<div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Hi Stuart,</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,112,192);background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">“Consciousness
is not magic, it is math.</span>”<span style="color:rgb(0,112,192)"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">How do you
get a specific, qualitative definition of the word “red” from any math?</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,112,192);background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">“I don't
think that substrate-specific details matter that much</span>.”</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Then you are
not talking about consciousness, at all.
You are just talking about intelligence.
Consciousness is computationally bound elemental qualities, for which
there is something, qualitative, for which it is like.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,112,192);background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">“It is irrelevant
that I perceive red as green</span>.”</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Can you not
see how sloppy language like this is? I’m
going to describe at least two very different possible interpretations of this
statement. If you can’t distinguish
between them, with your language, then again, you are not talking about consciousness:</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="gmail-MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.5in;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">1.<span style="font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:7pt;line-height:normal;font-family:"Times New Roman"">
</span>One person is color blind, and represents both
red things and green things with knowledge that has the same physical redness
quality. In other words, he is red green
color blind.</p>
<p class="gmail-MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt 0.5in;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">2.<span style="font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:7pt;line-height:normal;font-family:"Times New Roman"">
</span>One person is qualitatively inverted from the
other. He uses the other’s greenness to
represent red with and visa versa for green things.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">You can’t
tell which one you’re statement is talking about. Again, you’re not talking about consciousness,
if you can’t distinguish between these types of things with your models and
language.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Sure, before
Galileo, it didn’t matter if you used a geocentric model of the solar system or
a heliocentric. But now that we’re flying
up in the heavens, one works, and one does not.
Similarly, now, you can claim that the qualitative nature doesn’t matter,
but as soon as you start hacking the brain, amplifying intelligence, connecting
multiple brains (like two brain hemispheres can be connect) or even religiously
predicting what “spirits” and future consciousness will be possible. One model works, the other does not. In fact, my prediction is the reason we can’t
better understand how we subjectively represent visual knowledge, is precisely
because everyone is like you, qualia blind, and doesn’t care that some people
may have qualitatively very different physical representations of red and
green.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">If you only
care about if a brain can pick strawberries, and don’t care what it is
qualitatively like, then you can’t make the critically important distinctions
between these <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YnTMoU2LKER78bjVJsGkxMsSwvhpPBJZvp9e2oJX9GA/edit?usp=sharing" style="color:rgb(5,99,193)">3
robots</a> that are functionally the same but qualitatively very different, one
being not conscious at all.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,112,192);background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">“Nothing
in the universe can objectively observe anything else.”</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">All information
that comes to our senses is “objectively” observed and devoid of any physical
qualitative information, it is all only abstract mathematical information. Descartes, the ultimate septic, realized
that he must doubt all objectively observed information. But he also realized: “I think therefore I am”. This includes the knowledge of the qualities
of our consciousness. We know,
absolutely, in a way that cannot be doubted, what physical redness is like, and
how it is different than greenness.
While it is true that we may be a brain, in a vat. We know, absolutely, that the physics, in the
brain, in that vat exist, and we know, absolutely and qualitatively, what that
physics (in both hemispheres) is like.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Let’s say
you did objectively detect some new “perceptronium”. All you would have, describing that perceptronium,
is mathematical models and descriptions of such. These mathematical descriptions of
perceptronium would all be completely devoid of any qualitative meaning. Until you experienced a particular type of
perceptronium, directly, you would not know, qualitatively, how to interpret
any of your mathematical objective descriptions of such.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Again, everything
you are talking about is what Chalmers, and everyone would call “easy”
problems. Discovering and objectively
observing any kind of “perceptronium” is an easy problem. We already know how to do this. Knowing, qualitatively, what that
perceptronium is qualitatively like, if you experienced it, directly, is what
makes it hard.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">The only “hard”
part of consciousness is the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap" style="color:rgb(5,99,193)">Explanatory Ga</a>p”, or
how do you eff the ineffable nature of qualia.
Everything else is just easy problems.
We already know, mathematically what it is like to be a bat. But that tells you nothing, qualitatively
about what being a bat is like.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 1:10 PM Stuart LaForge <<a href="mailto:avant@sollegro.com">avant@sollegro.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
Quoting Brent Allsop::<br>
<br>
<br>
> Max Tegmark’s paper, like everythingelse in all of the peer reviewed <br>
> literature on physics, and consciousness, and particularlystudies on <br>
> perception of color are all completely qualia blind.<br>
<br>
Perhaps because qualia are arbitrary encodings by consciousnesses for <br>
perceived physical phenomena. With emphasis on the word arbitrary.<br>
<br>
> Everyone uses the term “red” in only a functionalist way, which <br>
> imparts no qualitative meaning, whatsoever. For example, you said: <br>
> “Redness is a function of red”. Statements like this provide no <br>
> qualitative meaning, especially when you consider what should be an <br>
> obvious fact that my redness could be like your greenness.<br>
<br>
How red looks to us on the inside (subjectively) doesn't matter as <br>
long as it is consistent. It is irrelevant that I perceive red as <br>
green so long as we both agree to call it red, and I remember what it <br>
looks like, then we will always be in agreement as to what things are <br>
red.<br>
<br>
Relativity disclaimer: this assumes we are not moving at any <br>
appreciable fraction of the speed of light with respect to another. <br>
Otherwise Doppler shifts make it so we no longer agree on an objects <br>
color.<br>
<br>
> In order to know, qualitatively, the meaning of a word, like redness <br>
> or red, you need to keep in mind that it is only a label for a <br>
> particular set of physical properties or qualities. Everyone uses <br>
> the term “red” to talk about when something reflects or emits red <br>
> light, they also use it as a label for a particular type of light, <br>
> they also use it to talk about “red” signals in the optic nerve and <br>
> “red” detectors in the retina… ALL of these are purely <br>
> functionalist definitions and provide no qualitative meaning. They <br>
> are completely ambiguous definitions,and nobody knows which physical <br>
> qualities they are talking about, when the use any such terms.<br>
<br>
If consciousness didn't serve a function, it would be too costly to <br>
maintain. I am therefore fine with a functionalist definition of <br>
consciousness. The qualitative meaning is that meaning itself is <br>
qualitative. Without consciousness there is no meaning. Consciousness <br>
gives meaning to shit that happens in the physical universe. That is <br>
what I mean by redness<br>
<br>
> In order to not be qualia blind, you need to use different words for <br>
> different sets of physical properties or qualities. I use the word <br>
> “red” as a label for the physical property of anything that reflects <br>
> or emits 650 NM light.<br>
<br>
That's a sensible definition of the word red.<br>
<br>
> I use the word “redness” as a label for a very different set of <br>
> physical properties or qualities. It is a label for a set of <br>
> physical qualities we can be directly aware of, as something our <br>
> brain uses to represent knowledge with. This physical quality can <br>
> be used to represent any type of knowledge. A bat could use it to <br>
> represent echolocation knowledge. Some people could use it to <br>
> represent green knowledge, and so forth<br>
<br>
Right. Red is a wavelength of light and redness is your own subjective <br>
experience of it. My redness might not be your redness but we would <br>
agree on what was red.<br>
<br>
> To say “Redness is a function of red” is, again, completely qualia <br>
> blind and ambiguous. Qualitatively, I have no idea what you are <br>
> talking about.<br>
<br>
No it is a very precise way of describing what qualia are. They are <br>
your brain's "token" for a physical property that you can perceive. <br>
Functions just map the members of one set to another set. So functions <br>
can be qualitative if you define at least one of the sets to be so.<br>
<br>
> Are you talking about your redness, or my redness which is like your <br>
> grenness?<br>
<br>
Again how red "looks" to me versus the way it "looks" to you doesn't <br>
matter so long as we can consistently agree on what is red and what is <br>
green. And if we can't consistently agree, then your driver's license <br>
needs to be revoked. :-P<br>
<br>
> Tononi’s idea of “redness = PHI(red)” is also completely sloppy, <br>
> definition wise.<br>
<br>
That's not actually Tononi's idea, it is mine. Tononi equates <br>
consciousness with PHI but he defines it differently based on <br>
partitioning sets of information. Overall, I think his definition is <br>
unnecessarily complicated leading to making it too hard to calculate <br>
(NP-hard even) to be a useful definition.<br>
<br>
> Is he talking about one person’s redness, which may be another’s <br>
> greenness….? As I was saying, this, and everything else is <br>
> completely qualia blind.<br>
<br>
Qualia don't explain anything. Instead they need to be explained. My <br>
definition does that. Don't ascribe qualia more importance than they <br>
merit. I really do think our souls are made out of math not qualia.<br>
<br>
><br>
> Take the name of the neurotransmitter glutamate, for example. We <br>
> know this is a label for a particular set of physical properties. <br>
> We also have abstract descriptions of glutamate's atomic makeup, and <br>
> how it behaves in synapses. But, again, all of this abstract <br>
> information about glutamate is also just functional. It provides no <br>
> qualitative meaning. We know how glutamate behaves in a synapse, but <br>
> what is that glutamate behavior qualitatively like? If you think of <br>
> the qualitative definition of the word redness, and the qualitative <br>
> definition of the word glutamate, you should realize that these <br>
> could be abstract labels for the same set of physics. Not realizing <br>
> this is qualia blindness.<br>
<br>
Again, it doesn't matter how one brain encodes redness vs another so <br>
long as they agree.<br>
<br>
> The ONLY thing that provides qualitativ emeaning to anything is <br>
> subjective experience, or our ability to directly experience some of <br>
> the physics in our brain. ALL objectively observed information is <br>
> purely abstract, and devoid of any qualitative meaning. We can’t <br>
> talk about consciousness in any way, until we start thinking <br>
> clearly, and non-ambiguously about the qualitative meaning of words.<br>
<br>
Nothing in the universe can objectively observe anything else. Any <br>
observation is necessarily subjective even for the most simplest of <br>
measuring devices let alone full-blown brains. There is no absolute or <br>
privileged reference frame from which to be objective, not for an <br>
observer. If particles could not collapse one another's wave <br>
functions, they would never collide.<br>
<br>
> Max Tegmark asserts the existence of some “perceptronium”? Even if <br>
> there was such a thing, all objective observations of such would be <br>
> purely functional, while direct experience of such functional <br>
> descriptions would be qualitative.<br>
<br>
> Proposing new physics buys you nothing about consciousness, as long <br>
> as you remain qualia blind, and fail to make the qualitative <br>
> connections. Once you are no longer qualia blind, you realize you <br>
> don’t need any new physics. You just need to think, clearly and <br>
> qualitatively, about what we already know of current physics.<br>
<br>
I disagree. Consciousness is but one of a whole category of physical <br>
phenomena that would fall under the label emergence and emergent <br>
properties that current physics explains very poorly. New physics is <br>
precisely what we need.<br>
<br>
> We simply must see people start using multiple words to talk about <br>
> different physical qualities. Red for something that reflects or <br>
> emits red light, and redness for a very different set of physical <br>
> qualities, which could be a quality of anything we already know <br>
> about, objectively, in the brain, like glutamate.<br>
<br>
I don't think that substrate-specific details matter that much. I <br>
think consciousness is a mathematical property analogous to the wave <br>
equation which is valid regardless of whether you are talking about <br>
water waves, sound waves, or electromagnetic waves. Let go of <br>
glutamate, it is substrate-specific detail that won't help you with <br>
understanding consciousness.<br>
<br>
Consciousness is not magic, it is math.<br>
<br>
Stuart LaForge<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div>