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Brent Allsop wrote:<br>
<br>
<cite>>One of the important fundamentals is that knowledge of
reality is different than reality. Knowledge of reality is
simplified and optimized so we can survive more efficiently. It
only focuses on and models what is important to us. Qualia
blindness is simply having a model of reality that does not
include qualia. If there is only one word being used for all
things red, that is qualia blind language.</cite><cite><br>
</cite><br>
Ah, so you're just talking about the models of the world we create
in our heads being a different thing to the 'real' world outside. I
suppose there must be people who don't think about that, but they
will be the people who aren't interested in such things. Surely
everyone who has any interest in how our minds work realises this?<br>
<br>
You're saying that it's important to use language that distinguishes
between 'reality' (the world outside our heads) and our internal
models of it. OK, fair enough, so I'm not qualia-blind after all,
and never have been, since I started thinking about such things, a
long time ago. I probably was before that.<br>
<br>
<br>
<cite>>All experimentalists, today, only use one word for all
things red. If they detect any physical differences in the brains
of people percieving red, they "correct" for this only thinking of
all of it as red. </cite><cite><br>
</cite><br>
Well, I can't speak for "all experimentalists, today", but I doubt
if they fail to understand the difference between the red light
entering the eye, and the internal representation of whatever red
thing is seen, including the abstract mental category 'redness'. In
fact, I can't see how they could fail to. Are you sure you
understand <i>them</i>? I don't really see how anyone who studies
the brain can really think of the representations of sensory
information as being <i>the same thing</i> as the external signals
that drives them. That would imply they think there is red light
inside the brain, everytime that brain thinks about red light. I'm
certain nobody seriously thinks that.<br>
<br>
<br>
<cite>>And that is the only reason, today, nobody can tell is the
colour of anything.</cite><cite><br>
</cite><br>
I don't follow that. What do you mean by "nobody can tell the colour
of anything"?<br>
<br>
<br>
<cite>>And that is the only reason people think there is a hard
mind body problem</cite><cite><br>
</cite><br>
Personally, I never thought the 'hard problem of consciousness' made
any sense, if that's what you're referring to. But what has it got
to do with what you're talking about?<br>
<br>
OK, tell you what, never mind.<br>
<br>
I've just read your exchanges with Stathis, and you seem to be
telling him different things to what you're telling me.<br>
Does he understand, as you told me, that all this is a
thought-experiment in a totally unrealistic, simplified made-up
world?<br>
Because, you know, that's important! I thought, all this time, you
were talking about one aspect of the real world, and when you said
it's not, it made more sense. A bit more sense.<br>
<br>
But it seems clear that you still think there is such a 'thing in
itself' as redness, even though you seem to accept that redness is a
representation in the mind of something seen by the eyes. You seem
incapable of understanding that this representation can be different
in different minds and at different times, but still have the same
meaning (e.g. 'redness').<br>
<br>
I can experience redness, but there is no such 'thing' as redness.<br>
In other words, redness is an experience, a process, not a thing in
its own right, independent of the brain that creates it.<br>
<br>
I think this is where we differ most. You think that 'redness' is a
thing that has an existence independent of a mind. Am I right?<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Ben Zaiboc</pre>
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