<div dir="ltr"><br><div>Interesting topic.</div><div>I think all that is possible and important to identity.</div><div>The more the better. For example, if you change your shirt, you are a tiny bit different. If you forget something, you have lost a part of yourself, and so on.</div><div>The critical part to all of identity, to me, is subjective binding, in your CPU that is doing the computation. If you subjectively bind a new quality into your unified subjective experience, you are a larger you.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 7:45 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:<br>
<br>
> Copying from the other thread:<br>
><br>
> > > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know<br>
> >when it leads to > you being "dead forever" "experiencing<br>
> >nothing" "an eternal blank", with > "someone else" (who isn't<br>
> >you) walking around living and enjoying the world. <br>
> ><br>
> > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my<br>
> > point.<br>
><br>
> I'm not so sure.<br>
> <br>
> In brief, I am asking:<br>
> <br>
> What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing something<br>
> right now in this moment? What had to happen?<br>
> <br>
> - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and<br>
> experiencing something right now?<br>
<br>
Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have happened<br>
_if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since<br>
this is impossible.<br>
<br>
> - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different<br>
> atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?<br>
<br>
> - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a<br>
> different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing something<br>
> right now?<br>
<br>
> - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and<br>
> experiencing something right now?<br>
<br>
See above.<br>
<br>
> All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be<br>
> changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to<br>
> have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?<br>
<br>
I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,<br>
since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of<br>
questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various<br>
experiments when it comes to the future.<br>
<br>
> If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say "it<br>
> doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as someone<br>
> was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open<br>
> individualism.<br>
<br>
I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been presented with<br>
any empirical proof of me not being me.<br>
<br>
> If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact -- "I<br>
> had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do" --<br>
> then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.<br>
> <br>
> My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this <br>
<br>
Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed position<br>
as well.<br>
<br>
The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward and<br>
intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily observable<br>
fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing theory<br>
than more complex and abstract alternatives.<br>
<br>
The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,<br>
the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by<br>
our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our<br>
embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our<br>
experiences and identities.<br>
<br>
The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for<br>
how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal<br>
responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable<br>
for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more<br>
abstract or psychological criteria.<br>
<br>
The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most<br>
intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our<br>
everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.<br>
This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than<br>
more esoteric alternatives.<br>
<br>
The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a<br>
naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human<br>
beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity<br>
is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or<br>
non-physical factors.<br>
<br>
Best regards, <br>
Daniel<br>
<br>
<br>
P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous thread:<br>
<br>
Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an empirical <br>
way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable <br>
events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr of <br>
events.<br>
<br>
Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting in a <br>
bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my <br>
probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the fact <br>
that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when calculated <br>
through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument against it <br>
not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or other <br>
theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took place, <br>
each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more rare <br>
the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the start <br>
of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not allow us, <br>
in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations and <br>
other questions.<br>
<br>
So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very convincing in <br>
the face of empirical reality.<br>
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</blockquote></div>