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On 07/01/2024 00:21, Jason Resch wrote:<font size="4"><br>
<br>
</font> >>> If you step into a star trek style
transporter, but some error causes<br>
>>> 5 identical copies of yourself to beam down, which
one do you become?<br>
>>><br>
>>> A) none of them<br>
>>> B) one of them<br>
>>> C) all of them<br>
<br>
>>"Which one do you become?" is not a sensible or
meaningful question. <br>
<br>
...<br>
<br>
> Let's say someone comes to your door with the following
proposition:<br>
<br>
> He will pay you $1,000,000 to scan you, destroy you (kill you,
painlessly), then create a perfect replica of you to take over your
life from that point forward. Do you take him up on his offer?<br>
<br>
No.<br>
<br>
> Here, you need a theory of personal identity to decide whether
or not you are killed, or whether or not you are paid a million
dollars to be a test subject in using the first teletransporter.<br>
<br>
> Faced with this proposition, you can't avoid the issue by
saying it's a meaningless question.<br>
<br>
That's right. but it's not the same question. In the original
question, you get into a transporter, which disassembles your body
and recreates it somewhere else (and accidentally creates more than
one). In your second question, you are non-destructively duplicated,
leaving your original body intact, which is then murdered. I know
there are people who regard destructive duplication as the same
thing, but I don't. Maybe you can translate that into a 'theory of
identity'. I won't try to. I'll just say that the crucial thing is
the timing. Destructive scanning instantaneously (subjectively,
anyway) translates the subject into the new form/s. Non-destructive
scanning leaves the subject intact, with their own ongoing
experiences. So non-destructive scanning plus subsequent destruction
of the subject equals murder, destructive scanning does not (which
raises the interesting question of what about if the subject is
rendered unconscious before the procedure?).<br>
<br>
...<br>
<br>
> Do you consider any questions that asks: "What do you expect to
experience in the next moment?" to be meaningless?<br>
<br>
No. I consider questions that refer to a singular 'you' in the
context of multiple duplication to be meaningless. A bit like
sending an interactive novel to 5 different people, then asking
"what happens next?", and expecting just one answer.<br>
<br>
<br>
>> The same thing applies to someone who is duplicated
multiple times. Each<br>
resultant person is the same in the sense that they can
correctly claim<br>
to have been the original in the past, and they are all
different from<br>
each other because they are now separate minds that have
different<br>
experiences since the duplication. They will probably retain the
same<br>
basic personality traits, and will probably express them in
different<br>
ways, depending on their individual circumstances. They will
each be an<br>
independent person, with the same past as all the others, up to
the<br>
point of divergence.<br>
<br>
<br>
> But does your consciousness survive? That's what people are
concerned with.<br>
<br>
I don't see why that question occurs to you. Of course it survives,
in multiple instances. How could it not? If it didn't, there would
have been no duplication.<br>
If you sent a story to 20 different people, you don't ask yourself
"does that story still exist?", even if you had deleted the copy on
your own computer, you wouldn't doubt that the story still exists.<br>
<br>
<br>
>> If you insist on the wording "which one do you become?",
I'd have to<br>
answer A and C. Which kind of illustrates that it's a silly
question.<br>
<br>
<br>
> I think your answer shows the silliness of the conventional
view of personal identity. Your answer indicates a preference for
either empty individualism or open individualism, which are both
logically more tenable, but empty individualism is non workable as a
decision theory since it allows no expectations and makes behaviors
like saving for retirement (or any future planning) pointless.<br>
<br>
I think my answer shows the silliness of the question. Or perhaps,
the fact that we're not used to thinking in terms of multiple
selves. I normally use the example of an amoeba dividing to
illustrate this. When an amoeba divides into two daughter amoebas,
by replicating all its organelles and splitting into two, which one
is the original amoeba? The question doesn't mean anything, does it?
The original becomes two. The question "Which one do you become?" is
the same. Conventional experience doesn't apply, because people have
never done this before. When (as I hope will happen) it becomes
possible, we'll have to change the way we think about personal
identity, and it will cause many people considerable problems.
Doubtless it will spawn new 'Theories of Identity'!<br>
<br>
Ask yourself this question: If you are duplicated, creating two new
people, and only one of them is 'you', then who the hell is the
other one???<br>
<br>
<br>
>>> The "2024-you" is also different in many ways
(different place,<br>
different atoms, different experience), from the "2023-you".<br>
<br>
>>> But we also, as a matter of general practice,
believe/assume that<br>
despite these difference, they are experienced by the same
person.<br>
<br>
>> I'd agree with both these things: Different, and also
the same,<br>
depending on which factors you're considering.<br>
<br>
<br>
> That's good. I would then add that person identity theories
attempt to specify which factors ought to be considered.<br>
<br>
I assume here you mean 'in each case', as they are different.<br>
<br>
<br>
>>> Personal identity theories attempt to answer the
question of what,<br>
and how much, can change while retaining the identity of a
person.<br>
<br>
>> The answer to that depends on what your definition of
'identity' is, so<br>
it's a circular question. You could create a philosophical field
called,<br>
say, Fish Identity Theory, that attempts to answer whether
Sardines are<br>
animals or fish. There is no definitive answer to a question
like this,<br>
without any other context (the most realistic answer, of course,
is<br>
"both"). Insisting on one or the other is really more of an
invitation<br>
to have a pointless argument than a genuine question.<br>
<br>
<br>
> What differentiates concerns of personal identity from taxonomy
is that there are definite hard answers to the questions or
concerns: i.e. will you, or will you not experience this particular
conscious experience?<br>
<br>
> It makes no difference to the fish what we call it, but it
surely makes a difference to you, whether the transporter kills you
(ends your consciousness permanently), or takes you to Paris.<br>
<br>
You are assuming that 'you' means the same thing before and after
the procedure. My point is that there is more than one 'you'
afterward, each fully entitled to be called 'you'. We are not used
to thinking in these terms, which is what I think causes these
misunderstandings. This is why the question "what happens to you?"
doesn't work, because people tend to baulk at the answer "you are
duplicated". People then ask "ok, but which one is REALLY you??",
which I hope you can see, is a silly question.<br>
<br>
The key thing to wrap our heads around, I think, is that 'you'
doesn't have to be unique. And I do appreciate, this is hard. I
struggled with it for quite a while. But the conclusion I came to in
the end, is that assuming that there can only be one unique 'you' is
a form of dualism. And I reject dualism completely. If the same
mental pattern is duplicated, then by necessity, the same person
becomes two, or more people, in every way. This is the same as
copying a CD or a DVD. A pattern of information is duplicated. There
are now 500 spreadsheets, or 30,000 Beethoven's fifth Symphonies.
The question "Which one is the real one?" is meaningless. They are
all the real one, all identical duplicates of the original single
one.<br>
<br>
<br>
>>> Empty individualism says any change at all, no
matter how small,<br>
constitutes a new person. Closed individualism, says you can
only change<br>
so much while being the same person. Open individualism says
there's no<br>
limit to how much can change and yet still remain the same
person --<br>
that all variations of material composition of the body or
psychological<br>
content of the experience, are mere contingencies.<br>
<br>
>> Ok, so there you have three different views on the
matter. That's all<br>
you can say. You certainly can't say if one is 'righter' than
the<br>
others, without further qualifying context.<br>
<br>
> Only one of these theories can be correct.<br>
<br>
I disagree. Each different theory is looking at a different aspect,
which is why I used the taxonomy examples.<br>
<br>
<br>
> Your last two answers are consistent, in that they recognize
time/space interchangeability. That is, there's no fundamental
difference between the same person existing in two times, vs. the
same person existing in two places.<br>
<br>
There is a considerable difference. the first is commonplace, the
second has never yet happened.<br>
<br>
<br>
>>And I'm still no closer to understanding what 'Open
Individualism'<br>
actually means. "One numerically identical subject, who is
everyone at<br>
all times, in the past, present and future" is a sentence that
makes no<br>
sense. What does 'One numerically identical...' mean?
'Identical' is a<br>
comparison, so you have to have at least two things, for them to
be<br>
identical to one another in any respect. 'One identical thing'
is<br>
meaningless. Can we replace that with "one person", for clarity,
or<br>
doesn't that work?. The rest just reads as gobbledigook. Can it
be<br>
boiled down to "one person, who is all people"? At least that
sentence<br>
is coherent. As for what it means...<br>
<br>
<br>
> Boiled down to one sentence, it is the idea that: "There is
only one person."<br>
<br>
Ok, well that is demonstrably not true. There are at least two
people, you and me (ok, I know about me, but... (and that's a
different discussion!))<br>
<br>
>>Your definition above is different, though. You refer to
how much<br>
someone can change and still be thought of as the same. The Wiki<br>
definition talks about everyone already being the same.<br>
<br>
> When I was talking about change, I was referring to changing
the material composition of the body and the content of experience,
while remaining the same person.<br>
<br>
The only thing left then is memory. If that remains the same, then
I'd say, yes, same person. If not, then there is no basis for
considering them to be the same person.<br>
<br>
> If anything about the body or experience is free to be changed
while not destroying the person, then there is only one person.<br>
<br>
Fine, but what has that got to do with the Wiki definition, which
encompasses all people, not just one?<br>
<br>
Someone in New Zealand, born 200 years ago, has a different body,
experiences and memories to me. We are definitely not 'the same
person'. As far as I can see, this idea of 'Open Individualism'
seems to be claiming that we are. Or have I got that wrong?<br>
<br>
<br>
Ben<br>
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