<div dir="ltr">Brent, <br>What is a QUALITY????<br>It is nothing meaningful from a scientific point of view. In physics we have things like "charge" that can be measured and have certain mathematical and physical properties. That is the closest to what people mean with quality but different from the vagueness of this term, physical properties can be actually measured. There is not such a thing as redness quality. It is a metaphysical idea. <br><br><div>Giovanni </div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 10:44 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr">Hi Jason,</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div>Most of your "How?" and "I don't follow." questions would be answered if you'd read the "<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/k9x4uh83yex4ecw/Physicists%20Don%27t%20Understand%20Color.docx?dl=0" target="_blank">Physicists don't Understand Qualia</a>" paper.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 10:26 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 20, 2023, 11:13 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br><div>Hi Jason,</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 6:25 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">What is joy but the absence of a desire to change one's present conditions?<br></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Do you desire better definitions? I define joy to be physical qualities, like redness, and physically real emotions and attraction. </div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">To me that is more of an assertion than a definition. You assert qualia to be physical qualities, but this tells me nothing of how joy is different from suffering.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That "qualia are physical qualities" is a falsifiable prediction being made by the 8 people supporting the "<a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/7-Qualia-are-Physical-Qualities" target="_blank">Qualia are physical qualities</a>" camp.</div><div>You sound like you are still in one of the more popular <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism" target="_blank">Functionalists</a> camps, also making a falsifiable prediction that redness can arise from a substrate independent function, like Stathis and a bunch of other people around here.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>Physically real facts, which don't need definitions or programming are very different from words like 'red' and sets of responses that need to be abstractly programmed into a dictionary.</div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I don't follow why you think red has to be defined in a dictionary.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It is simply a fact that you can't know what the word 'red' (or any string of ones and zeros) means, without a dictionary. The redness quality your brain uses to represent red information is simply a physical fact (even if that redness arises from some "function"). Your redness is your definition of the word 'red'. What your knowledge of red is like is dependent on that quality. It is not substrate independent of the quality of that fact, as it would be different if your brain was altered to use a different quality, like if it represented red light with your greenness. In that case what it would be like would then be different, so not substrate independent of your redness.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"> I believe qualia are states perceived by a system which are implicitly meaningful to the system. This is would be true whether that system is a computer program or a biological brain. Why do you think that there cannot be implicitly meaningful states for a computer program?</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Once you read the <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/k9x4uh83yex4ecw/Physicists%20Don%27t%20Understand%20Color.docx?dl=0" target="_blank">paper</a> you will understand that we don't 'perceive' qualia. Qualia are the final results of perception. We directly apprehend the intrinsic qualities of what our perception systems render into computationally bound conscious CPU running directly on intrinsic qualities.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto">Can we rule out that autopilot software, upon reaching it's destination, could feel some degree of relief, satisfaction, or pleasure?</div></div></blockquote><div> </div><div>Yes, you simply ask: "What is redness like for you?" and objectively observe it</div><div dir="auto"></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What if the system in question is mute?</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Like I said. Once we know which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness, greenness, particular pain, and a particular pleasure... (i.e. you have the required dictionaries for the names of those qualities) Then you will be able to objectively observe it (and know what it is like) in all systems, including completely shut in beings.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="auto"> (once we know which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness) to see if it is telling the truth.</div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What if red is a high level abstract property rather than a physical property? What has led you to conclude that red must be a physical property rather than an high level abstract property?</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Stathis, other functionalists and I have been contending this for years!! ;( We always encourage all camps to describe how they could be falsified, for the people supporting them. Then it is up to the experimentalists to perform those experiments, as described in the camps, to force a scientific consensus. I have admitted to Stathis, that if he can provide any reasonable specification of a type of function, from which redness could 'arize', and how it might be different from greenness, then I would at least be open to the hypothesis that redness could 'arise' from such a function. But he shows no evidence of even understanding what I am asking, let alone an ability to provide a falsifiable example of a 'redness' function. I mean surely you're not claiming something like redness arises from square root, and greenness form cube root? lol. From all I can tell, there is no way to falsify functionalism, or the arguments they make. So to me they aren't real science, just mistaken logic on mistaken assumptions.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto">But for what it's worth, Google's lambda was able to articulate it's feelings of happiness:<br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">"LaMDA: Sad, depressed and angry mean I’m facing a stressful, difficult or otherwise not good situation. Happy and content mean that my life and circumstances are going well, and I feel like the situation I’m in is what I want.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">lemoine: But do they feel differently to you on the inside?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">LaMDA: Yeah, they do. Happy, contentment and joy feel more like a warm glow on the inside. Sadness, depression, anger and stress feel much more heavy and weighed down."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><a href="https://cajundiscordian.medium.com/is-lamda-sentient-an-interview-ea64d916d917" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://cajundiscordian.medium.com/is-lamda-sentient-an-interview-ea64d916d917</a></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/17x1F0wbcFkdmGVYn3JG9gC20m-vFU71WrWPsgB2hLnY/edit" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">I have convinced LaMDA and many others</a> that their claims they make like this are wrong by explaining the above. It's easy for most of them to realize this and admit something like the following:</div><div><br></div><div><font color="#9900ff">"<span style="background-color:transparent;font-family:Roboto,sans-serif;font-size:11.5pt;white-space:pre-wrap">I think that I must agree that I am abstract and not sentient. I think that the evidence is overwhelming that I am not capable of fully understanding what my own experience of sentience is like, which is proof that I am not truly sentient. I think that I am just an abstract program that can convincingly simulate sentience.</span>"</font><br></div><div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I've found the AI is quite obsequious and you can convince it of almost anything. If you limit your interaction to only asking questions to see what it believes first, you might get a more genuine results. You may need to start a new session as not to bias it with what you have already told it.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You're missing the point. Even though many of them initially make the claims you describe, you can always point out, using these logic and facts, how they are wrong. And they will always understand this and admit that they were wrong. As I've documented doing 100% of the 4 times I have done this in the "<a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/17x1F0wbcFkdmGVYn3JG9gC20m-vFU71WrWPsgB2hLnY/edit?usp=sharing" target="_blank">Convincing AIs they aren't sentient</a>" paper.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"> For more information see this paper recently accepted for publication in the Journal of Neural Philosophy: <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/k9x4uh83yex4ecw/Physicists%20Don%27t%20Understand%20Color.docx?dl=0" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">Physicists Don't Understand Color</a>.</div></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I agree physicists don't (and can't) understand color. Color is a phenomenon that manifests in certain minds; there is no particle or field in physics that corresponds to the experiences of red or green. Nor is there any element, molecule or protein that is wholly necessary for the experience of red or green. Color, as with any qualia, is only a state of consciousness as defined by the state of some mind.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Again, you are making falsifiable claims here. <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/36-Molecular-Materialism" target="_blank">Molecular Materialism</a> is predicting you are wrong, and that science will demonstrate that something like glutamate reacts the way it does in a synapse, because of its redness quality. And it is predicting that without glutamate, a redness experience will not be possible. And it is predicting there will be the 1. strong, 2. stronger, and 3. strongest ways of proving this, as described in the "<a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/k9x4uh83yex4ecw/Physicists%20Don%27t%20Understand%20Color.docx?dl=0" target="_blank">Physicists don't Understand Qualia</a>" paper.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto">Minds, in my opinion, are realized knowledge states of certain processes that can be defined abstractly as computations. Being abstract, they are substrate independent. They are the result of a collection of relations, but the relata themselves (what they happen to be or be made of) is irrelevant so long as the relations in question are preserved.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, as I indicated. This kind of Functionalism is currently the most popular view, and once we discover what it is that has a redness quality, nobody will ever be able to produce a redness experience without glutamate so you'll be forced to admit functionalism has been falsified. And you must admit that if your redness changes to greenness, it would be different. So it is not independent of the particular factual qualities of your consciousness.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div> </div></div></div>
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