<div dir="ltr"><div><br></div><div>Hi Stathis,<br></div><div><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">
</font><p style="margin:0in 0in 0pt"><font color="#000000" face="Calibri" size="3"><br></font></p><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">
</font><p style="margin:0in 0in 0pt"><font color="#000000" face="Calibri" size="3">As I’ve
attempted to say over and over again (you always seem to think my answer is no to
this): yes, “</font><b><span style="color:rgb(85,85,85);line-height:107%;font-family:"arial",sans-serif;font-size:9.5pt">if the substituted component interacts with its neighbours
normally then the whole system will be able to distinguish red from green and
normally” </span></b><font face="Calibri"><font size="3"><font color="#000000"><span> </span>But, when you do a
neuro substation from redness to purpleness, to whiteness, to oneness…, each of
these isolates substituted stages will only be able to know the difference between
red and green with very measurably (both objectively and subjectively)
different representations of red and green knowledge.<span> </span>And if you don’t do the neuro substitution in
the right way, including the necessary functionality of being aware of all the
voxels of qualitative knowledge at the same time, so you can compare them all
at the same time, and if you insist on twisting any theory attempting to
include the redness, greenness…, comparison abilities, the way you always do, you
will remain qualia blind.<span> </span>Doing so will
make you tempted to erroneously claim that whatever is representing redness and
greenness, even if it is some kind of distinguishable functional process, you
will erroneously think you have proven that redness is preserved with such an
insufficient neural substitution.</font></font></font></p><p style="margin:0in 0in 0pt"><font color="#000000" face="Calibri" size="3"><br></font></p><p style="margin:0in 0in 0pt"><font color="#000000" face="Calibri" size="3">Brent</font></p><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">
</font><p style="margin:0in 0in 0pt"><font color="#000000" face="Calibri" size="3"> <span></span></font></p><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">
</font></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" target="_blank">stathisp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span><div>On Wed., 22 Mar. 2017 at 8:22 pm, Brent Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_extra m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg">On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 11:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <span class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><<a class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg" href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com" target="_blank">stathisp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><blockquote class="gmail_quote m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_extra m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><span class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"></div></span><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg">But the comparison of redness and greenness, or anything else whatsoever that the system does, will necessarily occur provided only that the substituted part is behaviorally identical. "Behaviorally identical" means that it interacts with its neighbors in the same way - nothing else. </div></div></div></div></blockquote><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg">Well, there you have it. I'm guessing that you still can't see how this is what I've been trying to say all along. You must include this comparison behavior when you do any type of neural substitution correctly. Not preserving this functionality in your theory is what makes it fallacious. Can you not see that up until now, you've always nuro substituted out any theory I provided that included this ability? You always twisted any theoretical system I was proposing, that preserves this ability to compare during the neuro substitution, in a way that always completely removed this comparison ability. Go ahead, propose any qualitative theory that preserves this, then try a nuro substitution with it.</div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg">If you provide a qualitative theory that include the necessary ability to compare red and green in your neuro substitutuion, you will be able to do a neural substitution from redness/greenness to purpleness/yellowness, in a way that both of them will behave the same honestly and accurately saying: "I know what red and green are like". You will be able to do this again, to blackness and whiteness. And again to oneness and zeroness. All of them still correctly proclaiming: "I know what red and green is like for me."</div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg">But, the only way to keep them "Behaviorally identical" is to keep each of these neural substituted conscious entities qualia blind and qualitatively isolated from each other - the way all of you still are. If you do the neural substitution in any way, such that the qualitative isolation is not preserved, the behavior will not be different saying things like: redness and greenness sure are different than purpleness and yellowness. For example, you could add a qualitative memory system, so that the being could remember and compare what redness and greenness was like, before the qualitative substitution.</div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg">It is also important to remember, that we are talking about a simple 2 qualitative pixel element comparison system. It's easy to preserve isolation with such a simple system, especially when you have a system your are substituting that only interacts with a few of it's neighbors. If you have a qualitative system like we have, where you can compare any of the tens of thousands of qualitative pixel or voxel element with all of the others at the same time, preserving the isolation is much more difficult, but not impossible. All of the tens of thousands of voxel elements must interact with all the others in some comparison enabling way - allowing the qualitative comparison of them all at the same time</div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><br class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"></div><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg">There is a scene in the British TV series "Humans" season 2 where one of the "Synths" that has become "conscious" recollects that life was very different before he become "conscious". Once we are no longer qualia blind, we'll all demand that our TV shows be much less qualia blind, having them say things more like like: "My oneness and zeroness representations of red and green were sure qualitatively less than my new redness and greenness representations. At least in Humans, you can see this qualitative recognition they have, on their faces, when they become conscious, and they walk outside for the first time. If they were "behaving the same", they wouldn't have that astonished look on their face, after they walk outside, once they become qualitatively "conscious."</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>So, do you agree that if the substituted component interacts with its neighbours normally then the whole system will be able to distinguish red from green and normally? Or can you imagine a situation where the substituted component interacts with its neighbours normally but the system does *not* behave normally? If the latter, please explain, preferably with an example not related to consciousness.</div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_extra m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="gmail_quote m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"><div class="m_8209492646981082656gmail_msg"></div></div></div></div></blockquote></font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><div dir="ltr">-- <br></div><div data-smartmail="gmail_signature">Stathis Papaioannou</div>
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