<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr">On Mar 20, 2022, at 1:21 PM, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> wrote:</div><div dir="ltr"><blockquote type="cite">Hi Dan, It looks like I may have failed to include the link to the actual answer?:</blockquote></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div><a href="https://www.quora.com/How-does-the-brain-create-colour-How-would-you-explain-colour-to-a-blind-person/answer/Brent-Allsop-1" target="_blank">https://www.quora.com/How-does-the-brain-create-colour-How-would-you-explain-colour-to-a-blind-person/answer/Brent-Allsop-1</a><br></div><div>And as you can see, the first paragraph proves this kind of Naive Realism view can't be true, for who's redness would be the property of the strawberry?</div><div>Also, the book summary talked about how qualia: " are related to the physical properties on which they supervene".</div><div>However if qualia supervene on something, then the qualia are different than what they "supervene" on.</div><div>And Dennett <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia">says that</a> qualia are "<i style="color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">directly or immediately <a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/apprehend" class="extiw" title="wiktionary:apprehend" style="text-decoration-line:none;color:rgb(51,102,187);background:none">apprehensible</a> by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness" title="Consciousness" style="color:rgb(6,69,173);background:none">consciousness</a></i>".</div><div>In other words, qualia are directly apprehended. We are interested in the qualities we directly apprehend, not the different stuff on which they allegedly supervene/intervene, right?</div></div></div></div></blockquote><br><div><div dir="ltr">I haven’t finished reading the book yet, so I can’t really respond in an informed way of how Watkins tries to overcome the issues you raise. I admit, he’s taking a rather controversial view here. And I’m not saying I’m agreeing with him from the start. (I'm interested in Moore, too, though Moore wasn’t a direct realist, I believe, in any meaningful sense. He was into sense data. I take it Watkins is a Moorean in the more abstract sense of taking the ‘common sense’ conclusion about colours than accepting a sense data view of perception or other trappings of Moore’s philosophy.)</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">Regards,</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">Dan</div></div></body></html>