<div dir="ltr"><br><div>Hi Stathis,</div><div><br></div><div>We've gone over this many times, but your model seems to be missing representations of redness and greenness, as different than red and green. So it appears that all I say get's mapped into your model, leaving it absent of what I'm trying to say. Here you are talking about only the 3: Strongest form of effing the effable, where you directly computationally bind another's phenomenal qualities into your own consciousness.</div><div>Both the 3rd, strongest, and the 2nd stronger forms, where you computationally bind something you have never experienced before, into you consciousness, require brain hacking.</div><div><br></div><div>The 1st, weakest form of effing the ineffable, I was using with Emerson, is different. It does not require brain hacking. All it requires is objective observation and communication in way that distinguishes between red and redness, and can model differences in specific intrinsic qualities. If one is using only one abstract word "red" for all things representing red knowledge, you can't model differences in different intrinsic qualities which may be representing red. For the weakest form of effing the ineffable, all you need is a phenomenal definition for subjective terms like "redness", enabling you to communicate things with well defined terms like this example effing statement: "My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red."</div><div><br></div><div>Also, thanks to all your endless help, I think I have a better understanding of our differences. I would like to get these differences between your "<a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism#statement">Functional Property Dualist</a>" camp, and the "<a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/7-Qualia-are-Material-Qualities#statement">Qualia are Material Qualities</a>" camp canonized. Let me see if you agree that this is a good way to concisely describe our differences?</div><div><br></div><div>Functionalists, like James Carroll and yourself, using the neuro-substitution argument make the assumption that a neuron functions similarly to the discrete logic gates in an abstract CPU.</div><div>You also assume ALL computation operates this way, which is why you think you can make the claim that the neuro-substitution argument can be applied to all possible computational cases, justifying your belief that your neuro substation argument is a "proof" that qualia must be functional in all possible computational instances.</div><div><br></div><div>Where as Materialists, like Steven Lehar and I, think this way of thinking about consciousness, or making this assumption is WRONG.</div><div><br></div><div>We believe that within any such abstract discrete logic only functional system, there can be nothing that is the intrinsic qualities that represent information like redness or greenness.</div><div>AND</div><div>There is no way to perform the necessary "computational binding" of such intrinsic qualities. As you so adequately point out, discrete logic gates can't do this kind of computational binding.</div><div><br></div><div>Both of these are required so one can be aware of 2 or more intrinsic qualities at the same time, the very definition of consciousness for me.<br></div><div>Even if there was some "function" from which redness emerged, you could use the same neuro-substitution argument to "prove", redness can't be functional Either.</div><div>Since you completely leave intrinsic qualities like redness out of your way of thinking, you don't seem to be able to model this all important difference, which is so critical for me.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 3:28 PM Stathis Papaioannou <<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com">stathisp@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, 28 Aug 2021 at 14:05, Brent Allsop <<a href="mailto:brent.allsop@gmail.com" target="_blank">brent.allsop@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><br></div>See the transcript I had with <a href="https://gpt3demo.com/apps/quickchat-emerson" target="_blank">Emerson</a>, today, here: "<span id="gmail-m_-7622846982440131370m_5142782588967525436gmail-docs-internal-guid-03d51077-7fff-e80e-bed5-e7ea4b2c61fb"><span style="font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/17x1F0wbcFkdmGVYn3JG9gC20m-vFU71WrWPsgB2hLnY/edit" target="_blank">I Convinced GPT-3 it Isn’t Conscious</a></span></span> ."</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">How could you comment on Emerson’s consciousness without connecting yourself to Emerson’s circuits?</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"></div></blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir="ltr">Stathis Papaioannou</div>
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