<div dir="ltr"><div>Can we talk about certain facts you guys continue to ignore? I keep trying to do this with everything including the <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YnTMoU2LKER78bjVJsGkxMsSwvhpPBJZvp9e2oJX9GA/edit?usp=sharing">3 robots paper</a>, but you guys, forever, continue to refuse to acknowledge these facts.</div><div><ol><li>Robot 1s honest and factually correct answer to the questions: "What is redness like for your?" is:</li><ol><li>My redness is like what Stathis experiences when he looks at something that reflects or emits red light.</li></ol><li>Robot 2s honest and factually correct answer to the same question is different:</li><ol><li>My redness is different, it is like what stathis experiences when he looks at something that reflects or emits green light.</li></ol><li>For you guys, the only requirement for something to have "qualia" is that it has the same quantity of memory, and that the robot be able to pick the strawberry identically to robot 1 and 2.</li><ol><li>Your model is, by definition, qualia blind, since it can't account for the fact that the first of these two robots have very different answers, and robot #3 has no justified answer to this question.</li><li>Your definition of 'qualia' is completely redundant to your system. You don't need the word 'qualia', and you don't need two words like red and redness, because one word, red, is adequate to model everything you care about. So, trying to use the redundant term 'qualia' in your system, just makes you look like you are trying to act smart, but obviously are still very qualia blind.</li><li>You remain like Frank Jackson's Mary, before she steps out of the black and white room. LIke you, she has abstract descriptions of all of physics. To you guys, that is all that matters, and you don't care to step out of the room so you can learn the physical qualities your abstract descriptions are describing.</li><li>Within your model there is an "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap">Explanatory Gap</a>" which cannot be resolved, and there are a LOT of people that have justified arguments for there being a "harde [as in impossible] mind body problem."</li><li>All the arguments you continue to assert, including the neural substitution argument, and your assertion that this #3 robot has qualia, are only justified and only adequate "proofs" in such a qualia blind model which can't account for all these facts.</li><ol><li>Within a less naive model, which is sufficient to account for the above facts, all your arguments, definitions of qualia, and so on, are obviously absurdly mistaken, unjustified, and anything but 'proof'.</li><li>Your so called 'proof' is all you are willing to consider, since you don't care about any of these other facts, and you are perfectly OK with saying robot 3 has 'qualia', even though you have no objective or subjective way of defining what the quali might be like.</li></ol></ol></ol></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 10:15 AM Will Steinberg via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">Things are NOT colors. A strawberry has nothing to do with the red quale, it simply reflects 680 nm light. <div><br></div><div>680 nm light is NOT a color. It is interpreted as a red quale when it interfaces with the eyes and brain.</div><div><br></div><div>Some entities can't sense that light. Some might see something different. Some might be moving very fast and experience a doppler effect and not even see the light as 680 nm. Not only is everything relative, but everything is VERY relative because qualia are not standalone, they only happen when information enters a system. They depend on both. </div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 10:12 AM John Clark via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif">On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 9:31 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:</span><br></div></div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br></div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><i><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span>you guys are all completely qualia blind.</i></blockquote><div><br></div><div class="gmail_default"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"></font><font size="4">You have 2 possibilities to consider:<br>1) Solipsism is true, we are zombies and so we really are qualia blind and you are the only conscious being in the universe.<br>2) You are qualia delusional, that is to say your philosophical ideas are self contradictory. </font></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span><i>Not only do you not know the physical color anything, you don't care.</i></blockquote><div><br></div><font size="4">I am unable to care much until you explain exactly (or at least approximately) what you mean by "physical color". And if it doesn't involve the subjective ability to notice a change in the wavelength of electromagnetic radiation and the ability to objectively act on that differentiation then whatever you mean by it just isn't very interesting. I mean... if it doesn't effect anything objectively and it doesn't effect anything subjectively either then I just can't work up much enthusiasm about studying it.</font><br></div><div dir="ltr"><div><br></div></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span><i>Having this dictionary will tell us what color things are,</i></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class="gmail_default"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"></font><font size="4">You keep trying to find the nature of things at the most fundamental level and yet for some strange reason you keep talking about dictionaries. A dictionary is a list of definitions of words. Every definition is itself made of words, every one of those words has its own definition also made of words, and the infinite loop continues. You're not going to obtain philosophical insight by reading a dictionary. And if there isn't an infinite chain of "why" questions and there really is one correct answer to the consciousness question at the most fundamental level then at some point in the chain of questions you are going to say "I see a termination because a miracle occurs here" or if you prefer "a brute fact occurs here". After all, an effect without a cause does not violate any law of logic. Fortunately with data processing the miracle is as small as possible because changes don't get simpler than changing on to off. </font></div><div> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div> <span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span><i>where we connect our brains with 3 millions neurons, so we can directly experience the actual physical colors in other's brains, the same way the physical knowledge in our left hemisphere is directly computationally bound to the physical knowledge in our right. </i></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class="gmail_default"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"></font><font size="4">We know with experiments with people that when those 3 million neurons connecting the brain's hemispheres are cut the individual who received the surgery starts acting in ways that are different from the way he acted before the surgery. And both hemispheres are capable of acting independently of the other, and that behavior is different from each other, and neither matches the behavior of the pre-surgery individual. And it can be shown that one hemisphere can know things that the other does not. And so I would maintain neither hemisphere knows what it's like to be the other, and neither hemisphere knows what it's like to have 2 working hemispheres connected by 3 million information carrying cables, and the pre-surgery individual doesn't know what it will be like to have a split brain in his head.</font></div><div class="gmail_default"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><i><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span>we aren't jsut some kind of brain in a vat.</i></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font size="4">I don't know why you keep saying that as if it's something of fundamental importance, skulls and vats are just slightly different types of containers for brains. </font></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span><i>And it's up to the experimentalists. </i></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class="gmail_default"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"></font><font size="4">Exactly, and just like Evolution itself experimentalists can see intelligent behavior but they can't see qualia or consciousness. Nevertheless Evolution managed to produce consciousness at least once (in me) and probably many billions of times, so I conclude consciousness must be a byproduct of something that Evolution can see, something like intelligent behavior. And experimentalists can form some conclusions about qualia and consciousness, but only if they make some assumptions that, although my hunch is are largely correct, they can't prove and will never be able to prove.</font></div><div class="gmail_default"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><i><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span>the current popular consensus that "<font color="#500050">The supervening qualities are the result of the ones and zeroes"</font></i></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><font size="4">Ones and zeroes are pure abstractions but information is physical and so is the difference between a electrical circuit that is open and a electrical circuit that is closed. So I guess i believe in half of what you call the "popular consensus" (although in my experience it's not all that popular). Supervenience is just a two dollar word for "depends on" and I think that both intelligent behavior and consciousness is the result of not ones and zeros but of open/closed or on/off; you can represent one and zero with on and off if you want but you don't have to, if you're working in Boolean logic and not arithmetic you can have them represent true or false or any other binary quality you like.</font><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><i><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span>I'll bet any amount of money, at any odds, that functionalists camps will be the first to be experimentally falsified, once experimentalists stop being qualia blind.<span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"> </span>Anyone care to put any money, where their mouth is? </i></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class="gmail_default"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"></font><font size="4">I've been known to make small bets on scientific matters before (and to be honest I usually ended up losing money) but I refuse to make a bet if I don't understand exactly, or even approximately, what the bet actually is.</font></div><div class="gmail_default"><font size="4"><br></font></div><div class="gmail_default"><font size="4"> John K Clark</font></div></div></div>
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