<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, May 1, 2023, 6:43 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div>On 01/05/2023 22:34, Darin Sunley
wrote:<br>
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<div>Because neural firing patterns don't have a color (they're
mushy gray, just like everything else in the brain), nothing
about their physical properties has a direct causal
relationship with color experiences. Color experiences are
correlated to neural firing patterns, but to flatly declare
that they are caused by neural firing patterns is begging the
entire question [and very probably wrong].</div>
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<br>
No, colour experiences aren't <i>correlated with</i> or <i>caused</i>
<i>by</i> neural firing patterns, they <b>are</b> neural firing
patterns.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I disagree with mind-brain identity theory. To say something is something else established an identity relation, or a 1-to-1 mapping, if A is identical with B and B identical with C then A is identical with C.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But note that identity theory rules out multiple realizability. If colour experiences are identical with certain neural activity, then those same experiences can't be identical with certain silicon computations. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Here, if A is identical with B but we know A ≠ C, then we know B ≠ C.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If multiple realizability is true, then there must be a 1-to-many relationship between conscious states and realizations of those conscious states, be they by neurons, computer chips, or any other substrate, and this precludes an identity relationship between the conscious state and any realization of it.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> How is that not obvious? There's nothing else they could
be.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">We could also say experiences aren higher level patterns than the neural activity. For example: thoughts, ideas, beliefs, states of awareness, etc. The neurons then would be a lower level substrate thet supports the higher level structures. An analogy would be asking "what else a city skyline be but bricks?" While not entirely wrong, it's perhaps more reasonable to answer the skyline is made of buildings.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> The dynamic information patterns, embodied as neural firing
patterns, are what we call subjective experiences. They probably
need to have a certain structure or degree of complexity in order to
be conscious experiences, and that's something yet to be discovered,
but the general principle is not only sound, but inevitable (if the
patterns just <i>cause</i> the experience, then what is doing the
experiencing? In what are the patterns causing the experience to
happen? Doesn't make sense, does it? No, the patterns are the
experience).<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I don't follow why saying that "experience is" rather than "experience is caused" escapes or answers the question of who is having the experience.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jason</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
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This is similar to the confusion I mentioned earlier, caused by the
terminology 'my mind'. You don't <i>have</i> a mind, you <b>are</b>
a mind.<br>
<br>
These two misconceptions have the same cause, I think. Dualism. Once
you properly ditch that, these things are blindingly obvious.<br>
<br>
Ben<br>
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