<div dir="ltr"><br><div>Yea, I apologize for being so tempted to always add the word "physical".  I know there are far more <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/18-Qualia-Emerge-from-Function">Qualia arize from Function</a> people and other non physicalists, than <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/7-Qualia-are-Physical-Qualities">qualia are physical qualities</a> people like me.</div><div>I guess what I really mean is objectively observable.  Even if redness is some "function", it would still be a physical fact that a particular function had a redness quality, right?  And even in that case, that function, operating on anything, would still be objectively observable with logic probes, and the like, right?</div><div>I have trouble understanding why you are so hostile to the possibility that an objective description of something in our brain could be a description of subjective redness.</div><div>Or.... Please don't tell me you're a <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/48-Substance-Dualism">Substance Dualist</a>, because you are definitely sounding like one, if subjective qualities aren't physical.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 18, 2023 at 6:15 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 18, 2023, 7:35 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>You are making the same mistake here, when you say "physical qualities" don't exist, which Dennett makes when they say: "We don't have qualia, it just seems like we do."</div><div>The seeming, or mistaken knowledge, is the qualia.  So the statement is self contradictory.</div><div>If you know something, even if it is mistaken knowledge, that knowledge must be something physically real.</div></div></div></blockquote></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I would say I agree 100% with what you say above, but only if you take out the two instances of "physically." The insertion of that word makes what would otherwise make sense to me, something which I can't follow.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Could you describe what you mean by "physically" and why you feel it important to use that word here? That is, could you explain why you say "physical qualities" rather than "qualities", and "physically real" rather than "real"?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jason </div><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
extropy-chat mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br>
<a href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a><br>
</blockquote></div>