<div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">OK very good points. So, let me see
if I can address these good points in the way I’m saying things.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span style="font-size:12pt">If you do a neuro substitution from
redness physics to greenness physics, (and visa versa) that would be possible
if, in one step, you replaced all the glutamate being presented to the binding
neuron (including any possible memory of glutamates colorness property) with glycine
and your memory of </span><span style="font-size:16px">glycine's</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> colorness property, that would be possible as i've pointed out many times.</span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">But, still you must include this
binding neuron (or something that performs this required functionality) in your
thought experiment, otherwise composite computationally bound elemental
physical qualities like redness and greenness aren’t possible. And also, this same binding mechanism must be able to connect a pre inverted system, with a post inverted system, so that you can see that redness and grenness are inverted.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span style="font-size:12pt">Now, if you are doing a neuro substitution
from redness to a binary one or word </span><span style="font-size:16px">like</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> red (which is intentionally abstracted away from any physical
properties via additional hardware enabling substrate independence. It wouldn’t
be possible to include anything like knowledge that has a physical redness
quality functionality, without such extremely absurd hard programmed
functionality like: “If someone asks you
what it means to say: “My redness is like your greenness, both of which we say
is red” you say I understand that, and
it is all true. Even though such is lie,
since abstract ones and zeros, by definition, are abstracted away from such
physical properties.</span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"> </span></p></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Jan 19, 2020 at 2:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, 20 Jan 2020 at 02:59, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Jan 18, 2020 at 6:39 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, 19 Jan 2020 at 11:57, William Flynn Wallace via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div style="font-family:"comic sans ms",sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)"> whatever consciousness is, it would be reproduced if the function (the observable behaviour) of anything that has it is reproduced. stathis</span><br></div><div style="font-family:"comic sans ms",sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></span></div><div style="font-family:"comic sans ms",sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)">I keep reading this and keep thinking that I understand it, and then I think I don't. Are you saying that if we can get something to act like a human brain it will therefore have all the functions thereof?</span></div></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Neurons have observable behaviour: for example, when stimulated by other neurons they may “fire”, propagating an action potential along their axon, and in turn stimulate neurons to which they connect. Billions of neurons in your visual cortex interact in this way and as a result you can identify objects in front of your eyes. These neurons, via a relay of multiple intermediate neurons, connect to the motor neurons controlling speech and you say “I see a strawberry”. If the neurons in your visual cortex were destroyed their output would not get through to your vocal cords and you would not say “I see a strawberry”, because you would be blind. But if the neurons were replaced by an artificial device that produced the same output given the same input, your vocal cords would receive the same input as before and you would say “I see a strawberry”.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is all qualia blind. There is only red things in all this. You must also include the physically different redness that we experience as knowledge of red things. Also, everything you are saying here are objective descriptions of behavior in the brain. There are two ways for us to be aware of the same physical facts. One is by objective observation, which is qualia blind. The second way is subjective. The only way to know the physical quality, all this stuff Stathis is saying is describing, is to experience those physical facts being described, directly.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="auto">The above is a purely behavioural account.</div></div></div></blockquote><div>As is everything stathis is describing, It's all only behavior descriptions of physical qualities, i.e it is qualia blind.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="auto">As external observers, we can’t be sure if you have visual experiences or not.</div></div></div></blockquote><div>We can objectively know if people are having visual experiences or not, via both the week and strongest forms of effing the ineffable. In order to do the week form, you just need a dictionary that tells you what phenomenal color descriptions of stuff in the brain are describing. If you objectively see a word like 'red' representing red knowledge, you know that isn't physically red. If you see a person representing green things with knowledge composed of glycine, you know that person is red / green inverted from you. With a neural ponytail (does what the corpus callosum does), where you can directly experience the physical colorness properties in another's consciousness, you will be aware of all your physical knowledge, and the same time you are aware of your partners physical knowledge. You will know, absolutely, that your partners is red / green inverted from yourself.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="auto">However, we can be sure that if you had them before the neural replacement, you have them afterwards as well.The alternative is that you become blind but don’t notice, and still say “I see a strawberry”. This is absurd: what meaning could the word “blind” have if you cannot notice that you are blind and behave as if you have normal vision?</div></div></div></blockquote><div>Again, this is qualia blind. Consciousness is computationally bound elemental physical qualities like redness and grenness. In order to not be qualia blind, you need to include the physical redness functionality (must be objectively different than grenness functionality), and a computationally binding mechanism that enables you to be aware of both of them at the same time. The neural substitution mind experiment you propose can lead people astray in many ways. For example, if you have a single binding neuron, that is performing the binding functionally, so you can be aware of thousands of pixels neurons, each potentially firing with either glutamate and glycine (or whatever it is that has the redness and grenness physical qualities) When you do the neural substitution of the binging neuron in that case, it is just a slight of hand when you are switching between glutamate(redness)/glycine(grenness) the 1s(red)/0s(green). With that one neuron switching, you are removing any computationally bound information that was actual computationally bound awareness of redness, and replacing all of it with 1.</div><div><br></div><div>Also, a required functionality is the ability to computationally bind, via a neural ponytail the two systems both before and after the neural substitution. With this required functionality, you must be able to know, directly, whether the neural substituted system now has redness swapped with grenness, or 1s. If you do not provide the ability to do that in your thought experiment, your thought experiment is qualia blind. If you thought experiment is not qualia blind, everything makes sense, there are no conundrums or absurd things like fading/dancing qualia. If your thought experiment is not qualia blind, and if you know the phenomenal physical quality of stuff (or functionality, if you must) everything is knowable both objectively and subjectively. In qualia blind views like this, there are impossibly hard mind body problems. If your thought experiment is not qualia blind, the only problem is an easy color problem.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="auto">The conclusion is that an artificial device that correctly replicated neural behaviour will also replicate any associated consciousness.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This conclusion can only true in a qualia blind thought experiment that does not include a necessary redness functionality that necessarily can be computationally bound.</div></div></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Here is the problem which you seem to be missing. If your visual cortex is replaced, you are qualia blind with respect to visual qualia. However, you behave normally, because the output to the muscles is the same. Also, the rest of your brain works normally because it was not modified, and even blind people are able to think and talk. Why don’t you say “I am qualia blind”? What is the point of having qualia if even you yourself don’t notice if the qualia disappear?</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir="ltr">Stathis Papaioannou</div>
_______________________________________________<br>
extropy-chat mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br>
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a><br>
</blockquote></div>