<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 5:26 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Good evening Jason,<br>
<br>
On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:<br>
<br>
> Let's break #2 into two categories:<br>
> A) Bodily continuity<br>
> B) Mind continuity<br>
<br>
But what about A and B?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I am not sure what you are asking. Does what I say below help?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> For B, consider: we can make small changes to ones mind, adding a memory here, forgetting a memory there, so that, over time we could<br>
<br>
Externally adding/deleting memories I'd say would constitute a break in<br>
continuity.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Strictly speaking yes. But what about over the course of normal life? How much is gained and lost between a person when they are five years old and when they are fifty-five? Is it more accurate to say it's 100% the same person, or is it better to say it's something like 5-10% the same person?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">And is there a continuous spectrum between any two persons?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Then there are all the problems for which these give no good answer:<br>
> <br>
> For A:<br>
> <br>
> Why are two identical twins not the same person, when each is a continuity of the same fertilized egg (same body)?<br>
<br>
They don't have the same A and B. Different A:s and different B:s. Just<br>
the fact that they occupy different space and later on, will experience<br>
different angles, etc. makes A and B diverge.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I agree they diverge, but both twins are part of the same continuation of what began as one shared body. If you trace back either twin over time, you end up at what was a single shared cell (or shared cluster of cells). From a pure bodily-continuity perspective, if we ask: "what experiences will this body eventually have?" I think this perspective would have to say the experiences of both twins belong to the future continuations of this cell.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This is strange, and something we rarely consider, but it all comes down to: why am I experiencing this perspective, rather than some other? What pre-conditions were necessary for me to have been born, be alive, and experience life?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Did it depend on certain atoms?--(what if my mom ate a different lunch when she was pregnant?) Does it depend on certain genes?--(what if my eyes had been a different color?)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The twins, in this example share (or did share), the same material body, and the same genes. Whatever was important to experience life as one twin was president, identically, in the other. So what determined which perspective one would have? If the first twin asked, why am I the first twin born rather than the second? How would you answer? And does your answer apply equally to anyone who asks, why was I born as this person rather than a brother? Or why was I born to these parents, rather than some other parents?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">When you begin tugging on these questions, the conventional view begins to unravel, especially when you consider the vast improbability of your existence, if it required certain material or certain genes. Let's say it required a specific sperm cell for you to be born. Then we're 1 in 200 million. But this so required a specific sperm and egg for your father to be born, so 1 in (200 million)^2, then grandfather, 1 in (200 million)^3.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For any of us to have been born, is equivalent to winning a national lottery for every one of our ancestors. This is the improbability of the requirement of certain genes or certain materials being necessary to your existence. When we abandon such pre-conditions, the result is universalism/open individualism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Why would receiving a neural prosthesis not be regarded in the same way as death?<br>
<br>
Depends on the circumstances. How is it implemented and when is it<br>
implemented?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Right now we only have things like artificial hippocampi and retinas, but we can envision a future with entire brains are replaced after a memory transfer to a new substrate (biological or otherwise). Let's assume a complete brain replacement to a newly grown brain and memory copy, so mentality is preserved but bodily continuity is discontinuously changed.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> For B:<br>
> <br>
> Why are two duplicates created by a faulty teleporter not the same person, when each is a continuity of the same mind? <br>
<br>
They don't occupy the same space, and just by the fact of not doing<br>
that, their minds diverge.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes but we could imagine an upload of a mind to two identical virtual realities. Would it then matter that the two realities were executed by different CPUs? We know space and time are symmetrical, laws don't change based on location or orientation in spacetime. So while is a physical (bodily) distinction, from the internal subjective point of view it's the same conscious state, indistinguishable from their point of view, and hence is the same mental/psychological state.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
This is the theme of a very entertaining<br>
science fiction short story by Lars Gustafsson <br>
(<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Gustafsson" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Gustafsson</a>).<br>
<br>
In 1989, Gustafsson ventured into the field of science fiction and published Det sällsamma djuret från norr och andra science-fiction-berättelser. The book takes place 40,000 years into the future, when humans are extinct and the galaxy is populated by artificial intelligences. It is a philosophical exploration of life and existence and can be seen as an homage to Stanislav Lem.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Sounds very interesting!</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I don't think it is available in english, but I'd love to translate it<br>
if I ever got the chance and permission.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If you can, or if you find an English translation, please let me know.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Why is total amnesia not regarded in the same way as death?<br>
<br>
This is more of an ethical question to me and one frequently debated in<br>
hospitals the world over.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It's also interesting to consider, we all start from an initial mindless/memoryless state. There is then some primordial state of consciousness from which we all emerge. And further, during a degradation of a dying mind, we return to this simplest possible conscious state. For example, let's say the simplest mind state is when I'm the embryo the first neurons wire together and fire for the first time, and in a dying brain when the last two surviving neurons fire for the last time. Then from the mental continuity perspective all mine states of all organisms are part of a connected set.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> For both A and B:<br>
> <br>
> If two people are each slowly morphed into the other person, where are the two people after the procedure? Have they teleported to<br>
> the other's location, or has each changed, but remained in the same spot? Why?<br>
<br>
If it is cell-by-cell replacement, I see no disturbance in A and B.<br>
<br>
> When a brain is split by cutting the corpus callosum, the result is two independently consciousness minds. Are they the same as the<br>
> mind that was there before? If not, where did the two minds come from? If the connection were to be restored to fuse the minds, what<br>
> happens to the two minds when they become one?<br>
<br>
Do they have A and B continuity? If you cut the hardware, to me, it<br>
sounds like you don't have A continuity and based on your description<br>
(is this a real experiment? Could you please in that case, send me some<br>
links.) doesn't sound as if you have B continuity either.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There is the Wada test, where an anesthetic is applied to one carotid artery to anesthetize one brain hemisphere at a time. Consciousness is preserved through the procedure regardless of which hemisphere is anesthetized. When it wears off both hemispheres reintegrate into one combined mind.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There are also many cases of split brains where each hemisphere remains independently consciousness with its own beliefs, thoughts, desires, and perceptions. When I return to my computer I can send you more references to both these cases if you are interested. I find the self reports of those undergoing this procedure to be fascinating.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There's also the case of the Hogan twins who are able to hear each other's thoughts and see out of each other's eyes which raises interesting questions of the dividing line between two minds.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
If you can fuse it together, who knows?<br>
<br>
> If the same person can exist in the same place at the two different times, then why can't the same person exist at two different<br>
> places at the same time?<br>
<br>
Laws of physics? This one, I don't understand, but it is getting late<br>
here, so I'll blame my tired brain. ;)<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Physics reveals a complete symmetry and interchangeability between spaces and time. But we seem to have a bias against the latter situation. If we take time-space symmetry seriously, we must recognize this as a bias internal to us. It suggests that duplicates are self, as much as the same self is preserved over time.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> When it comes to #1, it does sound philosophically unfeasible to me, since we're two selves havinga discussion. If all is<br>
> illusion, how can there even be any knowledge at all?<br>
> <br>
> There would still be individual conscious states, each with they're own consciousness, but nothing (actually) connecting one to any<br>
> other. It's consistent in my view, but unworkable as it provides no justification to doing anything since we would each be trapped in<br>
> our own thought moment forever.<br>
<br>
Well, let's leave #1 to the side. I think we're in agreement, perhaps<br>
for different, but maybe not incompatible reasons, that this is<br>
unworkable.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Okay, agreed.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> When it comes to #3, I tried to google it, but it looks as if it is not a very popular stance among philosophers. Why do<br>
> you think it is not popular? <br>
> <br>
> It's relatively new, and highly counter to the brain's self-imposed ego-illuision, which is hard to escape without serious<br>
> meditation, drugs, traumatic brain injury, or logic.<br>
<br>
I find #3 very interesting. I'm not discounting it, and I will read<br>
through your blog again.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Thanks. Note that this article just introduces the idea, but doesn't really argue for it. I would recommend Zuboff's linked paper to see the reasons for believing it.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jason </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Best regards, <br>
Daniel<br>
<br>
<br>
> Jason <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
><br>
> On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:<br>
><br>
> The question you are asking about below concerns the topic in philosophy known as personal identity. That<br>
> topic asks: which I<br>
> experiences belong to which person's, in other words, how do we define the temporal borders of a person.<br>
> There are in general three<br>
> approaches generally taken:<br>
> 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment, or thought-moment is its own isolated thing,<br>
> there's no such thing as a<br>
> self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.<br>
><br>
> 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism: either bodily or psychological continuity. A self is a<br>
> continual things either though<br>
> the continuation of some physical body, or some more abstractly defined psychological organization.<br>
><br>
> 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or psychological preconditions for an experience<br>
> being yours, all experiences<br>
> are I, and in truth there is only one mind.<br>
><br>
> I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically consistent. Between #1 and #3, #3 is more useful<br>
> (it permits decision<br>
> theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic arguments for it. For example, those given in "One self:<br>
> the logic of experience"<br>
> which I cite here:<br>
><br>
> <a href="https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife</a><br>
><br>
> One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves any concern of whether some particular copy is<br>
> you, as all conscious<br>
> perspectives are you.<br>
><br>
> Jason <br>
> <br>
><br>
> On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br>
> My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would not grant the physical me<br>
> immortality. I would<br>
> look at it as a mind-seed, or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a part<br>
> of me lives on in<br>
> a child, although actually that part is way more of me, than in a child.<br>
><br>
> However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of theseus uploading is much<br>
> more interesting from<br>
> an identity point of view.<br>
><br>
> As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by neuron, over time. I would not<br>
> have a break, and<br>
> my mind would transition onto the new media.<br>
><br>
> I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading grants a form of immortality<br>
> think about that<br>
> scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal"<br>
> through a shop of<br>
> theseus procedure if it were possible?<br>
><br>
> As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my identity is probably based on my<br>
> mind, sense of<br>
> continuity and location. In a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the<br>
> definition of<br>
> identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity would be perserved, and location would be<br>
> single.<br>
><br>
> Best regards,<br>
> Daniel<br>
> <br>
><br>
> On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:<br>
><br>
> On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:<br>
><br>
> An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality is not so much<br>
> continuity<br>
> as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, they're not the same thing].<br>
><br>
> If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload will remember being<br>
> me, but<br>
> /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And no, killing me painlessly, or even<br>
> instantaneously, during or in the immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the<br>
> problem<br>
> either.<br>
><br>
> If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me, but you haven't<br>
> moved<br>
> me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to be immortal.<br>
> <br>
><br>
> So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when copied, somehow changes<br>
> into 'not-me'.<br>
> I don't understand this. If it's an exact copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there not<br>
> now be two<br>
> 'me's? Two identical beings, in every way, including their subjective experience, with no<br>
> discontinuity with<br>
> the original singular being?<br>
><br>
> When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and I will keep a copy.<br>
> Which one is<br>
> the real message? If they were conscious, why would that make any difference?<br>
><br>
> You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do you move data? You make a<br>
> second copy<br>
> of it then delete the first copy. So destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving me',<br>
> yet you say<br>
> it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an uncopyable supernatural<br>
> 'soul') how<br>
> this could be.<br>
><br>
> This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I think we should really<br>
> understand it,<br>
> yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please explain further?<br>
><br>
> Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and not-discontinuity not being the<br>
> same thing?<br>
><br>
> Ben<br>
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