<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans ms,sans-serif;font-size:large;color:#000000">Ben, if it were possible to copy my brain contents into a clone or a computer, it would be another me in a sense, but I can't see how I could be conscious in both 'bodies'. So, yes, true dualist. Otherwise it's just magical thinking in my opinion. It follows that if a copy were made and put into a clone after I am dead, my consciousness is still dead - there is no more 'me'. Although the copy would fool anyone. bill w</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 4, 2023 at 12:39 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
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On 04/04/2023 08:43, William Flynn Wallace wrote:<br>
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<div style="display:inline">Date: </div>
04/04/2023, 02:33</td>
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ExI chat list <a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank"><extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org></a></td>
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<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:"comic sans ms",sans-serif;font-size:large;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Jason, I think,
wondered how many of us were dualists. I wonder too. Are
you? I am not. bill w</div>
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<br>
Not really a fair question, I think. Certainly not one that will
give us much of an idea.<br>
<br>
The reason I think this, is that there are quite a large number of
people, I've observed over the years, that I classify as
'crypto-dualists'. That is, people who claim not to be dualist, but
whose arguments are firmly grounded in a dualistic mindset. This is
most clearly revealed in the (I hardly dare say it!) arguments about
identity in a 'mind-copying' scenario. The old 'If someone makes a
copy of my mind, is it still me?' question.<br>
<br>
I'm not trying to revive that tired old debate (because it never
goes anywhere useful, it just polarises entrenched opinions even
more), just using it to illustrate what I mean. In order to think
that a perfect copy of your mind isn't really you, you have to have
a dualistic mindset, regardless of what you claim. So, I think that
just asking the question won't get accurate answers. People may not
lie, but they may well be mistaken in their answer. It needs a test,
not a straightfowrward question, to reveal the truth.<br>
<br>
So, Bill, you say you are not a dualist. Do you think that a perfect
copy of your mind, instantiated in any capable processing system
(including, but not limited to, another biological brain) is still
you?<br>
<br>
Do you think it's possible for there to be two yous, each with equal
claim to be 'the real you'?<br>
<br>
If you agree with both of these, I accept that you're not a dualist.<br>
<br>
There are plenty of crypto-dualists on this list (or certainly were,
about 10 years ago). I have no intention of starting the argument up
again, just wanted to give my take on how this question isn't much
use.<br>
<br>
Ben<br>
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