<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Mar 10, 2025, 6:40 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">> > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing something<br>
> > right now in this moment? What had to happen?<br>
> ><br>
> > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and<br>
> > experiencing something right now?<br>
><br>
> Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have happened<br>
> _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since<br>
> this is impossible.<br>
> <br>
> I am merely highlighting the fact, which I think all people agree on, that one<br>
> being present in the world, that is, here, alive, and conscious, is not<br>
> contingent on certain particulars in your environment or experience. Consider<br>
> this randomly chosen word, which I will subject you to now:<br>
><br>
> "hat"<br>
> <br>
> If I had written "cat" instead of "hat", you would still be alive and here,<br>
> and conscious, but you would have seen the random word to have been something<br>
> different. These are contingencies that are simply unimportant to you being<br>
> here, and being conscious and alive.<br>
<br>
Sounds reasonable!<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">👍</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Where things get interesting, is when we consider, how far can things go, in<br>
> terms of changing particulars (of your experience, or in your environment)<br>
> without changing the fact that you would still be here, experiencing<br>
> something, as someone.<br>
<br>
Yes!<br>
<br>
> Can we:<br>
> * Can we change the clothes you are wearing? ✅<br>
> * Change elements in your experience? ✅<br>
> * Can we change atoms in your body? ✅ (had you eaten some other food<br>
> yesterday, you would still be here, having some experience)<br>
> * Can we change atoms in your brain? ✅ (likewise, had you drank something<br>
> different, these different water molecules would now be in your brain)<br>
> * Can we change which neurons are active? ✅ (depending on what random word<br>
> I wrote, different neurons are now active in your brain)<br>
> * Can we change how neurons are wired? ✅ (since I gave you a particular<br>
> random word, and not the other, different patterns and memories being laid<br>
> down as altered neural connections)<br>
> * Can we change your genes? <br>
> * Can we change who your parents were?<br>
> Very quickly, we get to questions that have less and less obvious answers (short of having a theory of personal identity).<br>
<br>
True. I would add to that, the rate of change, and the eternally slippery amount<br>
of change, and how that change is made (that is, a thought experiment, or a<br>
change aligned and consistent with our laws of physics).<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Good points. Those are also cases of concern that various theories of personal identity contend with.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different<br>
> > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?<br>
><br>
> > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a<br>
> > different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing something<br>
> > right now?<br>
><br>
> > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and<br>
> > experiencing something right now?<br>
><br>
> See above.<br>
> <br>
> Are you able to consider counterfactual situations? If not then this<br>
> conversation is going to be very difficult, if not impossible.<br>
<br>
Sorry, what do you mean? Could you please give an example?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I interpreted your "See above." As referring to when you wrote:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">"If you mean, what would have happened _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since this is impossible."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">A counterfactual situation is one that concerns something which didn't happen. For example if someone asks "How hungry would you feel right now, if you didn't eat breakfast this morning?" And the person says "Well I did eat breakfast this morning." And if that person does not, or refuses to consider or address that hypothetical question because it concerns something that didn't actually happen, then that person isn't able to handle counterfactuals.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It is possible I misinterpreted your meaning of "since this is impossible" or what you meant by "see above."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But if I did interpret your answer correctly, then not being able to answer or consider questions involving alternative possible pasts (counterfactual events), imposes a severe limitation on the situations we can consider and which are especially important to developing theories of personal identity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be<br>
> > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to<br>
> > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?<br>
><br>
> I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,<br>
> since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of<br>
> questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various<br>
> experiments when it comes to the future.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I'm not asking you to change the past. Only to consider what might have happened, had something in the past occurred differently.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> <br>
> Okay, I would like to reframe this entirely as an equivalent thought<br>
> experiment concerning the future. I hope you will oblige and consider this<br>
> question thoroughly to give an answer. Here is the scenario:<br>
> <br>
> You will be put to sleep, and while you are asleep, Bob will decide whether<br>
> you are to play the easy game or the hard game (he is known to go either way,<br>
> with roughly equal odds, depending on his mood).<br>
> <br>
> If Bob chooses that you play the easy game, then he will flip a fair coin<br>
> 1,000 times, and afterwards, Bob will awaken you regardless of what pattern of<br>
> heads and tails came up.<br>
> <br>
> If Bob chooses that you play the hard game, then he will flip a fair coin<br>
> 1,000 times, but we will only awaken you if he observes a specific<br>
> predetermined pattern series of 1,000 heads and tails. That is, only if Bob<br>
> sees the exactly correct, single pattern (out of the 2^1000 possible patterns)<br>
> will you awaken. One coin flip off, and you will remain sleeping forever.<br>
> <br>
> Now, let's say you play this game, and then find that you have awakened. Are<br>
> you justified in believing it was _overwhelmingly_ more probable that you are<br>
> awake because the easy game was played?<br>
> <br>
> If you can answer this question (noteL it is not a trick question, but one<br>
> meant to be straight-forward and one that nearly everyone can agree on) then<br>
> we can proceed.<br>
<br>
For the sake of discussion, let's go with yes. I think I know where you will go<br>
with this, but I am curious.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In the field of personal identity, there is also an "easy game" and a "hard game".</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Closed individualism conditions your existence on being born as a specific individual having a specific material body and specific genetic make up. (Empty individualism goes even further, conditioning it on a specific state of mind). By placing such tight constraints on coming into existence, one must overcome incredible odds in order to exist.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Closed individualism is therefore (I argue) equivalent to the "hard game" described above, where "being awakened" requires a stroke of incredible luck. The difference is that winning in closed individualism requires winning a series of ancestral "sperm cell lotteries" rather than winning a series of coin tosses.) -- Note that the 1 in 2^1000 is reached and exceeded after considering 37 ancestor conceptions, which is just 5 prior generations.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Open individualism, is the equivalent of the easy game. No luck is required, no special circumstances were needed, you would always be born (awakened), no matter what.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So accepting that one is justified (based on one's observation of having been awakened) in concluding it is almost certain that they played the easy game, rather than the hard game. Your task is this:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">To show why we are not similarly justified in concluding open individualism (the easy game) rather than closed individualism (the hard game).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">(The first instinct many people have when confronted with this argument is to say "Well someone had to win" but note this doesn't make it one bit more likely that *you* should be a winner. Even if *someone* wins the lottery on every drawing, it remains unlikely that *you* should be the one who wins.)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say "it<br>
> > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as someone<br>
> > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open<br>
> > individualism.<br>
><br>
> I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been presented with<br>
> any empirical proof of me not being me.<br>
> <br>
> Note that both closed individualism and open individualism explain the<br>
> appearance of you only being able to remember being Daniel from Daniel's point<br>
> of view.<br>
> <br>
> Closed individualism says this is due not to the fact that brains are not<br>
> integrated, but because your "identity" (some might say soul) is, for lack of<br>
> a better word, *pinned* to one particular material body. Open individualism<br>
> says it is due solely to the fact that different brains are not integrated.<br>
> <br>
> One need make no metaphysical assumptions about souls being pinned to bodies,<br>
> the fact that you don't remember being anyone else is entirely explainable due<br>
> to the lack of integration between brains.<br>
> <br>
> Since both theories make the same predictions for your experience, that you<br>
> experiencing no integration with other minds is not a clue you can use to<br>
> determine which one is true.<br>
<br>
Why not? Closed individualism is easy to prove.</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> I'm an individual, I have<br>
continuity of mind and body, and so do other healthy people.</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This is a fact all theories of personal identity agree with. No theory of personal identity rejects the idea that bodies, brains, memories, etc. exist and are generally experienced as if they occur continuously, and are generally limited to the memories accessable to a single nervous system.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But none of this esteblishes closed individualism as true.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> They can be<br>
interviewed, queried about memories, they act every day as if they were<br>
individuals, completely aligned with closed individualism.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This is equally aligned with open individualism (and empty individualism too, for that matter).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I think those are all good arguments for closed individualism, in addition to my<br>
intuition of course, which aligns well with closed individualism.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Closed individualism is intuitive, and it makes sense (evolutionarily speaking) that we should be programmed to believe it by default. But that something feels a certain way should not be considered sufficient grounds of proof. It feels like Earth isn't moving, for example.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Also consider that the intuitive nature of closed individualism breaks down as soon as one strays away from ordinary situations of common experience. When you consider transporters, duplication machines, fission or fusion of minds or bodies, memory erasures and implantations, etc. Then closed individualism begins to seem ill-equipped to provide intuitive answers.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
So with that in mind, how would you empirically prove open individualism?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Using the argument I outlined above. We can take the empirical observation that somehow one has awakened into existence. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">From that observation we can reason that it is overwhelmingly more likely that this awakening was contingent upon an "easy game" of personal identity having been played, rather than a "hard game" of personal identity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Perhaps this analogy helps to think about the theories:<br>
> Empty Individualism: Buddhist concept of self as a single thought: No-Self / Anattā<br>
> Closed Individualism: Abrahamic conception of the self as a single individual material body/spiritual soul<br>
> Open Individualism: Hindu concept of the self as selfsame with the all: "Thou art that" (Tat Tvam Asi)<br>
<br>
<br>
> > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact -- "I<br>
> > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do" --<br>
> > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.<br>
> ><br>
> > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this <br>
><br>
> Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed position<br>
> as well.<br>
><br>
> The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward and<br>
> intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily observable<br>
> fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing theory<br>
> than more complex and abstract alternatives.<br>
> <br>
> Closed individualism makes the further (unnecessary and unwarranted)<br>
> assumption of "soul pinning". This assumption should be discarded, if<br>
> simplicity is what you are after. <br>
<br>
I don't think it does. In my opinion all it says, is that today, what you see is<br>
what you get.</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I think "soul pinning" is a metaphysical assumption implicit in closed individualism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It is the idea that *your experiences* are locked into being only the experiences that happen to some particular bundle of matter (your body) and it's continuous transformations.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But if you make a copy, or if one collection is destroyed and another remade with different materials, you say those experiences aren't yours, because this metaphysical thing (that you say is tied to this one bundle of matter) isn't there, present in that other copied or reformed bundle of matter.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But *what is* this metaphysical thing pinned to some bundle of matter (a thing which can't be measured) which you maintain is necessary for the experiences to *be yours*?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> Who knows? There might be some kind of uploading able to preserve<br>
continuity in a way that conclusively proves that our consciousness and identity<br>
are subtrate independent, but we have no evidence of this yet.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Substrate independence is a concern of philosophy of mind. I don't see it as related to theories of personal identity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I think science might be able to answer, or at least give indications of this in<br>
time.<br>
<br>
I also think you can have closed individualism without soul-pinning as an<br>
assumption.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What would that look like?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I think if one drops the notion of soul pinning from closed individualism, then are left with open individualism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,<br>
> the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by<br>
> our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our<br>
> embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our<br>
> experiences and identities.<br>
<br>
I think this is a weak argument for closed invidiualism. I like simplicity and<br>
how it confirms intuition much better.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I thought it was pretty nonsensical to mention animalism as an argument. You can argue it is simpler and more intuitive, but as I see it, open individualism makes fewer assumptions about what is required to be you, and it provides more intuitive answers than closed individualism when it comes to less than ordinary situations.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for<br>
> how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal<br>
> responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable<br>
> for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more<br>
> abstract or psychological criteria.<br>
<br>
This is interesting. From a pragmatic point of view, closed individualism works<br>
well.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It may work well, but I don't think pragmatism holds any weight when the concern is finding what is true rather than deciding how to organize society.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Let's assume open individualism is true, how would you see that changing the way<br>
society works in terms of crime and punishment?</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If more people believed open individualism, I think there would be more compassion, more charity, more concern for the future, and less harming and cheating of others.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">As far as crime and punishment, the goal should always be harm minimization never inflicting pain for the purpose of pain alone, though punishment may serve the purpose of reducing pain overall (via deterrence). It is a complex question.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most<br>
> intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our<br>
> everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.<br>
> This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than<br>
> more esoteric alternatives.<br>
<br>
This I'd lump in under simplicity.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I would also note that most of the great breakthroughs of science came about by demonstrating common sense was wrong.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a<br>
> naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human<br>
> beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity<br>
> is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or<br>
> non-physical factors.<br>
<br>
This is nonsense.<br>
<br>
> Did AI help write this? The verbosity and lack of coherence seems unlike your<br>
> usual style.<br>
<br>
My apologies! Yes, I should have told you that. =( My idea was to bring in some<br>
starting points for discussion, and to discuss these myself (see comments<br>
above), and then ask what you think. This was my mistake, sorry about that.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">No worries! I was pretty sure it wasn't written by you by how far off base it seemed with it's answers. AI is good for generating a lot of ideas, but at least here, not so good at judging the relevance of those ideas.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jason </div></div>