<div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 4, 2023 at 6:30 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr">On Tue, Apr 4, 2023 at 12:47 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>Yay, someone besides me is wondering what others believe. Thanks Jason and William. That is why we built canonizer in the first place, so we could track this, in real time.<br></div><div><br></div><div>From what I can see, Most people here are still in the popular consensus <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism" target="_blank">functionalist camp</a>. (I'm ccing Stathis, who is the only one of you many functionalists willing to support that camp) Functionalists, like <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/48-Substance-Dualism" target="_blank">substance dualists</a>, separate things like color qualities from physical reality. Functionalists predict that qualities, of which consciousness is composed merely 'supervene' on physical reality, or that redness 'arises' from 1s and 0s, in some magical physical substrate independent way that is not approachable via science. Stathis, this is all true, right? Do you (or any other functionalists brave enough to admit it) admit you are a dualist in this way, and that qualities or consciousness are independent of any physical substrate?</div><div><br></div><div><a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/7-Qualia-are-Physical-Qualities" target="_blank">Physicalists</a> like me, on the other hand, are not dualists. Although we are still in the minority at that lower level, despite the fact that most of you functionalists are not willing to give any support to any functionalist camp.</div><div><br></div><div>Wouldn't it be great if we did know who all currently believed what!! </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The structure of the way you have ordered camps does not make sense to me. I no longer see a functional camp anywhere in the tree, as I recall there used to be one.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sibling camps are competing camps. There should be no duplicate doctrine in sibling camps. Instead, things two camps agree on should be pushed up to a super camp, as a single source of agreed on doctrine.</div><div>When you explicitly support a camp, you also support all parent camps, up to and including the agreement camp (where you ask the question or state the purpose of the topic.)</div><div><br></div><div>There are two functionalist camps:</div><div><a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/7-Qualia-are-Physical-Qualities">Qualia emerge from functionalism</a> under the <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/65-Monism">monism</a> branch.</div><div>and <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism">Functional Property Dualism</a>, property dualism being a competitor to monism.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>I found an archived version here which includes functionalism: <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210118165938/https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/49-Ideal-Monism#statement" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20210118165938/https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/49-Ideal-Monism#statement</a></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This camp still exists. </div><div><a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/49-Ideal-Monism#statement">https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/49-Ideal-Monism#statement</a><br></div><div>And you can see all the history with the "as of" setting on the side bar. (a historical animation of the progress of things is in the works.)</div><div>I didn't know anyone would consider that to be a functionalist camp.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>But it is placed under Mind-Brain Identity. I don't think functionalists consider themselves mind-brain identity theorists, since multiple realizability as implied by functionalism disproves the 1:1: mapping between mind states and brain states, and thus is a rejection of mind-brain identity. Functionalism implies a 1-to-many relationship between mind states and brain states.<br></div><div><br></div><div>While we can choose which camp to subscribe to, we do not control the description of the camp, nor its place in the hierarchical organization, do we? Can others change that?</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>Seems to me, most everyone here is too afraid to declare what they currently believe. Evidently they just want to continue to bleat and tweet what they believe, in half backed never improving ways, eternally.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think nuances of difference between everyone's beliefs makes it quite difficult to exactly quantify people's positions. For example, consider all the various famous thought experiments. It might be easier and also more revealing to conduct a poll for each of the famous thought experiments, for example:</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We should make topics for each of these. Especially since some of my choices aren't in the possible list of answers. I'll try to get back to this to provide my answers, but need to run right now..</div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>1. The Fading Qualia Experiment: A) Qualia Suddenly Disappear, B) Qualia Gradually Fade, C) Qualia Remain Unchanged</div><div><br></div><div>2. The Chinese Room Experiment: A) Nothing in the room understands Chinese B) Something in the room (or the room itself) understands Chinese</div><div><br></div><div>3. The Mary's Room Experiment: A) Mary learns something new when she sees red for the first time, B) Mary does not learn anything new when she sees red for the first time</div><div><br></div><div>4. The Being a Bat Experiment: A) It is impossible to know anything about what it is like to be a bat if you are not a bat, B) Some things, but not everything, can be known about what it is like to be a bat, C) It is possible to know exactly what it is like to be a bat while not being a bat</div><div><br></div><div>5. The China Brain Experiment: A) The china brain is not conscious, B) The china brain is conscious</div><div><br></div><div>6. The Inverted Spectrum Experiment: A) It is logically possible that color qualia could have been inverted without changing anything about the brain, B) It is not logically possible that color qualia could have been inverted without changing anything about the brain</div><div><br></div><div>7. The Blockhead Lookup Table Experiment: A) The lookup table is conscious, B) The lookup table is not conscious but its construction likely involved invoking consciousness, C) No consciousness exists in the look up table or in the process of its creation.</div><div><br></div><div>8. The Blindsight Experiment: A) People can see without the qualia of sight, B) Something in their brain sees, even if the part of the brain that talks is not aware of it</div><div><br></div><div>9. The Lucas-Penrose Argument: A) Only people can infer mathematical truths, B) Machines (appropriately designed) can infer mathematical truths</div><div><br></div><div>10. Philosophical Zombie Consistency: A) Philosophical zombies are nomologically possible, B) Philosophical zombies are logically possible but not nomologically possible, C) Philosophical Zombies are not logically possible</div><div> </div><div>Now would two people who agree on 9 out of 10 of these questions fall into the same camp? Or could two people in the same camp validly disagree on one of the above questions?</div><div><br></div><div>I think if you answered the above questions for yourself, it would help me greatly understand your position and your camp.</div><div><br></div><div>I will make an attempt to go first:</div><div>1. C</div><div>2. B</div><div>3. A</div><div>4. B</div><div>5. B</div><div>6. B</div><div>7. B</div><div>8. B</div><div>9. B</div><div>10. C</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 3, 2023 at 7:34 PM William Flynn Wallace via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div style="font-family:"comic sans ms",sans-serif;font-size:large;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Jason, I think, wondered how many of us were dualists. I wonder too. Are you? I am not. bill w</div></div>
_______________________________________________<br></blockquote></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I would say that computationalism (digital mechanism/functionalism) explains the most about ourselves and our universe.</div><div><br></div><div>My post was not an attempt to identify dualists, but rather, to show that computationalism implies the existence of something that many religions might call a soul, as it makes the conscious mind something that shares many of the properties often attributed to souls. This, however, is not a justification of Descartes's interactionist dualism, as computationalism can exist within a system of simple inviolable laws while interactionist dualism cannot.</div><div><br></div><div>Jason</div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
extropy-chat mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br>
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>