<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Mar 11, 2025, 1:27 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">> > Can we:<br>
> > * Can we change the clothes you are wearing? ✅<br>
> > * Change elements in your experience? ✅<br>
> > * Can we change atoms in your body? ✅ (had you eaten some other food<br>
> > yesterday, you would still be here, having some experience)<br>
> > * Can we change atoms in your brain? ✅ (likewise, had you drank something<br>
> > different, these different water molecules would now be in your brain)<br>
> > * Can we change which neurons are active? ✅ (depending on what random word<br>
> > I wrote, different neurons are now active in your brain)<br>
> > * Can we change how neurons are wired? ✅ (since I gave you a particular<br>
> > random word, and not the other, different patterns and memories being laid<br>
> > down as altered neural connections)<br>
> > * Can we change your genes? <br>
> > * Can we change who your parents were?<br>
> > Very quickly, we get to questions that have less and less obvious answers (short of having a theory of personal<br>
> identity).<br>
><br>
> True. I would add to that, the rate of change, and the eternally slippery amount<br>
> of change, and how that change is made (that is, a thought experiment, or a<br>
> change aligned and consistent with our laws of physics).<br>
> <br>
> Good points. Those are also cases of concern that various theories of personal<br>
> identity contend with.<br>
<br>
I liked the closest continuer idea. I tried to grasp at something similar when<br>
talking about the natural paths the electrons take, within the contraint of the<br>
laws of physics to try and distinguish the system in its natural state, vs<br>
changes to the system from without in the form of teleporting.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The reason I dislike it is because it seems arbitrary and ad hoc. And moreover, what forbids the existence/creation of two or more equally-close continuers?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For example, if two simultaneous duplicates formed from a teletransporter each the same number of Planck units away from the original?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What should happen in that case?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Do we then have to introduce a priority for Left-Right or North-South into our definition of closest?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > Are you able to consider counterfactual situations? If not then this<br>
> > conversation is going to be very difficult, if not impossible.<br>
><br>
> Sorry, what do you mean? Could you please give an example?<br>
> <br>
> I interpreted your "See above." As referring to when you wrote:<br>
> <br>
> "If you mean, what would have happened _if_ I did this earlier this morning,<br>
> the question makes little sense, since this is impossible."<br>
> <br>
> A counterfactual situation is one that concerns something which didn't happen.<br>
> For example if someone asks "How hungry would you feel right now, if you<br>
> didn't eat breakfast this morning?" And the person says "Well I did eat<br>
> breakfast this morning." And if that person does not, or refuses to consider<br>
> or address that hypothetical question because it concerns something that<br>
> didn't actually happen, then that person isn't able to handle counterfactuals.<br>
> <br>
> It is possible I misinterpreted your meaning of "since this is impossible" or<br>
> what you meant by "see above."<br>
> <br>
> But if I did interpret your answer correctly, then not being able to answer or<br>
> consider questions involving alternative possible pasts (counterfactual<br>
> events), imposes a severe limitation on the situations we can consider and<br>
> which are especially important to developing theories of personal identity.<br>
<br>
Ahhh... got it! Thank you for the explanation. This did send me down a<br>
rabbithole. I like the fact that through you, and our discussions, I get exposed<br>
to new questions. What I do not like, is the demand on my time to do you and<br>
your arguments justice, and to form a somewhat informed opinion on the matter.<br>
;)<br>
<br>
When it comes to empirical evidence for hypotheses, I am not a fan of<br>
counterfactuals, since they deal with potential, historical events we cannot<br>
change. Therefore they do seen like pointless speculation to me, for the purpose<br>
of getting some kind of empirical evidence for various ideas.<br>
<br>
If it comes to counterfactuals I do think they have a valid place when it comes<br>
to testing theories, when we can in fact test and change variables to see how<br>
our theories are affected, as long as we can then _actually_ perform those<br>
experiments and verify that what we see matches our speculation.<br>
<br>
When it comes to questions such as what I ate this morning it might have its<br>
place in trying to track down if I have a kind of allergy, since I can then<br>
change my diet, but note that this again means that the variable I reason with<br>
is something I am able to change in the real world and measure the result of. So<br>
I could start with some counterfactual reasoning, am I allergic to substance a,<br>
b, c, and then I proceed by just changing that variable in my diet, and then<br>
track how I feel.<br>
<br>
If we talk counter factuals such as if the Nazis would have won ww2, then we'd<br>
see Dicks stories come to life I do not find useful when it comes to finding<br>
truth, since we can never do that, so just like the principle of deductive<br>
closure, while valid when doing logic puzzles, might lead us astray if we cannot<br>
test the end result and verify, I think counterfactual reasoning that depends on<br>
assumptions outside time and space equally lead us astray.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Well I do see counterfactuals as closely tied to deductive reasoning, as they require starting from alternative premises and working out from there what should happen.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be<br>
> > > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to<br>
> > > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?<br>
> ><br>
> > I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,<br>
> > since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of<br>
> > questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various<br>
> > experiments when it comes to the future.<br>
> <br>
> I'm not asking you to change the past. Only to consider what might have<br>
> happened, had something in the past occurred differently.<br>
<br>
This is true, but the fact remains that this is not possible, so basing our<br>
reasoning on something which is impossible I thinks risks causing confusion and<br>
leads to wrong conclusions, or perhaps, meaningless conclusions.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Some theory is required and must be assumed for the purposes of reasoning out the consequences. This is how we can develop/design tests that ultimately can refute ones theories. We evaluate what a theory predicts for a given starting conditions, then with luck we can test this and confirm or disconfirm that prediction.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If you have no theory under which to operate and make predictions, then counterfactual reasoning won't work. But you should be able to reason according to temporarily assuming one theory vs. another, and find, for example that one theory of personal identity predicts one thing while another theory predicts something else. Then you can test this situation to see which theorist right, or you can see if one theory leads to contradictions.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > Okay, I would like to reframe this entirely as an equivalent thought<br>
> > experiment concerning the future. I hope you will oblige and consider this<br>
> > question thoroughly to give an answer. Here is the scenario:<br>
...<br>
> > If you can answer this question (noteL it is not a trick question, but one<br>
> > meant to be straight-forward and one that nearly everyone can agree on) then<br>
> > we can proceed.<br>
><br>
> For the sake of discussion, let's go with yes. I think I know where you will go<br>
> with this, but I am curious.<br>
> <br>
> In the field of personal identity, there is also an "easy game" and a "hard<br>
> game".<br>
> <br>
> Closed individualism conditions your existence on being born as a specific<br>
> individual having a specific material body and specific genetic make up.<br>
> (Empty individualism goes even further, conditioning it on a specific state of<br>
> mind). By placing such tight constraints on coming into existence, one must<br>
> overcome incredible odds in order to exist.<br>
<br>
I think there is another way to analyze this, and that is a descriptive way. I<br>
was born, and as a result I have a body, brain and a unique identity.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That's all well and true, but there is something important missing from this description.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Namely, that *you* inhabit this particular brain and body. The experiences that happen to this brain and body are *yours*, and will be experienced by *you*.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Now then, the real difference between closed and open individualism comes down to a single question: is this fact (that it is *you* who is in this particular body) conditioned on something or not?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
There is not condition here, it is just an event along a long chain of causes<br>
and effects. It is the same with reality. It happens to us, we have no choice. I<br>
think this also shows us that probability is part of the language of math, that<br>
is only meaningful for us as conscious human beings. Without human beings,<br>
"speaking" the language of math and probability, the concept is meaningless.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If there is no condition that determines you being in some body, and not in others, then that is open individualism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
So going back to our thread about the world, what can be infered and what not, I<br>
think you are committing the same kind of mistake here.<br>
<br>
Another favourite example of mine is Pascals wager that shows you the mistakes<br>
and error you end up with when you do probability with ideas, and especially<br>
when adding infinities, and start to "weigh" probabilities.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Pascal's wager is valid logic, but it makes an implicit unstated and unjustified assumption: that God would reward, rather than punish blind belief in him. If one factors in this possibility, and considers it equally likely as the god who punishes disbelief in him, then it is a wash.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Logic works, but this shows how important starting assumptions are for reaching correct conclusions.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
That is why I think that grounding calculations in empirically verifiable<br>
experiments is very valuable. Without that grounding, they tend to lead us<br>
astray and distracts us from what we actually can find out.<br>
<br>
With that in mind, as we have already established, with my strict criterias<br>
there is a greater risk that I will miss things, or dismiss things, which you<br>
are not susecptible to, and that is a good thing.<br>
<br>
> Closed individualism is therefore (I argue) equivalent to the "hard game"<br>
> described above, where "being awakened" requires a stroke of incredible luck.<br>
> The difference is that winning in closed individualism requires winning a<br>
> series of ancestral "sperm cell lotteries" rather than winning a series of<br>
> coin tosses.) -- Note that the 1 in 2^1000 is reached and exceeded after<br>
> considering 37 ancestor conceptions, which is just 5 prior generations.<br>
> <br>
> Open individualism, is the equivalent of the easy game. No luck is required,<br>
> no special circumstances were needed, you would always be born (awakened), no<br>
> matter what.<br>
> <br>
> So accepting that one is justified (based on one's observation of having been<br>
> awakened) in concluding it is almost certain that they played the easy game,<br>
> rather than the hard game. Your task is this:<br>
> <br>
> To show why we are not similarly justified in concluding open individualism<br>
> (the easy game) rather than closed individualism (the hard game).<br>
><br>
<br>
That would be my arguemnt regarding counterfactuals. I think your intuition was<br>
the right one here.<br>
<br>
But if I look at the AI:s definition of open individualism vs closed<br>
individualism:<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">These are terribly misleading and wrong definitions, as I will point out below.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
"Closed individualism is a philosophical concept that posits that each person is<br>
a distinct, separate individual with a unique identity that does not extend<br>
beyond their own consciousness. </blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This is circular and meaningless since it doesn't define what a person is, (which is the entire crux of the problem.) Also, no entity "extends beyond their own consciousness," in any theory of personal identity. So this is another meaningless distinction.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">In this view, individuals are seen as isolated<br>
entities, and their experiences, thoughts, and identities are confined to<br>
themselves.</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This is true for empty and open individualism as well.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> This perspective contrasts with open individualism, which suggests<br>
that all individuals share a common identity or consciousness, implying a deeper<br>
connection among all people." (GPT 4o mini)<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There is no consciousness link, hive mind, nor collective consciousness as GPT seems to suggest here. This is a common accusation against open individualism, but it is not a suggestion made by any of its serious proponents.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Open individualism is merely the idea that there are no further metaphysical facts binding particular experiences to partic bodily or mental continuations. It is subtle, and hard to see what it is that I am saying is not there, but perhaps it is best to work it out with an example:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">------------------------</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Consider a deep space mission:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">INASA has selected you for your unique skill set for a 50 year voyage to the outer planets of the solar system. Given this extended time period, you and the rest of the crew will be placed into a state of suspended animation until you arrive at your destination: one of the moons of Saturn.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">However, due to high cost of the mission and the high the risk of micro-meteoroids impacting the hull and possibly puncturing crew members' bodies, NASA decides to create five duplicates of each crew member and place them in different areas of the ship.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Thus, there exists redundancy for each crew member. If one is hit by a micro-meteoroid, other intact copies remain. NASA informs you that when the ship arrives at its destination, one of your duplicates will be thawed to conduct your mission.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Later that night, as you consider NASA's plan you begin to worry. Will NASA default to
</div><div dir="auto">waking the original me or will they pick one of the five duplicates randomly? Does it even matter?
</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The next day you ask the mission planners about this and they tell you not to worry, all duplicates are the same down to the last molecule, and the continuity of matter is irrelevant to preserving your identity because atoms in your body are replaced all the time. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You ask that assuming the original copy of you reaches the destination unscathed, that they awaken the original instead of the duplicate. The chief mission planner sighs, but agrees to do so if it will put your mind at ease.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Fifty years later, your space ship reaches its destination. You emerge well-rested from your
</div><div dir="auto">cryo-chamber, but are initially shocked to see "Cryo-chamber #2" inscribed on it when you last remembered entering "Cryo-chamber #1". As you walk over towards Cryo-chamber #1 you see a crack in the glass, and as you move closer you find the point where a micro-meteroid passed through the self-sealing hull of the ship, shot through the glass and buried itself in the neck of your original copy.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">When NASA contacts you they apologize for not being able to revive the original copy as you had requested, and say that the first year into the mission while passing the asteroid</div><div dir="auto">belt, your original copy suffered a fatal injury. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You nod and admit it was silly to have worried, as afterall, I am here and I seem to have survived just fine.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">While wating your first meal in 50 years, a sudden chill comes over you as you realize that you could have become any of your copies. If #1 and #2 had both been destroyed, I would be #3, and #3 instead of #2 would be here right now eating these dehydrated frosted flakes.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If you have the potential to become any of the duplicates that are thawed, what does that mean if all the surviving duplicates were thawed? These questions so preoccupy your mind that the next day while working on the ships electronics, you fail to pay sufficient attention to what you are doing. You</div><div dir="auto">touch a live capacitor which shocks you and stops your heart. When the other crew members find you it is too late to do anything. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They decide to thaw #3. Informed of how your predecesssor met his end, you are extra vigilent in focusing on the mission and complete it successfully.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">We can draw several conclusions from this thought experiment. The functionalism </div><div dir="auto">suggests that one's conscious state does not depend on the material identity of the atoms in one's brain. Therefore, it is in principle possible to survive teleportation.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If we analyze just one of the four duplicates NASA creates of you, we see that it is equivalent to teleportation. A scan of the original is made and a copy is reconstructed in a different location, while the original is destroyed.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The twist here is that multiple replicas of you are created. Which one of them do you become? The only answer that appears to make sense is "all of them". Your survival does not depend on which of the five replicas</div><div dir="auto">is thawed, because you would live and survive as any of them.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Therefore, if all five are thawed would you not live as each of them? In what way does it make sense to say you live as one but not the others?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">------------------------</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Closed individualism (or some closest continuer theory) says that you die if/when copy #1 is destroyed, even if copy #2 survives. This is on account of this *metaphysical youness* being bound up with some collection of frozen atoms, and yet this property is not found within the exactly identical (except for different spatial coordinates) collections of other frozen atoms in the same organization. Yet spacetime, rotational, and translational symmetry tell us the laws of physics don't care about time, location, or orientation. So how does this *metaphysical youness* matter to anything (or to anyone)? The copies of you, say #2 when he is awoken, feels exactly the same as #1 does. How is his conscious state. It yours? He feels just the same as you, is just as confident in being alive, conscious, and being a self, an "I" as you feel.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any physical facts that account for him being Thomas Nagel:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">"consider everything that can be said about the world without employing any token reflexive
</div><div dir="auto">expressions. This will include the description of all its physical contents and their states, activities and attributes. It will also include a description of all the persons in the world and their histories, memories, thoughts, sensations, perceptions, intentions, and so forth. I can thus describe without token-reflexives the entire world and everything that is happening in it–and this will include a description of Thomas Nagel and what he is thinking and feeling. But there seems to remain one thing which I cannot say in this fashion–namely, which of the various persons in the world I am.</div><div dir="auto">Even when everything that can be said in the specified manner has been said, and the world has in a sense been completely described, there seems to remain one fact which has not been expressed, and that is the fact that I am Thomas Nagel. This is not, of course, the fact ordinarily conveyed by those words, when they are used to inform someone else who the speaker is–for that could easily be expressed otherwise. It is rather the fact that I am the subject of these experiences; this body is my</div><div dir="auto">body; the subject or center of my world is this person,"</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So since there are no physical facts that could account for this, it either doesn't exist (there is no factor) or it must be added as an additional metaphysical property.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Closed individualism is the assumption/belief in the existence of this extra metaphysical property.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Open individualism is the denial that there are such additional metaphysical properties.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
and<br>
<br>
"Open individualism is a philosophical concept that suggests that all<br>
individuals share a common identity or consciousness. In this view, the<br>
distinction between different people is seen as superficial, and at a deeper<br>
level, everyone is considered to be the same self or consciousness experiencing<br>
life through different perspectives. This perspective implies that the<br>
experiences, thoughts, and feelings of one person are fundamentally connected to<br>
those of others."<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It starts off okay in saying there is a common identity, or single self. It goes wrong when it talks about there being some connection between the thoughts and feelings.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I would argue from the basis of our every day experience. Based on that, it<br>
seems like closed individualism is what is the right view.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I would too if I believed these definitions. But these definitions are deeply flawed and misleading. There are no empirical differences between what it would feel like to be you whether closed or open individualism is true.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
In addition, I would ask myself what experiment we could design to show that<br>
thoughts and feeling and experiences are connected to those of others?<br>
Empirically, I can only come up with scenarios that would confirm closed<br>
individualism.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This is based on GPT's incorrect definition.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
We are born, we have bodies and brains, and unique identities, interviews seem<br>
to confirm this. We have no evidence of telepathy.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There is no telepathy in open individualism, again this I blame GPT's terribly misleading definition.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The only way to some kind of open individualism I see, is just the way of<br>
definition or agreement, where we look at what we _do_ share. We share our DNA<br>
to 99.9% (?), we are all links in the chain of causation, the electricity in our<br>
brains and nervoussystem is the same electricity, so it could be said from that<br>
point of view that the same "power" powers us all, and this power came from a<br>
common source way down the tree of life. It could argued that we are also<br>
shared components of the global ecosystems, so looking at the planet as a whole,<br>
we could see that we are all components in that system.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">As Arnold Zuboff explains, all experiences are mine because they are all experienced as I -- in an immediate, first-person way. Every experience is felt as if it is experienced immediately by a first-person "I", and this trait is common to all conscious experiences. All experiences are felt as if they are experienced by I.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You need not go any deeper than this.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But you can, if you wish. For example, by considering statistical arguments, or cases that cause bodily or psychological continuity theories to break down, but this is all on top of the much more core notion of the "same I" being a common trait present in all experiences had by all conscious beings.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I think from a definition point of view, I'd try to go that route to establish a<br>
concept of open individualism.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Okay perhaps what I say above helps from the definitional perspective.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> (The first instinct many people have when confronted with this argument is to<br>
> say "Well someone had to win" but note this doesn't make it one bit more<br>
> likely that *you* should be a winner. Even if *someone* wins the lottery on<br>
> every drawing, it remains unlikely that *you* should be the one who wins.)<br>
<br>
True, but this is an after interpretation expressed after the fact in the<br>
language of mathematics (see above).<br>
<br>
> Why not? Closed individualism is easy to prove.<br>
><br>
> I'm an individual, I have<br>
> continuity of mind and body, and so do other healthy people.<br>
> <br>
> This is a fact all theories of personal identity agree with. No theory of<br>
> personal identity rejects the idea that bodies, brains, memories, etc. exist<br>
> and are generally experienced as if they occur continuously, and are generally<br>
> limited to the memories accessable to a single nervous system.<br>
><br>
> But none of this esteblishes closed individualism as true.<br>
<br>
See above. I got a bit ahead of myself here. I'll add that to me, closed<br>
individualism seems to be the simpler definition here.<br>
<br>
> They can be<br>
> interviewed, queried about memories, they act every day as if they were<br>
> individuals, completely aligned with closed individualism.<br>
> <br>
> This is equally aligned with open individualism (and empty individualism too, for that matter).<br>
<br>
Open individualism, as per the definition above, must account for the sharing,<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There is sharing.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
and how boundaries are drawn,</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In open individualism, no boundaries need be drawn. See my three diagrams in the Google slides from my first message.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> and it must also explain away the ilusion of<br>
closed individualism.</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This is explained by the simple fact that our nervous system aren't integrated. I don't have access to your memories and you don't have access to mine.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> Closed doesn't suffer from this, it perfectly explains our<br>
every day ordinary experience.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The fact that we have separate brains is enough to explain this. Souls need not be pinned to bodies to ensure the only experiences you can remember having are those had by your particular brain. Having a particular brain is enough to explain this (in closed and in open individualism).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> I think those are all good arguments for closed individualism, in addition to my<br>
> intuition of course, which aligns well with closed individualism.<br>
> <br>
> Closed individualism is intuitive, and it makes sense (evolutionarily<br>
> speaking) that we should be programmed to believe it by default. But that<br>
> something feels a certain way should not be considered sufficient grounds of<br>
> proof. It feels like Earth isn't moving, for example.<br>
<br>
True, but neither should it be disregarded. We do feel heat, and that is<br>
definitely reason enough to move the hand away from the stove.<br>
<br>
An argument could be made, just like when it comes to the material world, that<br>
we don't need to do or think anything in order to "live" closed individualism,<br>
and that what we should do is to come up with a way to falsify closed<br>
individualism.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">How do you explain split brains? What happens to ones personal identity when the two halves of the brain stop talking? Empirically we know the result is two independent consciousnesses, which hemisphere does closet continuer predict I will become when by brain is split? The right or the left?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Open individualism says you remain present in both -- the apparent disunion is due only to a lack of integration between the hemispheres. Should they be connected in the future, they would become integrated, and again feel as one mind.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What would closed individualism say would happen?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Also consider that the intuitive nature of closed individualism breaks down as<br>
> soon as one strays away from ordinary situations of common experience. When<br>
> you consider transporters, duplication machines, fission or fusion of minds or<br>
> bodies, memory erasures and implantations, etc. Then closed individualism<br>
> begins to seem ill-equipped to provide intuitive answers.<br>
<br>
True, but these are all thought experiments, and links to our previous<br>
discussion.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Split brains are a real, and empirically studied phenomenon.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> So with that in mind, how would you empirically prove open individualism?<br>
> <br>
> Using the argument I outlined above. We can take the empirical observation<br>
> that somehow one has awakened into existence. <br>
<br>
Do you have any other way that does not depend on statistics and<br>
counterfactuals?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes split brains I think for the bill.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > Closed individualism makes the further (unnecessary and unwarranted)<br>
> > assumption of "soul pinning". This assumption should be discarded, if<br>
> > simplicity is what you are after. <br>
><br>
> I don't think it does. In my opinion all it says, is that today, what you see is<br>
> what you get.<br>
> <br>
> I think "soul pinning" is a metaphysical assumption implicit in closed<br>
> individualism.<br>
> <br>
> It is the idea that *your experiences* are locked into being only the<br>
> experiences that happen to some particular bundle of matter (your body) and<br>
> it's continuous transformations.<br>
<br>
But based on neurology and researched into memories, they are stored in our<br>
brain. This is empirically proven.</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes and it applies equally to both closed and open individualism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> We have no evidence for that they are stored<br>
in some collective substrate or leak across people.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Again this stems from GPT's bad definition. Open individualism makes no such claims.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> But if you make a copy, or if one collection is destroyed and another remade<br>
> with different materials, you say those experiences aren't yours, because this<br>
> metaphysical thing (that you say is tied to this one bundle of matter) isn't<br>
> there, present in that other copied or reformed bundle of matter.<br>
<br>
Hmm, I think maybe we should fold our offlist email discussion into this thread?<br>
We started to discuss this in the email I think.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You could bring some of that in.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>> But *what is* this metaphysical thing pinned to some bundle of matter (a thing<br>
> which can't be measured) which you maintain is necessary for the experiences<br>
> to *be yours*?<br>
<br>
A process of electrons in a brain? We do know to some extent where various<br>
functions that are part of our identity or feed it reside in the brain.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But is this process not interrupted, in sleep, coma, concussions, anesthesia, etc. and later restarted in some other time and place (often with different electrons)?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If we survive such discontinuous interruptions then identity can't be strictly tied to the continuity of the process.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Who knows? There might be some kind of uploading able to preserve<br>
> continuity in a way that conclusively proves that our consciousness and identity<br>
> are subtrate independent, but we have no evidence of this yet.<br>
> <br>
> Substrate independence is a concern of philosophy of mind. I don't see it as<br>
> related to theories of personal identity.<br>
<br>
I can see a cross over depending on the definition of identity. As for<br>
philosophy of mind, substrate independence I hope is a question that might one<br>
day take the leap from philosophy to science.<br>
<br>
> I think science might be able to answer, or at least give indications of this in<br>
> time.<br>
><br>
> I also think you can have closed individualism without soul-pinning as an<br>
> assumption.<br>
> <br>
> What would that look like?<br>
<br>
Just like what is described in any text book on the body, the brain, coupled<br>
with the empirical experience we all have. This is based on a kind of<br>
behavioural definition of consciousness.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If there's nothing binding one's identity to a particular body/brain, then that is open individualism, for then you can survive via the continuation of any body or brain.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> I think if one drops the notion of soul pinning from closed individualism,<br>
> then are left with open individualism.<br>
<br>
How come?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Because then there's nothing tying you to a particular group of atoms or collection of memories.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,<br>
> > the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by<br>
> > our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our<br>
> > embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our<br>
> > experiences and identities.<br>
><br>
> I think this is a weak argument for closed invidiualism. I like simplicity and<br>
> how it confirms intuition much better.<br>
> <br>
> I thought it was pretty nonsensical to mention animalism as an argument. You<br>
> can argue it is simpler and more intuitive, but as I see it, open<br>
> individualism makes fewer assumptions about what is required to be you, and it<br>
> provides more intuitive answers than closed individualism when it comes to<br>
> less than ordinary situations.<br>
<br>
When it comes to less ordinary situations, if I think back to what you wrote<br>
above, some of them are just thought experiments, some might be impossible, and<br>
some we might get closer to answering scientifically. Don't you think?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I think thought experiments are a necessary tool for finding the truth, especially in the domain of personal identity (moreso even than in philosophy of mind).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for<br>
> > how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal<br>
> > responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable<br>
> > for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more<br>
> > abstract or psychological criteria.<br>
><br>
> This is interesting. From a pragmatic point of view, closed individualism works<br>
> well.<br>
> <br>
> It may work well, but I don't think pragmatism holds any weight when the<br>
> concern is finding what is true rather than deciding how to organize society.<br>
<br>
This is true, but can we? And given the fact that it does work well, wouldn't it<br>
be interesting to see if it can be falsified empirically somehow?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I think is is falsified by way of statistical reasoning, and few things could be more important than learning the truth of open individualism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Let's assume open individualism is true, how would you see that changing the way<br>
> society works in terms of crime and punishment?<br>
> <br>
> If more people believed open individualism, I think there would be more<br>
> compassion, more charity, more concern for the future, and less harming and<br>
> cheating of others.<br>
> <br>
> As far as crime and punishment, the goal should always be harm minimization<br>
> never inflicting pain for the purpose of pain alone, though punishment may<br>
> serve the purpose of reducing pain overall (via deterrence). It is a complex<br>
> question.<br>
<br>
True! Both are interesting questions, maybe better for a separate thread?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You can, though.I'm not sure I have much more than that I would have to contribute.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most<br>
> > intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our<br>
> > everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.<br>
> > This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than<br>
> > more esoteric alternatives.<br>
><br>
> This I'd lump in under simplicity.<br>
> <br>
> I would also note that most of the great breakthroughs of science came about<br>
> by demonstrating common sense was wrong.<br>
<br>
This is true! We must always be ready to update our mental<br>
models in the face of new evidence.<br>
<br>
> > The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a<br>
> > naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human<br>
> > beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity<br>
> > is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or<br>
> > non-physical factors.<br>
><br>
> This is nonsense.<br>
><br>
> > Did AI help write this? The verbosity and lack of coherence seems unlike your<br>
> > usual style.<br>
><br>
> My apologies! Yes, I should have told you that. =( My idea was to bring in some<br>
> starting points for discussion, and to discuss these myself (see comments<br>
> above), and then ask what you think. This was my mistake, sorry about that.<br>
> <br>
> No worries! I was pretty sure it wasn't written by you by how far off base it<br>
> seemed with it's answers. AI is good for generating a lot of ideas, but at<br>
> least here, not so good at judging the relevance of those ideas.<br>
<br>
Thank you! Yes, it is kind of hit or miss. Sometimes I find that they give nice<br>
summaries, and sometimes they are way off. That's why I do not use them for<br>
work. The consequences are too important, so I have to proof read, and then I<br>
can just write what I need myself regardless.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Have a great day!</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jason </div></div>