<div dir="ltr"><p style="border:0px solid rgb(217,217,227);box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;color:rgb(55,65,81);font-family:Söhne,ui-sans-serif,system-ui,-apple-system,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Noto Sans",sans-serif,"Helvetica Neue",Arial,"Apple Color Emoji","Segoe UI Emoji","Segoe UI Symbol","Noto Color Emoji";font-size:16px;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:rgb(247,247,248)">GPT-4:
I can offer a rough estimate based on a general understanding of the English language.</p><p style="border:0px solid rgb(217,217,227);box-sizing:border-box;margin:1.25em 0px;color:rgb(55,65,81);font-family:Söhne,ui-sans-serif,system-ui,-apple-system,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Noto Sans",sans-serif,"Helvetica Neue",Arial,"Apple Color Emoji","Segoe UI Emoji","Segoe UI Symbol","Noto Color Emoji";font-size:16px;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:rgb(247,247,248)">It's important to keep in mind that this is an approximation, and the distinction between physical objects and abstract ideas or intangible things is not always clear. Some words can have multiple meanings, and others can be used metaphorically.</p><p style="border:0px solid rgb(217,217,227);box-sizing:border-box;margin:1.25em 0px;color:rgb(55,65,81);font-family:Söhne,ui-sans-serif,system-ui,-apple-system,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Noto Sans",sans-serif,"Helvetica Neue",Arial,"Apple Color Emoji","Segoe UI Emoji","Segoe UI Symbol","Noto Color Emoji";font-size:16px;white-space:pre-wrap;background-color:rgb(247,247,248)">Considering the nature of language, it's reasonable to assume that around 40% of the 170,000 words in the English language might refer to physical objects, while the remaining 60% could refer to abstract ideas or intangible things. However, this is only a rough estimate, and the actual distribution may vary.</p></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 12:49 AM Giovanni Santostasi <<a href="mailto:gsantostasi@gmail.com">gsantostasi@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"> <b>In particular, semantic interpretations no longer
line up very neatly with what appears to be true of the world. That is, we appear to be
able to truthfully attribute properties to “things” that don’t exist <br></b><br><a href="https://carleton.ca/cognitivescience/wp-content/uploads/2003-03.pdf" target="_blank">https://carleton.ca/cognitivescience/wp-content/uploads/2003-03.pdf</a><br><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 12:34 AM Giovanni Santostasi <<a href="mailto:gsantostasi@gmail.com" target="_blank">gsantostasi@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"> <b> The problems posed to reference-based semantic theories by the existence of nonreferring terms are hard problems and they resist simple or dismissive solutions </b><br>And here an entire thesis showing that there is a huge part of language (I would say all of it but this guy is conservative) that is has no referents. <br><a href="https://carleton.ca/cognitivescience/wp-content/uploads/2003-03.pdf" target="_blank">https://carleton.ca/cognitivescience/wp-content/uploads/2003-03.pdf</a><br><br><br> <br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 12:10 AM Gordon Swobe via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Apr 23, 2023 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><br>That is all fine and good, but nowhere do I see any reason to think the AI has any conscious understanding of its inputs or outputs.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Nor would I expect that you would when you define conscious understanding as "the kind of understanding that only human and some animal brains are capable of."</div><div>It all comes down to definitions. If we can't agree on those, we will reach different conclusions.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, agreed, and this goes back to something I believe I wrote to you some weeks ago about how I consider it a logical error to say such things as "Language models have no conscious understanding as we understand the term, but they nonetheless have some alien kind of conscious understanding that we do not understand."<br><br>I find that nonsensical. We could say the same of many things. To use an example I often cite, we could say that because the human immune system acts in seemingly intelligent ways, it has a conscious understanding alien to us that we do not understand. Used this way, the word "conscious" becomes meaningless. <br><br>Like any other word, I think that if we are to use the word "conscious" in any way, it must be in terms we understand. Anything that does meet that criteria must simply be called not conscious.<br><br>You replied something like "Well, we don't understand human consciousness, either," but I find that answer unsatisfactory. It feels like an attempt to dodge the point. While it is certainly true that we do not understand the physics or biology or possibly metaphysics of consciousness, we <b>do</b> understand it phenomenologically. We all know what it feels like to be awake and having subjective experience. We know what it is like to have a conscious understanding of words, to have conscious experience of color, of temperature, of our mental contents, and so on. Our experiences might differ slightly, but it is that subjective, phenomenological consciousness to which I refer. If we cannot infer the same in x then we must simply label x as not conscious or at least refrain from making positive claims about the consciousness of x. As I see it, to do otherwise amounts to wishful thinking. It might indulge our sci-fi fantasies, but it is a fallacy.<br><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>"Just code."</div><div>You and I also do amazing things, and we're "just atoms." </div><div><br></div><div>Do you see the problem with this sentence? Cannot everything be reduced in this way (in a manner that dismisses, trivializes, or ignores the emergent properties)?</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br>Not denying emergent properties. We discussed that question also with respect to a language model understanding words. As I tried to explain my view and I think you agreed, emergent properties must inhere intrinsically even if invisibly before their emergence, analogous to how the emergent properties in chess are inherent in the simple rules of chess. The seeds of the emergent properties of chess are inherent in the rules of chess. I do not however believe that the arbitrary symbols we call words contain the seeds of their meanings. <br><br>-gts</div></div></div>
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