<div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div>On Wed., 22 Feb. 2017 at 2:45 pm, Brent Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">Hi Stathis,</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">Dang, I really thought this iteration of the argument, if you
fully understood it, would at least have some effect on your
insistence that the neuro substitution argument is not completely
flawed.<br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">These statements of yours seem obviously completely wrong and
indicate you still don't fully understand what I'm trying to say
about qualitative discern-ability and how the binding neuron can't
work the way you say describe, and how it must behave in the way I
say it needs to - to achieve the necessary subjective or objective
qualitative discern-ability functionality: <br class="gmail_msg">
</p></div><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><i class="gmail_msg">"the hypothesis is self-contradictory, since if it were true
it would lead to a subject whose qualia could change in a gross
way, but who would never be able to notice the change." </i><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
</div><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg"><p class="gmail_msg">and</p></div><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><i class="gmail_msg">"if you are right and qualia are due to a certain brain
structure, then qualia do not exist"</i></p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
</div><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg"><p class="gmail_msg">Could you describe why you think these are in a little more
detail, or provide an example, as I don't see how anyone could
think either of these could be true?</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">And could you tell me if the most recent description of my
qualitative discern-ability theory had any effect, whatsoever, on
the way you think about the neuro substitution and the qualitative
nature of consciousness? Do you understand what I mean by
objective and subjective qualitative discern-ability are necessary
given what we (I, sorry John) subjectively experience of
qualitative knowledge? If you don't understand it, probably
nobody else will be able to understand it. :( I guess we're not
done, after all. Oh well, thanks for still not giving up on
trying to understand what I'm trying to say, and or helping me to
better understand the way you think. I sure don't want to have to
resort to just waiting for the experimental neuroscientists to
prove to us which of us closer to the true theory of the
qualitative nature of consciousness.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>But there is NO experimental result that would make any difference to the argument. To give some emotional distance I have tried non-biological examples. If the power supply of your computer is replaced with a different power supply that produces exactly the same voltage and current, is it possible that your programs will run differently? If the cylinders in your car engine are replaced with cylinders of a different material with the same dimensions, density, melting point, and every other relevant physical parameter is it possible that your car will run differently?</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg"><p class="gmail_msg"></p></div><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg">Brent<br class="gmail_msg">
</p></div><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<br class="gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554moz-cite-prefix gmail_msg">On 2/21/2017 4:03 PM, Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_msg">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" style="font-size:12.8px" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><span style="font-size:small" class="gmail_msg">On 22 February 2017 at 08:56,
Brent Allsop </span><span style="font-size:small" class="gmail_msg"><<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span><span style="font-size:small" class="gmail_msg"> wrote:</span><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_quote gmail_msg">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote gmail_msg" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_msg">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">Hi all you thankfully very persistent, and
patiently helpful people,</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">James is probably going to hate me for this, but
I've again CCed him in this conversation, as I again
think that after dozens of more iterations here
since he was last CCed, we might have achieved a
breakthrough (and this time I'm more sure than the
last 100 or so times I thought this! ;) and I
couldn't have done it without all your help. If you
guys think you've told me your ever improving
arguments too many times, James has given me
Stathis' nero substitution argument what seems to be
hundreds of times in ever improving ways over the
span of many years. Via James continued prodding he
helped me realize that from the subjective side, you
need to do something like distinguish redness from
greenness, and on the objective side, the same thing
will appear to be something like distinguishing
between the qualitative nature of something physical
like (not, see below) glutamate and (not, see below)
glycene neuro transmitters. On the subjective side,
all we know of not glutamate, is it's redness
quality. So thanks, everyone, for all your patient
help over so many years with all this.</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="gmail_msg">Perhaps there is a problem here with the way you are
arguing. I think you are proposing that glutamate has a
redness quality (or if not glutamate, some other structure
in the brain). It is OK to propose this as a hypothesis,
but then in scientific discourse the hypothesis is
challenged. My challenge is that the hypothesis is
self-contradictory, since if it were true it would lead to
a subject whose qualia could change in a gross way, but
who would never be able to notice the change. This is
self-contradictory because, whatever else we might say
about qualia, being able to notice our own qualia and
notice when they change is a necessary part of the qualia
deal; if you get rid of this aspect of qualia then you may
as well say that qualia do not exist. In other words, if
you are right and qualia are due to a certain brain
structure, then qualia do not exist. You say below that
functionalism leads to the "hard problem" of
consciousness, which you don't like. I don't see how it
leads to the "hard problem" any more than
structure-specific qualia, but even if it does, that's
just too bad - because structure-specific qualia leads to
the elimination of the qualia that you and I know we have.
This argument is independent of any particular details of
brain function; it could have validly been made in a
bygone era before the existence of neurons was even
suspected.</div>
<div class="gmail_msg"> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote gmail_msg" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_msg">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg">Oh, and I've CCed the brilliant Steven Lehar, as I
think he'll get a kick out of this. He was the
first person that helped me understand how all this
knowledge in the brain stuff could work back in the
80s. He may have some better proposed theories
about what qualitative not glutamate and not glycene
may be, including what the binding neuron could be.
Steve, for more context, you may want to watch this
15 minute video to know what I mean by the
simplified theoretical world that only has 3 colors:
redness(glutamate) grenness(glycene) and
whitness(aspartate): <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a>
where I describe how to eff the ineffable in the
simplest (as far as I know) possible theoretical
way.</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">"<i class="gmail_msg">The most certain way to succeed is always to
try just one more time.</i>" Thomas A. Edison</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">Ben is definitely getting close with this
realization he described below, but he doesn't quite
have it all. The external behavior, that is the
ability to verbally report (as in outside the black
box behavior) qualitative differences inside the
black box is possible and important too.</p>
<br class="gmail_msg">
So, let me more rigorously define what I mean by
qualitative discern-ability function (which includes
something that could lead to verbal report ability).
To reproduce qualitative discern-ability in any
theoretical testable way, there needs to be at least 2
qualitative representation of knowledge or knowing.
When you talk to me, you should use simple words like
glutamate(redness) and glycene(greenness) to represent
this objective and subjective qualitative
functionality representing knowledge (because I'm not
too smart, and need a simplified (though evidently
this particular example theory is already falsified in
some people's minds) way to comprehend this kind of
qualitative theory). But when you talk to Ben and
John, Ben describes it this way:<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<i class="gmail_msg"><<<<</i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg">Not some/thing/. </i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg"> </i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg">I don't think knowledge is a 'thing', it's a
process. As John K Clark would put it, knowledge
isn't a noun, it's more like a verb or an adjective.
This means that there is no such thing as 'a
knowledge', but there is such a thing as 'knowing'.
</i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg"> </i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg">More conventionally put, knowledge (and
experience) is an information-process. </i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg"> </i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg">So your statement above could be reworded: "If
you know something, there must be an information
process that is that knowing". </i><i class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</i><i class="gmail_msg"> </i><i class="gmail_msg">>>>></i><br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
So, for others I'll call it "not glutamate". Ben
should take "not glutamate" to be a process of knowing
redness, at least until the neuro scientists falsify
his particular theory. And "Not glycene" is the
process of knowing greenness. It must be possible to
know what qualitative distinguishable functionality is
with this, on the
detectable objective side, and it is important to have
the ability to tell the qualitative difference between
redness and greenness on the subjective side. This
qualitative discern-ability of the knowledge process
is what gives the system the ability to objectively
distinguish between knowledge of strawberries and
knowledge of leaves (and to verbally report
qualitative difference). For Ben, the redness
functionality is the process of knowing redness which
is objectively detect-ably different than the process
of knowing greenness. This can be true, even if it
isn't possible to truly
eff the difference - John would probably say you must
change from Ben or John to know all the subtle
differences between redness and greenness, and you
must become Brent, to fully detect Brent's redness and
greenness. While this particular theory is harder,
it's not objectively detect-ably impossible.<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
And finally, you need a third function which can be
testibly proposed to be some kind of binding system or
maybe a binding neuron. Or maybe, if you must maybe
call it a binding - not a neuron. Whatever it is
test-ably theoretically proposed to be, it is the
ability for the system to be aware of and report, or
fire, only when
at least 2 different objective and subjective things
are qualitatively different. It has the ability to
combine simple or elemental qualia to produce the
diversely complex composite qualia or conscious
knowledge required for powerful natural intelligence.<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
I'm not quite sure what Stathis and James, or anyone
that champions "functionality" based qualia because of
the neuro substitutuion argument, should think of "not
glutamate" as. They will always assert that it will
"arise" some place at some "functional" level, outside
of wherever you propose to do the physical
substitution test. They have a little trick that will
always enable them to neuro substitute out any
proposed physical theoretical claim of qualitative and
physical discern-ability, no matter where you propose
to test for it in the system. As far as I can see,
the only possibility they have is that it "arises" in
some impossible to objectively detect (else they will
swap it out using this little trick) "magic" or
inconceivably "hard" way.<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
Stathis gave me the idea of how to describe and point
out this little trick, when he used a glutamate
receptor, combined with glutamate, to keep the
"binding neuron from functioning the same" before and
after substituting glutamate (and it's glutamate
receptor) with glycene (and it's glycene receptor).<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
So, you can start with a system that is detecting the
qualitative difference between not glutamate and not
glycene and the binding neuron is firing, indicating
they are different. When Stathis does the neural
substitutuion of not glutamate (and a not glutamate
receptor) with not glycene (and a not glycene
receptor), even though you now have not glycene
chemically reacting in both of the
input synapses of the binding neuron, it is
incorrectly doing the "same observable behavior" and
reporting that they are different, even though they
are both the same not glycene (and not glycene
receptor). The problem is, if this is true, you have
removed the necessary functional ability of the system
to fire correctly and report qualitative discernment
of not glutamate and not glycene. If you preserve the
necessary qualitative discernible functionality (and
the ability to verbally report such) with your theory,
the system must report the qualitative difference
between not glutamate and not glycene. Hence this
little "trick" is a functional fallacy since it is
removing the very qualitative discern-ability you need
from the system, no matter where you propose it might
testably physically resides. No matter what you
theorize that not glutamate and not glycene may be,
and how it might be physically distinguished, Stathis
and James will attempt to use some physical trick like
not glutamate receptors and not glycene receptors to
remove the necessary objective qualitative
discern-ability of the system - resulting in all the
"hard" problems and the removal of any objective
ability to detect or discern it.<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
Now, if you can preserve the correct qualitative
discern-ability function, theoretically possibly by
physically or chemically coupling the two synapses in
some way giving the binding neuron's ability to be
aware of when one synapse has the reference quality
key like not glycene functionality and the lock like
not glycene receptor functionality and the other
synapse has either the same or the not glutamate and a
not glutamate receptor, so the system can be aware of,
and correctly report whether they lock and key like
functionality are qualitatively different, then notice
that by preserving the qualitative discern-ability
function and firing correctly when they are different,
and not firing when they are the same the "hard"
problems go away - and you can now objectively detect
not glutamate, and distinguish this from not glycene
and there by objectively eff the ineffable - if
science is able to prove your proposed not glutamate
and not glycene, to be the real reliable for everyone
and every subjective computer thing. Proving which
theory is THE ONE, will be left to the experimental
neuroscientists, who will be able to finally know how
to effingly test for this stuff, once they understand
this qualitative theory, how to properly qualitatively
interpret what they are observing, to know how to not
be qualia blind as most of them now do simply because
they are miss interpreting the abstracted information
about what they are observing, and be able to eff the
ineffable. I bet this will happen relatively rapidly,
once experimentalists understand this kind of
qualitative discern ability theory, and how to
properly qualitatively interpret what they are
observing.<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="gmail_msg"> <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
So, does this help? Any questions? Do we need to keep
going? Is there any simpler way to describe any of
this kind of qualitative discern-ability theory so
that more neuro scientists can more easily relate to
it?<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
Brent Allsop<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_2371438666313423721moz-cite-prefix gmail_msg">On
2/20/2017 1:59 PM, Ben wrote:<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="gmail_msg">John K Clark wrote: <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
"if internal changes to a part produce no changes in
the way that part interacts with other parts then
they make no change to the overall behaviour of the
system" <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
Aha, I think I see now where the difference of
opinion lies. <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
He can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Brent is
of the opinion that it /does/ matter what goes on
inside the black boxes of interacting parts, whereas
the rest of us don't, as long as the interactions
remain the same. <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
I hope I'm right, because this suddenly makes sense
of what Brent has been saying. <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
Not that it's correct, I think it's profoundly
incorrect, and I think there are very good logical
and empirical reasons for thinking this, but at
least it's understandable now. <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
Thanks, John. <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
Ben Zaiboc <br class="gmail_msg">
_______________________________________________
<br class="gmail_msg">
extropy-chat mailing list <br class="gmail_msg">
<a class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_2371438666313423721moz-txt-link-abbreviated gmail_msg" href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>
<br class="gmail_msg">
<a class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_2371438666313423721moz-txt-link-freetext gmail_msg" href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a>
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
<span class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-im gmail_msg">On
17 February 2017 at 16:04, Brent Allsop <span class="gmail_msg"><<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br class="gmail_msg">
</span>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote gmail_msg" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">Hi Stathis,</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">You obviously know more than I know about how
neuro transmitters work. Thanks for helping
me to better understand this type of stuff.</p>
<span class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-im gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">As I said, if what you say is true, then it
merely falsifies the prediction that
glutamate is what performs the redness
quality we experience.</p>
</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div class="gmail_msg">It falsifies the theory that *any* particular
substrate or physics is necessary for the redness
quality, or any other quale. The general argument
is this: <br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
A. The brain is a system made of parts.<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">B. Each part interacts with neighbouring parts.<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">C. If you replace one part with a different
part that interacts with its neighbours in the
same way, then the system as a whole will behave
in the same way.<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">D. If the part you replaced were essential for
qualia, then the qualia would change but the
behaviour would not.<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">E. Think about what it would mean if (D) were
true.<br class="gmail_msg">
<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">Note that this does not say anything about
whether qualia can be detected - only that qualia
cannot be due to a particular substrate or
physics.<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<p class="gmail_msg">That is why I always resort to talking about the
"simplified theoretical world". In the simplified
world, there are only 3 colors: red, green and
white. And in that simplified world, glutamate
has the redness quality, glycene has the greenness
quality, aspartate that has the whiteness quality,
and it is one neuron that binds them all together,
so you can be aware of them all at once. And for
Ben's sake: in this simplified world there are
"red and green signals in the optic nerve" that
can be easily inverted.<br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">The goal is to make a very hard topic a little
more simple. If one can understand the
qualitative theory I'm trying to describe, and how
neuro substitutuion works with no "hard" problems,
and how people in such a simplified world can "eff
the ineffable" by properly qualitatively
interpreting abstracted observation knowledge -
then they should be able to apply the same
qualitative theory in the more complex real
world. All that is required is to test for, and
find, experimentally, in the real world, what it
is that takes the place of glutamate, glycene,
aspartate, and the single neuron binding system.
That job is for the experimentalists to do, once
they understand how to test for it by no longer
being qualia blind (by miss interpreting
abstracted observation information as they all do
now) and effing the ineffable by interpreting what
they are observing, qualitatively correctly.</p>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="gmail_msg">Ben, I don't know if it will help, but I describe
the "simplified theoretical world" in more detail,
in this talk: <a class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-txt-link-freetext gmail_msg" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4</a>
. But it may not help if you believe there are
not elemental qualities out of which our brain
builds or paints composite qualitative experiences
with. It sounds like you and John Clark agree on
this? Do you also, like John, believe that effing
the ineffable is impossible, and thereby, qualia
will forever not be approachable via objective or
sharable science?<span class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681HOEnZb gmail_msg"><font color="#888888" class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</font></span></p>
<span class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681HOEnZb gmail_msg"><font color="#888888" class="gmail_msg"> <br class="gmail_msg">
<p class="gmail_msg">Brent</p>
</font></span>
<p class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</p>
<br class="gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-cite-prefix gmail_msg">On
2/15/2017 8:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_quote gmail_msg">
<div class="gmail_msg">On Wed., 15 Feb. 2017 at 4:48 pm, Brent
Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote gmail_msg" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<p class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg"><br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">Hi
Stathis,</p>
<p class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg"><br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</p>
<p class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">Thanks
for expressing all this so concisely. I
hope I can be as concise so we can make
progress with this. I think the key
point in our misunderstanding is
captured by you with this:<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</p>
</div>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536m_6245842760609192653moz-cite-prefix
gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">On
2/14/2017 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">You're
missing the point when you talk
about "qualitative representation".
*Observable behaviour* is the only
thing necessary to consider in order
to replicate *observable behaviour*.
The argument is that if you ignore
qualia and just replicate
*observable behaviour* then the
qualia will also necessarily be
replicated. I gave an example of
this which I believe is clear (tell
me if not) with the
glutamate/glycine swap.</div>
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail_extra
gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg"><br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</div>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
Yes, your answer was very clear. I agree
with most of what you are saying, but we
both believe that the other is missing the
point. You first want to focus on: "If
you ignore qualia and just replicate
*observable behavior* then the qualia will
also necessarily be replicated." But even
if I do agree with this, from how I see
things, it is still missing or removing
some important functionality. In the past
you never want to move beyond this,
because or until this has been settled.
The problem is, I can't point out the
required functionality being removed,
until you first understand and agree with
some other things in the qualitative
theory. So, this time, could you move
beyond that, at least for a bit and digest
this initial description, then given that
understanding (if you agree), I'll be able
to point out the reasons I can't yet
accept this functionalist way of doing
neuro substitution.<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
Let's start on the subjective side of
things, again, with our simple 3 element
system. The system is experiencing both
redness and greenness as a unified
composite qualitative experience. So,
there are two qualitative representations
of knowledge and there is a 3rd part of
the system that is binding the two
different representations into one
composite experience. The fact that the
system is aware of both of these
qualitative representations at the same
time, is the critical base functionality
on which the comparison system is derived
- outputting an indicator that could lead
to one saying they are consciously aware
that they are qualitatively the same or
not.<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
So, given that we subjectively know that,
would you agree with the following? There
must be something that is performing the
functionality of the redness experience,
and there is something that is performing
the functionality of the greenness, and
there is a 3rd element that is performing
the function of binding these two
representations of information together to
make a composite experience - enabling the
3rd awareness/comparison neuron to
indicate whether they are the same or not.<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
You seem loath to want to go there,
instead, first, wanting to first focus on:
"If you ignore qualia and just replicate
*observable behavior* then the qualia will
also necessarily be replicated." But this
ignoring of qualia is the problem, and you
end up removing the most important parts
of the functionality we want to observe as
we neuro substitute.<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
Let's compare this subjective way of
observing things to the objective way of
observing things, and for the time being
assume it is glutamate that has or
performs the redness experience
functionality, and it is glycene that
performs the greenness experience
functionality. Given that, with
subjective observation, we would
experience a redness detector and with
objective observation we would see a
glutamate detector. So, what the 3rd part
of the system (we are assuming it is a
single neuron for simplicity's sake) is
basically an objective and subjective
comparison system - outputting an
indicator as to whether the two
representations of knowledge are
functioning the same or not. This
functionality derived from the way it
binds together awareness of the two
representations of knowledge to make one
composite qualitative experience.<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
Now, when you say you replace glutamate
with glycene, and you replace the
glutamate receptor with a glycene
receptor, then assert that the comparison
neuron will behave the same, you are
removing the important comparison
functionality, or simply falsifying the
theory that it is only glutamate that
reliably performs the redness function (if
so, necessitating that it be something
else, yet to be discovered, that is
reliably performing the redness
functionality we know so well). Both
representations of knowledge are now the
same qualitative glycene (or the greenness
functionality), yet you are asserting that
the output is still indicating that the
two are different. This removal of the
correct functionality as you do the neuro
substitution, is why I can't accept your
line of reasoning, along with it being the
source of all the "hard" problems.</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">I started answering point by point but I
think it is best to just respond to this
point, because it seems that you are
ignoring what neurotransmitters actually do.
Neurotransmitters are small molecules that
are released from the presynaptic neuron and
bind to the appropriate receptor on the
postsynaptic neuron. Receptors are proteins
in the cell membrane which have special
sites to which neurotransmitters attach
non-covalently (without forming a permanent
chemical bond), sometimes described as being
analogous to a lock and key mechanism. As a
result of this interaction the receptor
protein is pulled into a different shape,
leading to a cascade of events in the
neuron. With so-called ionotropic receptors
the binding of the neurotransmitter opens up
channels in the receptor allowing ions to
move into and out of the neuron: sodium,
potassium or calcium ions. Since ions are
charged entities, this changes the voltage
across the cell membrane, which can then
change the shape of transmembrane proteins
called voltage-gated ion channels, which can
then cause a spike in voltage to propagates
down the axon of the neuron, and ultimately
to cause neurotransmitter release at the end
of the axon, triggering the next neuron in
the chain.<br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<div class="gmail_msg">Now, if we swap glutamate for glycine in
this setup it won't work - glycine will not
bind to the glutamate receptors. If we swap
the glutamate receptors for glycine
receptors it won't work - glutamate will not
bind to glycine receptors. But if we swap
glutamate for glycine and glutamate
receptors for glycine receptors, and the
glycine receptors otherwise have similar
properties to the glutamate receptors (open
similar ion channels when glycine binds),
then the neuron will behave in the same way
in regard to when it will fire, and hence
all the downstream neurons and the muscles
will behave in the same way, and the subject
will behave in the same way. "The subject
will behave in the same way" means, among
other things, that the subject will say in a
before/after comparison that the
strawberries look red to him in exactly the
same way as they did before. If you don't
agree with this, then please point out where
in the detailed chain of events I have
described I have missed something and
explain how the glutamate/glycine swap
(leaving everything else in the brain the
same) can possibly lead to the subject
saying that his qualia have changed.</div>
<div class="gmail_msg"><br class="gmail_msg">
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote gmail_msg" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
If you assume the qualia experience
functionality will arise or emerge in some
other way or some other abstracted level,
then it is this other abstracted location
of qualia that can't be ignored, and must
be able to be reliably compared via
composite awareness. I am talking about
doing a neuro substitution at this level,
with the required qualia comparison
functionality, not the level you are
talking about, where the qualia being
compared is being removed. If you are
going to claim that a comparison
functionality can be constructed out of
this simplistic lower level (I don't see
how this could be done), then provide at
least one theoretically possible
description of such (as I have done with
glutamate, glycene, and a binder neuron to
make a composite experience), and with
that, whatever it is, it will be obvious
what happens, and why, as the neural
substitution occurs.<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
If you do the neural substitutuion on a
system that, instead of ignoring and
removing qualia comparison, you provide
any testable theoretical method of really
doing the function of qualitative
comparison, it can be obvious what is
going on during the neural substitution.
Let's do this by having two sets of such
identical 3 element qualitative comparison
systems, one that doesn't change and is
for constant reference comparison
purposes, and the other one is the one we
will perform the neuro substitution on.
We will bind these two systems with the
same provided binding system in a meta
comparison functioning system which will
monitor and compare all the qualities, as
the neural substitution takes place on one
of the systems, so you can prove to
everyone, both objectively and
subjectively, exactly what it is going on,
and why both of the 3 element systems are
always indicating: "It is red" even though
one is the qualia invert of the other
after one of the neuro substitution
steps. If you duplicate all this
*observable behavior*, including the meta
awareness of what is going on with both
systems, there will be no hard problems
when it is neuro substituted since you are
not removing the most important
*observable behavior*.<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
Does that help?</div>
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg"><br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
Brent Allsop<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</div>
_______________________________________________<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
extropy-chat mailing list<br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" rel="noreferrer" class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a><br class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252m_2141192520744458986m_-1447008785589455536gmail_msg gmail_msg">
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br class="gmail_msg">
<fieldset class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252mimeAttachmentHeader gmail_msg"></fieldset>
<br class="gmail_msg">
<pre class="gmail_msg">_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
<a class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-txt-link-abbreviated gmail_msg" href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>
<a class="m_3786832104485180554gmail-m_-981744426459162913m_-7791046812564867596gmail-m_3359228272158160681m_-8405532388119358252moz-txt-link-freetext gmail_msg" href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" rel="noreferrer" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a>
</blockquote></div>
<div class="gmail_msg">
</div>--
<div class="m_3786832104485180554gmail_signature gmail_msg">Stathis Papaioannou</div>
</div></div>
<fieldset class="m_3786832104485180554mimeAttachmentHeader gmail_msg"></fieldset>
<pre class="gmail_msg">_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
<a class="m_3786832104485180554moz-txt-link-abbreviated gmail_msg" href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>
<a class="m_3786832104485180554moz-txt-link-freetext gmail_msg" href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
</div>_______________________________________________<br class="gmail_msg">
extropy-chat mailing list<br class="gmail_msg">
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br class="gmail_msg">
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" rel="noreferrer" class="gmail_msg" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a><br class="gmail_msg">
</blockquote></div></div><div dir="ltr">-- <br></div><div data-smartmail="gmail_signature">Stathis Papaioannou</div>