<div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Apr 2, 2023 at 1:01 PM Max More via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">Jason, although I agree with much of your post I have a
concern or two about what you wrote. Naturally, I’m going to focus on the
concerns rather than the agreement.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thank you for your detailed write up. I will try to address each of your points below.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> According to the computational theory of mind, the
conscious state must be identified not with any particular physical
manifestation (body), but rather, with some abstract
informational/computational pattern. At first glance, this seems like a trivial
distinction, but on a deeper inspection we see that it yields many properties
which religions typically ascribe to souls:</span><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><br>
<span style="background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> It has no definitive physical location, no
associated mass or energy. In a sense, it is immaterial.</span><br>
<span style="background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> Moreover, none of the states of an abstract
computation bear any dependence on physical properties, so in this sense it
might also be called non-physical.</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">I’m not sure this is incorrect or just potentially misleading.
By “the computational theory of mind” I take it that you mean some form of functionalism.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That's correct.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
According to that view, it is correct to say that “<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">the conscious state must be
identified not with any particular physical manifestation (body)”. However, I
get uncomfortable when you go on to say it “yields many properties which
religions typically ascribe to souls”, including immateriality and “non-physical”
and having no dependence on physical states or energy. This is a Moravecian
view but it’s not a functionalist view – or might not be depending on how you
mean it.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>What I mean is that the particulars of the physical can be abstracted away and ignored completely, because the logical meaning of the computation operates at a higher level. Programmers need not consider electric fields or quark gluon interactions when they write software. If our universe had different fields and particles, but still permitted the construction of a computer, then the computations could execute in that universe just as well as any other. As it happens, a universe needn't even have particles or fields, a universe as simple as the Game of Life, has everything necessary to build a Turing machine. In this sense, one's conscious state is entirely divorced from the underlying physics, and any conscious state can exist in, or be realized in any universe permitting construction of Turing machines. It is in this sense that I say consciousness is non-physical.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">In a functionalist/computational theory of mind, any
*instance* of mental/cognitive state is instantiated in a physical system,
</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree that at least one instantiation is required. And I did not mean to imply otherwise. However, I would add that the instantiation need not be what we would conventionally consider a "physical one." See more below.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">which consists of energy (always in the form on matter, at least so far).</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In *this universe* it does. Though a conscious state could also be realized in other universes of different kinds. Our consciousness may even exist in purely mathematical/platonic objects, or existing as a necessary consequence of mathematical truth. As it happens, this hypothesis can explain many aspects of our physical universe as I write about here: <a href="https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory">https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory</a> If this theory is true, it leads to a a form of idealism, wherein the physical universe as we see it is derivative of conscious states (rather than, as is normally supposed, consciousness being derivative from physical states).</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">
Souls, as traditionally understood, have NO physical instantiation.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There is a very long history of the concept of the soul. Beliefs concerning it across religions and time are varied. Here is a link to some of my writings about beliefs about the soul (including those of religions and philosophers) from prehistoric times on through to the middle ages: <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1W5Prsw4oyMZHecILb4c4qa07peLwKPS2/view?usp=share_link">https://drive.google.com/file/d/1W5Prsw4oyMZHecILb4c4qa07peLwKPS2/view?usp=share_link</a></div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> There is a
big difference between Christians who believe their souls will be to Heaven
after death and those who believe they will be physically resurrected. The
latter actually do not believe in a soul. Their bodies and brains could be reconstituted
from entirely new atoms. If God was feeling creative, He/it/they might even use
a completely different chemical basis for the resurrected people.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>When we learn new information, we are given a choice of what to do with our language. We can either throw out and discard the word, or we can amend and expand the meaning of the word. Across history, it seems we tend towards the latter path. Our concept of "atoms" and "heat", etc. have existed for thousands of years. But rather than throw out the word atom, when we learned atoms are in fact divisible, or rather than throw out the word heat, when we learned it was just the average speed of particles, we retained those words and expanded our meaning and understanding. It's not my choice whether we retain the word soul, or come up with a new term for the "immaterial, non-physical, transmigrating conscious state and primary essence of a person" that exists within the theory of computationalism, but my bet is that going forward we will keep the word, but expand its meaning.</div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">In other words, mental states cannot exist purely abstractly.
</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>States can only be defined abstractly, and in that sense only exist abstractly. But I see and agree with your point that there must be an instantiation. Though I should add the caveat that I consider platonic objects sufficiently real to count as an instantiation medium (though some might call platonic objects abstract, I think the difference between abstract and concrete is a matter of perspective --what appears as abstract to one observer might seem quite concrete to another (e.g. an observer in another inaccessible universe)). </div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">Nor can functioning minds exist simply as static data. </span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree there are probably no mental states associated with statically stored information. At a minimum, I think information must be subject to some kind of relation. Information cannot inform unless there is a system to be informed.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">Only once that data has
been embodied in a functioning system can mental statues restart.</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Agreed.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">I’m not sure you will disagree with this but the way you
state it makes it sound like you a dualist. I’m constantly correcting those who
call transhumanist dualists. (At least, substance dualists. Property dualism is
trickier.)</span></p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Functionalism leads to ideas which are often associated with religion, but from this association you should not assume that functionalism is a dualist theory. I confine my notion and description of functionalism/computationalism, purely to what can be explained in terms of simple mechanical rules.</div><div><br></div><div>However, that said there is a bit of a parallel between functionalism and dualism that I noticed recently. If you consider Hofstader's notion of a strange loop (wherein a hierarchy of different levels of causality, a top level reaches down to interfere in a lower layer (think molecules bouncing around in nerve cells, and nerve cells linking into neural nets, and neural nets supporting thoughts, and then a thought causes a neural activation, which triggers a muscle movement, which triggers changes in molecules)) there is some similarity to Descartes's idea that one's conscious thoughts DO reach down "from above" to interfere with the goings-on in the physical universe. Though here "from above" just refers to the higher levels of causality (each layer of which is sustained in purely mechanistic ways by the layer below it).</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> It can survive the death of the body (just as a story
can survive the death of a book containing it), and be resurrected into new
bodies via a transfer of this "immaterial" pattern, e.g. mind
uploading.</span><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><br>
<br>
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">There is no “transfer”. There is a reinstantiation. Information
is transferred, yes, but the non-functional, static information is not a consciousness.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think this may just be a slight difference in our use of words. I agree a snapshot of a computational state that is transferred is not some living experience while in transit. It is tantamount to cryogenically freezing a person, moving them to a new location, and then thawing them. My analogy with a book was not meant to suggest the pages of the book are alive, it was only meant to demonstrate the difference between "<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/">tokens and </a><a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/">types</a>". A conscious state, like a story, or a cent is a type. A particular brain, book, or penny, are tokens for those respective types. Types, being abstract, can be said to exist so long as there is at least one token of it.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
There’s a sense in which we can loosely say there is a transfer, but it’s likely
to be misleading. Hence all the mistaken “transhumanists are dualists”
statements. </p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Such criticisms I think are not coming from people who understand the meanings of those terms.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">An “immaterial pattern” is not a functioning mind until it has a
suitable embodiment.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> One's consciousness (or "soul"), not being
tied to any physical incarnation or material properties of this universe, can
then also be realized in wholly different universes having very different laws.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">I would amend that to “not being tired to any *specific*
physical incarnation…”</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Good correction.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> If denial of the soul is a reason you have rejected the
computational theory of mind, you should know this theory might be the support
science offers for the idea of the soul.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">The soul is usually understood as a non-physical substance.
That is very different from a mind understood from the computational/functionalist
perspective.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree that the concept of soul, as implied by computationalism, is different in many ways, but also similar in many ways, to what various religions have supposed about it. Various religions have supposed different things about the sun, and as our scientific understanding grew, we retained the word, but we now understand the sun very differently from how ancient peoples understood it.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> The soul explains nothing. It’s a useless hypothesis. </p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>To me "soul" is a word, rather than a theory. Just as different religions may all have their own concept and understanding of "god" and yet all use the same word "god".</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">It fails to
even begin to explain why alcohol makes you drunk or why head injuries may
cause loss of memory, blindness, or change in personality. The functionalist
view, seeing the mind as instantiated in a physical system (currently the
brain) can explain these and other things.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If someone asks you "Do dogs have souls?" and you are only allowed a "yes" or "no" answer, which answer is least wrong? You might say "no" is more correct, because you don't think anything like a soul exists. While another person, whose conception of a soul is amended to be consistent with their understanding of reality, or someone who considers how the other person will interpret the answer, might think "yes" is more correct, as to say "no" might imply to the other person that you think dogs are non-conscious automatons. Language is tricky, and I would rather avoid discussion of the merits of should we use this word or not, what is important are the properties and capabilities imbued to consciousness when we accept functionalist theories that abstract away the importance of particular material instantiations, and I think the word "soul" may be the most similar currently existing word in the lexicon for representing something having these properties, but I am welcome to suggestions for other better-fitting terms.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">> <span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">If what you are is that organization of information that has
structured your body's control system</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">I’m much more comfortable with this way of putting it,
because it doesn’t imply that mind or personality can exist without *any*
embodiment.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No disagreement here.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> There is actually an astonishing similarity between the
mind-as-computer-program idea and the medieval Christian idea of the ?soul.?
Both are fundamentally ?immaterial?</span><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><br>
<span style="background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> -- Frank Tipler in "The Physics of
Immortality" (1994)</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">Now I’m uncomfortable again! The David Darling quote also
suggests a conflation of dualism with functionalism.</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>To me, immaterial does not carry the same connotations as supernatural or magical. Scientists readily accept the existence of many abstract things: numbers, bits, words, concepts, emotions, stories, etc.</div><div>"Immaterial" in this sense, just means it is something of an abstraction which exists at a level above the physical. To acknowledge that computational states are abstract and immaterial in this sense is not to suggest that there is a ghostly realm of souls which reach down from heaven to magically push atoms around in our Pineal gland, it's just to point out that like numbers, bits, and words, computational states are not defined as particular material arrangements.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">Moravec’s view has long bothered me. When I pressed him on
it, he said that he believed every mind already exists everywhere because you
could see it with the right mathematical interpretation. Yikes!</p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>While I agree every mind state exists (because I believe reality contains every logically possible structure), I, like you, do not buy the idea of every possible computation happening within a rock, as some philosophers have argued. Counterfactuals matter in computation, without the IF-THEN follow-through, there is no relation among the bits and therefore no computation to speak of. Computations, through their structure of relations, are in a sense, self-defining, there is only one way to interpret the computation as it unfolds.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">Bostrom: “<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;background-image:initial;background-position:initial;background-size:initial;background-repeat:initial;background-origin:initial;background-clip:initial">> Recent cosmological data indicate that our
universe is quite likely infinite and contains an infinite number of galaxies
and planets.”</span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">I admit than I’m not terribly current on cosmology but this
isn’t what I understand. The universe appears to be expanding without limit but
is not infinite in extent. Unless we can reignite a physical singularity, there
is not an infinite amount of energy or matter. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in;font-size:11pt;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </p></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The current leading model in cosmology (the standard model of cosmology) a.k.a. the "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda-CDM_model#Shape_of_the_universe">ΛCDM Model</a>" assumes a flat geometry of spacetimes which implies a spatially infinite universe. This has not been proven, but our best observations have not ruled it out either. An infinite cosmology is also implied by eternal inflation, which is the model for how the </div><div><br></div><div>See:</div><div>Max Tegmark explains how the universe is big enough to have duplicates of each of us according to standard models: <a href="https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf">https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf</a> </div><div>Alan Guth explains how inflation implies bubbles which appear infinite in extent from the inside: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfeJhzPq3jQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfeJhzPq3jQ</a></div><div>My article on how big is the universe: <a href="https://alwaysasking.com/how-big-is-the-universe/">https://alwaysasking.com/how-big-is-the-universe/</a></div><div><br></div><div>"In an eternally inflating universe, anything that can happen will happen; in fact, it will happen an infinite number of times."<br>-- Alan Guth, in “<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf">Eternal inflation and its implications</a>“<br></div><div><br></div><div> Jason</div></div></div>