatively interpret what they are
                  observing.<br>
                </div>
                <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> <br>
                  <br>
                  So, does this help?  Any questions? Do we need to keep
                  going?  Is there any simpler way to describe any of
                  this kind of qualitative discern-ability theory so
                  that more neuro scientists can more easily relate to
                  it?<br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  Brent Allsop<br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <br>
                  <div
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_2371438666313423721moz-cite-prefix">On
                    2/20/2017 1:59 PM, Ben wrote:<br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote type="cite">John K Clark wrote: <br>
                    <br>
                    "if internal changes to a part produce no changes in
                    the way that part interacts with other parts then
                    they make no change to the overall behaviour of the
                    system" <br>
                    <br>
                    Aha, I think I see now where the difference of
                    opinion lies. <br>
                    <br>
                    He can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Brent is
                    of the opinion that it /does/ matter what goes on
                    inside the black boxes of interacting parts, whereas
                    the rest of us don't, as long as the interactions
                    remain the same. <br>
                    <br>
                    I hope I'm right, because this suddenly makes sense
                    of what Brent has been saying. <br>
                    <br>
                    Not that it's correct, I think it's profoundly
                    incorrect, and I think there are very good logical
                    and empirical reasons for thinking this, but at
                    least it's understandable now. <br>
                    <br>
                    Thanks, John. <br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    Ben Zaiboc <br>
                    ______________________________<wbr>_________________
                    <br>
                    extropy-chat mailing list <br>
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                      target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>
                    <br>
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                      target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailm<wbr>an/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <span
                      class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-im">On
                      17 February 2017 at 16:04, Brent Allsop <span
                        dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                          href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com"
                          target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
                      wrote:<br>
                    </span>
                    <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
                      0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                      rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                      <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                        <p><br>
                        </p>
                        <p><br>
                        </p>
                        <p>Hi Stathis,</p>
                        <p>You obviously know more than I know about how
                          neuro transmitters work.  Thanks for helping
                          me to better understand this type of stuff.</p>
                        <span
                          class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-im">
                          <p><br>
                          </p>
                          <p>As I said, if what you say is true, then it
                            merely falsifies the prediction that
                            glutamate is what performs the redness
                            quality we experience.</p>
                        </span></div>
                    </blockquote>
                    <div>It falsifies the theory that *any* particular
                      substrate or physics is necessary for the redness
                      quality, or any other quale. The general argument
                      is this: <br>
                      <br>
                      A. The brain is a system made of parts.<br>
                    </div>
                    <div>B. Each part interacts with neighbouring parts.<br>
                    </div>
                    <div>C. If you replace one part with a different
                      part that interacts with its neighbours in the
                      same way, then the system as a whole will behave
                      in the same way.<br>
                    </div>
                    <div>D. If the part you replaced were essential for
                      qualia, then the qualia would change but the
                      behaviour would not.<br>
                    </div>
                    <div>E. Think about what it would mean if (D) were
                      true.<br>
                      <br>
                    </div>
                    <div>Note that this does not say anything about
                      whether qualia can be detected - only that qualia
                      cannot be due to a particular substrate or
                      physics.<br>
                    </div>
                    <p>That is why I always resort to talking about the
                      "simplified theoretical world".  In the simplified
                      world, there are only 3 colors: red, green and
                      white.  And in that simplified world, glutamate
                      has the redness quality, glycene has the greenness
                      quality, aspartate that has the whiteness quality,
                      and it is one neuron that binds them all together,
                      so you can be aware of them all at once.  And for
                      Ben's sake: in this simplified world there are
                      "red and green signals in the optic nerve" that
                      can be easily inverted.<br>
                    </p>
                    <p><br>
                    </p>
                    <p>The goal is to make a very hard topic a little
                      more simple.  If one can understand the
                      qualitative theory I'm trying to describe, and how
                      neuro substitutuion works with no "hard" problems,
                      and how people in such a simplified world can "eff
                      the ineffable" by properly qualitatively
                      interpreting abstracted observation knowledge -
                      then they should be able to apply the same
                      qualitative theory in the more complex real
                      world.  All that is required is to test for, and
                      find, experimentally, in the real world, what it
                      is that takes the place of glutamate, glycene,
                      aspartate, and the single neuron binding system. 
                      That job is for the experimentalists to do, once
                      they understand how to test for it by no longer
                      being qualia blind (by miss interpreting
                      abstracted observation information as they all do
                      now) and effing the ineffable by interpreting what
                      they are observing, qualitatively correctly.</p>
                    <p><br>
                    </p>
                    <p>Ben, I don't know if it will help, but I describe
                      the "simplified theoretical world" in more detail,
                      in this talk:  <a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?<wbr>v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a>
                      .  But it may not help if you believe there are
                      not elemental qualities out of which our brain
                      builds or paints composite qualitative experiences
                      with.  It sounds like you and John Clark agree on
                      this?  Do you also, like John, believe that effing
                      the ineffable is impossible, and thereby, qualia
                      will forever not be approachable via objective or
                      sharable science?<span
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681HOEnZb"><font
                          color="#888888"><br>
                        </font></span></p>
                    <span
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681HOEnZb"><font
                        color="#888888"> <br>
                        <p>Brent</p>
                      </font></span>
                    <p><br>
                    </p>
                    <br>
                    <div
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-cite-prefix">On
                      2/15/2017 8:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:<br>
                    </div>
                    <blockquote type="cite">
                      <div dir="ltr"><br>
                        <div class="gmail_quote">
                          <div>On Wed., 15 Feb. 2017 at 4:48 pm, Brent
                            Allsop <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                              href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com"
                              target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>>
                            wrote:<br>
                          </div>
                          <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                            style="margin:0px 0px 0px
                            0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                            rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                            <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              <p
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg"><br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              </p>
                              <p
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">Hi
                                Stathis,</p>
                              <p
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg"><br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              </p>
                              <p
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">Thanks
                                for expressing all this so concisely. I
                                hope I can be as concise so we can make
                                progress with this.  I think the key
                                point in our misunderstanding is
                                captured by you with this:<br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              </p>
                            </div>
                            <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              <br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              <div
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536m_6245842760609192653moz-cite-prefix
gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">On
                                2/14/2017 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
                                wrote:<br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              </div>
                              <blockquote type="cite"
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                                <div
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                                  <div
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">You're
                                    missing the point when you talk
                                    about "qualitative representation".
                                    *Observable behaviour* is the only
                                    thing necessary to consider in order
                                    to replicate *observable behaviour*.
                                    The argument is that if you ignore
                                    qualia and just replicate
                                    *observable behaviour* then the
                                    qualia will also necessarily be
                                    replicated. I gave an example of
                                    this which I believe is clear (tell
                                    me if not) with the
                                    glutamate/glycine swap.</div>
                                  <div
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                                    <div class="gmail_extra
gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                                      <div
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg"><br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                                      </div>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </div>
                              </blockquote>
                              <br
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                            </div>
                            <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              Yes, your answer was very clear.  I agree
                              with most of what you are saying, but we
                              both believe that the other is missing the
                              point.  You first want to focus on: "If
                              you ignore qualia and just replicate
                              *observable behavior* then the qualia will
                              also necessarily be replicated."  But even
                              if I do agree with this, from how I see
                              things, it is still missing or removing
                              some important functionality.  In the past
                              you never want to move beyond this,
                              because or until this has been settled. 
                              The problem is, I can't point out the
                              required functionality being removed,
                              until you first understand and agree with
                              some other things in the qualitative
                              theory.  So, this time, could you move
                              beyond that, at least for a bit and digest
                              this initial description, then given that
                              understanding (if you agree), I'll be able
                              to point out the reasons I can't yet
                              accept this functionalist way of doing
                              neuro substitution.<br
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                              <br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              Let's start on the subjective side of
                              things, again, with our simple 3 element
                              system.  The system is experiencing both
                              redness and greenness as a unified
                              composite qualitative experience.  So,
                              there are two qualitative representations
                              of knowledge and there is a 3rd part of
                              the system that is binding the two
                              different representations into one
                              composite experience. The fact that the
                              system is aware of both of these
                              qualitative representations at the same
                              time, is the critical base functionality
                              on which the comparison system is derived
                              - outputting an indicator that could lead
                              to one saying they are consciously aware
                              that they are qualitatively the same or
                              not.<br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              <br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              So, given that we subjectively know that,
                              would you agree with the following?  There
                              must be something that is performing the
                              functionality of the redness experience,
                              and there is something that is performing
                              the functionality of the greenness, and
                              there is a 3rd element that is performing
                              the function of binding these two
                              representations of information together to
                              make a composite experience - enabling the
                              3rd awareness/comparison neuron to
                              indicate whether they are the same or not.<br
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                              <br
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                              You seem loath to want to go there,
                              instead, first, wanting to first focus on:
                              "If you ignore qualia and just replicate
                              *observable behavior* then the qualia will
                              also necessarily be replicated."  But this
                              ignoring of qualia is the problem, and you
                              end up removing the most important parts
                              of the functionality we want to observe as
                              we neuro substitute.<br
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                              <br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              Let's compare this subjective way of
                              observing things to the objective way of
                              observing things, and for the time being
                              assume it is glutamate that has or
                              performs the redness experience
                              functionality, and it is glycene that
                              performs the greenness experience
                              functionality.  Given that, with
                              subjective observation, we would
                              experience a redness detector and with
                              objective observation we would see a
                              glutamate detector.  So, what the 3rd part
                              of the system (we are assuming it is a
                              single neuron for simplicity's sake) is
                              basically an objective and subjective
                              comparison system - outputting an
                              indicator as to whether the two
                              representations of knowledge are
                              functioning the same or not.  This
                              functionality derived from the way it
                              binds together awareness of the two
                              representations of knowledge to make one
                              composite qualitative experience.<br
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                              <br
class="gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg">
                              Now, when you say you replace glutamate
                              with glycene, and you replace the
                              glutamate receptor with a glycene
                              receptor, then assert that the comparison
                              neuron will behave the same, you are
                              removing the important comparison
                              functionality, or simply falsifying the
                              theory that it is only glutamate that
                              reliably performs the redness function (if
                              so, necessitating that it be something
                              else, yet to be discovered, that is
                              reliably performing the redness
                              functionality we know so well).  Both
                              representations of knowledge are now the
                              same qualitative glycene (or the greenness
                              functionality), yet you are asserting that
                              the output is still indicating that the
                              two are different.  This removal of the
                              correct functionality as you do the neuro
                              substitution, is why I can't accept your
                              line of reasoning, along with it being the
                              source of all the "hard" problems.</div>
                          </blockquote>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>I started answering point by point but I
                            think it is best to just respond to this
                            point, because it seems that you are
                            ignoring what neurotransmitters actually do.
                            Neurotransmitters are small molecules that
                            are released from the presynaptic neuron and
                            bind to the appropriate receptor on the
                            postsynaptic neuron. Receptors are proteins
                            in the cell membrane which have special
                            sites to which neurotransmitters attach
                            non-covalently (without forming a permanent
                            chemical bond), sometimes described as being
                            analogous to a lock and key mechanism. As a
                            result of this interaction the receptor
                            protein is pulled into a different shape,
                            leading to a cascade of events in the
                            neuron. With so-called ionotropic receptors
                            the binding of the neurotransmitter opens up
                            channels in the receptor allowing ions to
                            move into and out of the neuron: sodium,
                            potassium or calcium ions. Since ions are
                            charged entities, this changes the voltage
                            across the cell membrane, which can then
                            change the shape of transmembrane proteins
                            called voltage-gated ion channels, which can
                            then cause a spike in voltage to propagates
                            down the axon of the neuron, and ultimately
                            to cause neurotransmitter release at the end
                            of the axon, triggering the next neuron in
                            the chain.<br>
                          </div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>Now, if we swap glutamate for glycine in
                            this setup it won't work - glycine will not
                            bind to the glutamate receptors. If we swap
                            the glutamate receptors for glycine
                            receptors it won't work - glutamate will not
                            bind to glycine receptors. But if we swap
                            glutamate for glycine and glutamate
                            receptors for glycine receptors, and the
                            glycine receptors otherwise have similar
                            properties to the glutamate receptors (open
                            similar ion channels when glycine binds),
                            then the neuron will behave in the same way
                            in regard to when it will fire, and hence
                            all the downstream neurons and the muscles
                            will behave in the same way, and the subject
                            will behave in the same way. "The subject
                            will behave in the same way" means, among
                            other things, that the subject will say in a
                            before/after comparison that the
                            strawberries look red to him in exactly the
                            same way as they did before. If you don't
                            agree with this, then please point out where
                            in the detailed chain of events I have
                            described I have missed something and
                            explain how the glutamate/glycine swap
                            (leaving everything else in the brain the
                            same) can possibly lead to the subject
                            saying that his qualia have changed.</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
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                            <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"
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                              If you assume the qualia experience
                              functionality will arise or emerge in some
                              other way or some other abstracted level,
                              then it is this other abstracted location
                              of qualia that can't be ignored, and must
                              be able to be reliably compared via
                              composite awareness.  I am talking about
                              doing a neuro substitution at this level,
                              with the required qualia comparison
                              functionality, not the level you are
                              talking about, where the qualia being
                              compared is being removed.  If you are
                              going to claim that a comparison
                              functionality can be constructed out of
                              this simplistic lower level (I don't see
                              how this could be done), then provide at
                              least one theoretically possible
                              description of such (as I have done with
                              glutamate, glycene, and a binder neuron to
                              make a composite experience), and with
                              that, whatever it is, it will be obvious
                              what happens, and why, as the neural
                              substitution occurs.<br
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                              <br
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                              If you do the neural substitutuion on a
                              system that, instead of ignoring and
                              removing qualia comparison, you provide
                              any testable theoretical method of really
                              doing the function of qualitative
                              comparison, it can be obvious what is
                              going on during the neural substitution. 
                              Let's do this by having two sets of such
                              identical 3 element qualitative comparison
                              systems, one that doesn't change and is
                              for constant reference comparison
                              purposes, and the other one is the one we
                              will perform the neuro substitution on. 
                              We will bind these two systems with the
                              same provided binding system in a meta
                              comparison functioning system which will
                              monitor and compare all the qualities, as
                              the neural substitution takes place on one
                              of the systems, so you can prove to
                              everyone, both objectively and
                              subjectively, exactly what it is going on,
                              and why both of the 3 element systems are
                              always indicating: "It is red" even though
                              one is the qualia invert of the other
                              after one of the neuro substitution
                              steps.  If you duplicate all this
                              *observable behavior*, including the meta
                              awareness of what is going on with both
                              systems, there will be no hard problems
                              when it is neuro substituted since you are
                              not removing the most important
                              *observable behavior*.<br
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                              <br
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                              Does that help?</div>
                            <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"
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                              <br
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                              Brent Allsop<br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                              <br
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                            </div>
                            ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br
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                          </blockquote>
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                      </div>
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</blockquote></div>

<div>
</div>-- 
<div class="gmail_signature">Stathis Papaioannou</div>
</div></div>


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