<div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Hi Stathis,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Very interesting. It’s been a long time since I’ve read this. I do not recall this. I’ll have to do some review work. </span><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;font-size:12pt">Thanks for pointing this out.</span><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;font-size:12pt">I was mainly pointing out that many people refer to or think of this paper, as the source of the substitution argument. </span><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;font-size:12pt">But in that paper, he does argue, and he
points out that he believes functionalism is the more likely theory, because of
the substitution argument right?</span></p></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, 17 Dec 2019 at 15:04, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Yay, someone brought up the consciousness
topic!! Thanks You.</span></p></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 8:01 PM Will Steinberg via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Yes, "consciousness is an illusion" is nonsense. The word illusion presupposes an object of the illusion. That object is the consciousness. Illusion is qualia!</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Exactly, I couldn’t have <a href="https://www.quora.com/Is-there-any-coherent-argument-in-support-of-consciousness-being-an-illusion/answer/Brent-Allsop-1" style="color:blue" target="_blank">said
it better</a>. Nobody can deny Qualia. All good theories of consciousness must
include them, and there is growing evidence that all experts agree with this in
“<a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Representational-Qualia/6" style="color:blue" target="_blank">Representational
Qualia Theory</a>”. No other theory has
any significant amount of support. Even
Dennett’s current “<a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Dennett-s-PBC-Theory/21" style="color:blue" target="_blank">Predictive Bayesian
Coding Theory</a>” is now a supporting sub camp to “<a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Representational-Qualia/6" style="color:blue" target="_blank">Representational
Qualia Theory</a>”. This defines consciousness is
computationally bound elemental physical qualities in the brain we are directly
aware of like redness and greenness. If
you are consciously aware of something, there must be something physical that
is that knowledge, and this knowledge must be computationally bound to the rest
of your current conscious knowledge.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Qualia are physical qualities, and
they can “causally interact with measuring devices”. But since the physics that interact with our
senses aren’t anything like the target of perception, all forms of causal
perception require the correct qualitative interpretation to observe a target’s
physical quality. You can’t know what the
word “red” means, without a physical definition. We don’t “perceive” redness, rudeness is the
physical quality that is the final result of perception. You can’t now the physical quality of
anything without experiencing it directly, subjectively, in the brain. The physical redness we experience directly
is the definition of the word “red”. We
need to distinguish between reality and knowledge of reality. Physicists can describe everything about
physics, they just can’t tell us the physical quality any of their descriptions
are describing. Physics, today, is all
qualia blind. None of it defines
“redness”.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Stathis has praise for Chalmers’ <a href="http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html" style="color:blue" target="_blank">Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia,
Dancing Qualia</a> but in my opinion this “neural substitution” argument
(copied from Hans Moravec’s book “Mind Children” published 8 years before this
paper) has done as much damage to the philosophy of mind as “Naive Realism”. Once you understand that consciousness is
computationally bound elemental physical qualities, the <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/79-Neural-Substtn-Fallacy/2#statement" style="color:blue" target="_blank">fallacy
in the argument</a> becomes obvious.</span></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Chalmers did not develop the neural substitution thought experiment, but in the cited paper he assumed that neural substitution did not preserve consciousness, as you also claim, and showed that if this were so it would lead to absurdity.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"></span></p></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>
-- <br><div dir="ltr">Stathis Papaioannou</div>
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