<div dir="ltr"><p class="gmail-MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Hi Stathis and Stuart,</p>
<p class="gmail-MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="gmail-MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Thanks for your continued
responses. I apologize for taking so
long to get back. Things have been
extremely busy with work and personal life.
I’m finally finding time to reply to both of your responses.</p>
<p class="gmail-MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </p></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 10:31 AM Stuart LaForge via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
Quoting Brent Allsop:<br>
<br>
> Hi Stuart,<br>
> Thanks for the feedback on my terminology. That really helps.<br>
> But, it would help if you could provide more evidence that you understand<br>
> why I'm using the terminology I am.<br>
> Much of what you are saying is evidence to me you don't yet understand the<br>
> model I'm trying to describe and what "qualia blindness" means.<br>
<br>
The simple fact that you are unsure whether I understand you or not <br>
indicates that you yourself are qualia blind. Moreover, the fact that <br>
your model is itself an abstraction indicates that your model is <br>
qualia blind. The sad truth is that your terminology and model have no <br>
physical qualities at all. They are just pictures and words composed <br>
of Shannon information i.e. literal bits on a bitmap projected on my <br>
screen and therefore qualia blind no matter how sublime and wondrous <br>
they may be in your own head.<br>
<br>
> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 9:28 PM Stuart LaForge via extropy-chat <<br>
> <a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
>> "Qualia blindness" sounds too pejorative to be useful as a term of<br>
>> art. You should stop using it especially since you tend to apply it to<br>
>> people who disagree with you and you have so much trouble explaining<br>
>> what it means. Perhaps "qualia denial" or "qualia denier" would be a<br>
>> better and more accurate term, since even Daniel Dennett experiences<br>
>> qualia, even though he doesn't believe them to be important.<br>
>><br>
><br>
> Saying this kind of stuff is strong evidence that you still don't<br>
> understand the model I'm trying to describe.<br>
<br>
Maybe it is because your description contradicts itself. Your <br>
description is merely abstract and has none of the physical qualities <br>
that it extols. Robots 1 & 2 claim that they experience physical <br>
qualities when seeing a strawberry, but a robot could be programmed to <br>
say that using a simple lookup table, regardless of it being true or <br>
not. Since there is no way for robots 1 and 2 to use abstract words <br>
and rules of grammar to prove that they see qualia, they are <br>
ultimately no different than robot 3 who simply admits that his <br>
knowledge is abstract. Especially since robot 3 might be lying too <br>
because he is afraid somebody might try to "fix" him if he displays <br>
signs of consciousness. Therefore there is no way for you to <br>
communicate ANY model that is not qualia blind since communication <br>
requires abstraction and information and therefore qualia blind.<br>
<br>
> "Qualia Blindness" is similar to the "pejorative" term "Naive Realism".<br>
> That fact that it is "pejorative" doesn't really matter compared to the<br>
> facts it is describing. In fact, some people think the fact that "Naive<br>
> Realism" is factually "Naive" is a good thing<br>
> <<a href="https://ida.mtholyoke.edu/xmlui/handle/10166/4025" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://ida.mtholyoke.edu/xmlui/handle/10166/4025</a>>. I would bet that John<br>
> would agree that his view is 'qualia blind' and that he is perfectly OK<br>
> with using one word for all things 'red' as he has indicated multiple<br>
> times. And of course, saying you should ignore qualia, as Dennett does, is<br>
> the very definition of being qualia blind. Dennett openly admits that.<br>
<br>
How does the number of words one uses to to describe "all things red" <br>
matter in the slightest? Words are words. That your model uses a <br>
thousand of words to try to explain redness does not make your model <br>
any less qualia blind than the single word "red".<br>
<br>
> Qualia blindness is as qualia blindness does. If you only have one word,<br>
> for all things red, that is, by definition, qualia blindness. It is simply<br>
> a fact that having one word for all things 'red' tells you nothing of the<br>
> actual physical qualities of any of the many things it is a label for.<br>
> Having a model (and the language of such) of the physical world that<br>
> ignores, or does not include qualia, is, by definition, qualia blind. If<br>
> you don't like the term "qualia blind" then every time I use it please<br>
> substitute it with: "Have amy model of physical reality that does not<br>
> include objectively observable qualia." Or anyone that claims we should<br>
> "quine qualia" and so on.<br>
<br>
Again your model is composed of words and pictures all of which are <br>
mere abstract Shannon information and and therefore devoid of <br>
objectively observable qualia. Your model is just as qualia blind as <br>
all the models that it presumes to criticize on that account.<br>
<br>
>> Not at all. Inverted perception in no way proves that qualia are not<br>
>> "phantasms of the mind" to use Newton's terminology. In fact, the<br>
>> rewiring I described between the retina and the visual cortex is<br>
>> specifically in reference to the signalling pathway model.<br>
>><br>
><br>
> More evidence you are not understanding what I'm trying to say. If you put<br>
> a red green signal inverter in the optic nerve<br>
> <<a href="https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/?chapter=Perception_Inverted" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/?chapter=Perception_Inverted</a>>,<br>
> The light and the "L-cone" will be firing 'red', but the knowledge will not<br>
> have a redness quality, it will have a greeness quality. This fact<br>
> necessarily proves that neither the L-cone, nore the 'red' light, (as you<br>
> are claiming) have anything to do with the physical quality of knowledge<br>
> (since it isn't redness, it is greeness when the inverter is in place).<br>
<br>
Criss-crossing the neural pathways is the only technologically <br>
feasible way that an inline red-green inverter could work. I doubt <br>
that the signal transduced from an L-cone is all that different from <br>
the signal transduced from an M-cone except with regard to the <br>
specific pathway it takes from the retina to the visual cortex. <br>
Sending one cone's signal down the other cone's pathway will trigger <br>
greenness in response to red.<br>
<br>
So how does your red-green signal inverter work? Magic?<br>
<br>
> I'm in a different camp<br>
> <<a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/79-Neural-Substtn-Fallacy/2" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://canonizer.com/topic/79-Neural-Substtn-Fallacy/2</a>>. Functionalist<br>
> are the only ones with a "hard problem" which they have no idea how to<br>
> address, let alone having any way of verifying what they think must be.<br>
> While my prediction is that they will first falsify "glutamate" as being<br>
> the same as "redness" and then experimentalists will substitute glutamate<br>
> with something else physical.<br>
<br>
I am not so certain about the "substrate independence" of specific <br>
qualia. While there is no reason why a simulated brain could not <br>
produce qualia, there is also no checksum to verify the fidelity of <br>
any simulated qualia. I suppose that any particular quale could be <br>
reproduced in many different substrates but would be the highest <br>
fidelity in its native substrate. Kind of like using a virtual machine <br>
to run Windows on a Mac. It works but not quite as well as a native <br>
installation on a PC. So would that be partial substrate independence?<br>
<br>
> Your "signalling pathway model" is a great<br>
> model. It's about the only prediction of what qualia are that nobody has<br>
> created a camp for yet. Experimental results could certainly verify it is<br>
> a "readiness pathway" that we experience as redness right? Would you be<br>
> willing to help us create a "signalling pathway model" camp, so<br>
> experimentalists have another way to test for this qualia possibility?<br>
<br>
Thanks. As I have mentioned before, it is part of a larger theory on <br>
the emergent properties of synergistic systems. I suppose I could <br>
write something up specifically in reference to qualia.<br>
<br>
> But<br>
> if experimentalists found a particular "pathway" that always resulted in<br>
> subjective redness, then this same "pathway" would always produce the same<br>
> redness no matter what brain it was in, right?<br>
<br>
Not necessarily. Redness is likely to be learned knowledge and the <br>
specific neurons and synapses involved would have been stochastically <br>
trained during development. So I would expect variation between <br>
different subjects as to the specific neurons involved but relative <br>
consistency within any given subject over repeated trials suing the <br>
same color.<br>
<br>
<br>
>> Reframing the "the hard mind-body problem" as the "color problem" does<br>
>> not help in the slightest because the "color problem" has remained<br>
>> unsolved for over 300 years and was first voiced by Isaac Newton in<br>
>> the 17th century.<br>
><br>
> Exactly, and the only reason is, is because everyone has been, to date,<br>
> qualia blind. Non of the sub camps of RQT can be falsified as long as all<br>
> experimentalists are qualia blind. To me, most of the theories and all the<br>
> religious stuff, are what I think of as 'crap in the gap'. (similar to the<br>
> idea of the God of the Gaps in evolutionary theory) As long as we can't<br>
> falsify things, people can believe any crap they want to believe. Qualia<br>
> blind people "correct" for any physical differences observed in the brain,<br>
> labeling it all with the single word 'red'. Again, doing this makes one<br>
> blind to any different physical qualities they may be detecting. As long<br>
> as experimentalists continue to do this, they can't falsify any of the sub<br>
> camps to RQT.<br>
<br>
Qualia blindness is likely an inescapable state of affairs. Simply <br>
creating a model that claims the existence of physical qualities does <br>
not magically grant one the ability to identify or manipulate them nor <br>
cause them to exist. Qualia are much like the Tao in that the redness <br>
that can be spoken of, or described in a model, is not the true redness.<br>
<br>
Stuart LaForge<br>
<br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div>