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<p>Hi Stathis,<br>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 3/10/2017 2:52 PM, Stathis
Papaioannou wrote:<br>
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<div class="gmail_quote">I see no evidence that you understand
the idea that with any possible system, if you swap a part
for another part that interacts with its neighbours in the
same way, the system as a whole will behave in the same way.
It is irrelevant what the system does or how complex it is.
The correct way to do the substitution is to make sure that
the new part interacts with the rest of the system in the
same way as the original part did, and you don't need to
understand anything about what the system does in order make
this substitution.<br>
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OK, let me attempt, yet again, to convince you that I do fully
understand the idea that with any possible system, if you swap a
part for another part, that interacts with it's neighbors in the
same way, the system as a whole will behave in the same way. I
completely agree with this, but the way you do the substitution is
erroneous, and you are corrupting the system by always insisting you
must be able to remove any way to compare one quality to another, no
matter where you theorized that it might be. For example, let's
assume, for a moment, your theory that redness is "functional" as
you claim.<br>
<br>
I assert that if your theory is true, then there must be some
"function" that is the redness function, and there must be some
other function that must be detectably different that is the
greenness function. Additionally, since we can be aware of them at
the same time, there must be something that is binding these two
functions enabling this composite qualitative experience of redness
and greenness, leading to the ability to verbalize that they are
qualitatively different.<br>
<br>
Now, the error you make, is that you assert that you must always be
able to replace the redness function, with the greenness function,
in a way that it will always "behave in the same way" which you
corrupting claim must be that the now new two greenness qualities
(the redness being substituted with the greenness) are still
different. In other words, no matter where you put the comparison
ability, you remove this ability, by asserting they must be
different, even though they are now the same.<br>
<br>
If you include the ability of the system to behave the same,
including comparison of redness and greenness (whether they are
material or functional) so that it preserves the ability to say that
redness is different than greenness, only then can you consider it
to be "behaving the same" in a sufficient, non corrupted way, to
explain qualitative conscious comparison behavior and verbalization
of such.<br>
<br>
Brent<br>
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