<div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It is the binding referred to in the "binding problem".</div><div dir="auto">You have knowledge of what you see in your brain. I am not directly aware of that knowledge, due to lack of subjective binding. </div><div dir="auto">Half of my visual knowledge is in my brain's Left hemisphere, and Visa versa for the right. I am directly aware of all of it, because of subjective binding. (Via corpus callosum)</div><div dir="auto">This is why both of my brain hemispheres are included in my identity, while your brain is not.</div><div dir="auto">Binding is basically computation. For example, two memory registers can be bound in a CPU.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, 10:36 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On Thu, 6 Mar 2025, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat wrote:<br>
<br>
> <br>
> Interesting topic.<br>
> I think all that is possible and important to identity.<br>
> The more the better. For example, if you change your shirt, you are a tiny bit different. If you forget something, you have lost a<br>
> part of yourself, and so on.<br>
> The critical part to all of identity, to me, is subjective binding, in your CPU that is doing the computation. If you subjectively<br>
> bind a new quality into your unified subjective experience, you are a larger you.<br>
<br>
Hello Brent!<br>
<br>
Could you give an example of subjective binding, so that I can understand <br>
a bit more clearly what it means?<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Daniel<br>
<br>
<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> <br>
> On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 7:45 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br>
> <br>
><br>
> On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:<br>
><br>
> > Copying from the other thread:<br>
> ><br>
> > > > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know<br>
> > >when it leads to > you being "dead forever" "experiencing<br>
> > >nothing" "an eternal blank", with > "someone else" (who isn't<br>
> > >you) walking around living and enjoying the world. <br>
> > ><br>
> > > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my<br>
> > > point.<br>
> ><br>
> > I'm not so sure.<br>
> ><br>
> > In brief, I am asking:<br>
> ><br>
> > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing something<br>
> > right now in this moment? What had to happen?<br>
> ><br>
> > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and<br>
> > experiencing something right now?<br>
><br>
> Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have happened<br>
> _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since<br>
> this is impossible.<br>
><br>
> > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different<br>
> > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?<br>
><br>
> > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a<br>
> > different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing something<br>
> > right now?<br>
><br>
> > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and<br>
> > experiencing something right now?<br>
><br>
> See above.<br>
><br>
> > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be<br>
> > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to<br>
> > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?<br>
><br>
> I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,<br>
> since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of<br>
> questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various<br>
> experiments when it comes to the future.<br>
><br>
> > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say "it<br>
> > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as someone<br>
> > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open<br>
> > individualism.<br>
><br>
> I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been presented with<br>
> any empirical proof of me not being me.<br>
><br>
> > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact -- "I<br>
> > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do" --<br>
> > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.<br>
> ><br>
> > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this <br>
><br>
> Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed position<br>
> as well.<br>
><br>
> The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward and<br>
> intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily observable<br>
> fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing theory<br>
> than more complex and abstract alternatives.<br>
><br>
> The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,<br>
> the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by<br>
> our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our<br>
> embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our<br>
> experiences and identities.<br>
><br>
> The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for<br>
> how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal<br>
> responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable<br>
> for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more<br>
> abstract or psychological criteria.<br>
><br>
> The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most<br>
> intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our<br>
> everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.<br>
> This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than<br>
> more esoteric alternatives.<br>
><br>
> The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a<br>
> naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human<br>
> beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity<br>
> is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or<br>
> non-physical factors.<br>
><br>
> Best regards,<br>
> Daniel<br>
> <br>
><br>
> P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous thread:<br>
><br>
> Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an empirical<br>
> way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable<br>
> events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr of<br>
> events.<br>
><br>
> Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting in a<br>
> bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my<br>
> probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the fact<br>
> that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when calculated<br>
> through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument against it<br>
> not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or other<br>
> theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took place,<br>
> each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more rare<br>
> the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the start<br>
> of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not allow us,<br>
> in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations and<br>
> other questions.<br>
><br>
> So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very convincing in<br>
> the face of empirical reality.<br>
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</blockquote></div>