<div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Mar 25, 2025 at 6:25 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
On Mon, 24 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:<br>
<br>
> Hi Daniel,<br>
<br>
Hello Jason,<br>
<br>
> I think this thread may be coming to a close. But I include just a few<br>
> comments to the remaining points of disagreement.<br>
<br>
I think so. I think the remaining ones can perhaps be taken off list.<br><br></blockquote><div>[snip] </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> I forgot what started this topic, but anyway, I think conscious states are<br>
> like this (they are particular abstract patterns). And a logical argument was<br>
> used to prove that conscious states cannot be identical to particular physical<br>
> states, if conscious states are multiply realizable.<br>
<br>
Leaving aside the fact that we don't know. But, as always, I find your theories<br>
well thought out, and starting from your definitions, I find no problem<br>
following your logic, to your conclusions. =)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I guess that is all I can ask for. :-) If we can't agree on premises then at least you see no flaws in the reasoning (the argument is "valid" if not "sound" in your view -- a sound argument requires the premises to be true, a valid argument requires only that the conclusions follow from the premises).</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> I think I'll leave it for the moment. The various threads give me a feeling of<br>
> being overwhelmed. But I think we can probably close one or two, and that would<br>
> then open up space (and time ;)) for new threads.<br>
> <br>
> Okay. I would welcome you to read those 20 thought experiments though, if<br>
> anything, it will provide a clearer picture of the history of how thinking<br>
> moved from dualism, to epiphenomenalism, to type-physicalism, to<br>
> functionalism. <br>
<br>
I'll make a note of it! And will have a look once I've dug into the identity<br>
thread. That one needs some love and attention now, I think. ;)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sounds good.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> I can be a physicalist, while being agnostic about<br>
> the description of the ultimate nature of the universe.<br>
> <br>
> That might require a further qualification, e.g. "I believe all phenomena that<br>
> appear in this universe are physical." rather than "all things are physical".<br>
> For if one is agnostic about the ultimate nature of the universe, then there<br>
> remains room for non physical things operating beyond this universe. But I see<br>
> your point that one can remain a physicalist concerning the goings-on within a<br>
> universe. :-)<br>
<br>
This is another example why I enjoy talking with you. You find these cases where<br>
confusion easily slips in. Yes... you are right. I do keep a "boundary" between<br>
within and without, and tend to disregard without. I'm searching for a better<br>
definition. Surely some philosopher somewhere has reached a similar conclusion<br>
or point of view. I'll have to perform some "google fu" to see if there perhaps<br>
isn't an existing path somewhere I can read up on. That's much quicker route<br>
than us discovering it together, although, perhaps, less fun. =)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thank you!</div><div><br></div><div>I know someone who used the word "primitive physicalist" or "Aristotelian" to refer to someone who believed all real things are purely and primitively (fundamentally) physical, and had nothing outside the universe that is not physical.</div><div>But I don't know what someone who was agnostic on that while being a physicist within the universe should be called. If you want me to invent something, perhaps "metaphysical agnostic" would work.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br><br>
<br>
> Do you have a better term? As with materialism, I feel I have confused you, so<br>
> maybe you have a better term?<br>
> <br>
> I am not aware of one. I think physicalist/physicalism is generally fine (and<br>
> only requires further specification when one delves into more detailed<br>
> ontological discussions).<br>
<br>
I'll keep looking! I think it's the agnostic streak in me that is causing the<br>
problem! I need a nice "fusion" of the two. ;)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It's combining both (physicalism + metaphysical agnosticism) views into a single word that is hard.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > I don't see what it means to be a physicalist if one does not accept the<br>
> > implications that follow from holding to that idea. If you want to remain<br>
> > agnostic on the implications that follow from physicalism, I think you must<br>
> > become agnostic on physicalism as a philosophy.<br>
> ><br>
> > Consider:<br>
> > P implies Q.<br>
> > You remain agnostic on Q.<br>
> > Can you still accept P while remaining agnostic on Q?<br>
><br>
> Yep. Let's say P is the world, and Q is a god that created the world. By<br>
> definition, god is "outside" the world, and can therefore not be verified by the<br>
> senses, be falsified or proven. I can safely remain physicalist about P, the<br>
> world, and be entirely agnostic, or apathetic about Q.<br>
><br>
> I think this is an excellent example about how logic and math trick us, or leads<br>
> us wrong, when we completely disconnect it from empirical evidence.<br>
> <br>
> Your example doesn't work because in this case P does not imply Q. For a clearer example of P implying Q, consider:<br>
> <br>
> P = "is a square"<br>
> Q = "it has four sides"<br>
<br>
Ok, I was too quick, but let me restate the cosmological argument here:<br>
<br>
<br>
Everything that begins to exist has a cause.<br>
The universe began to exist.<br>
Therefore, the universe has a cause.<br>
This cause is often identified as God.<br>
<br>
or<br>
<br>
If P, then Q<br>
P<br>
Therefore, Q<br>
<br>
and I actually expect the response that the proof doesn't work, since it<br>
doesn't. The key here is that if Q is not of this world, and can never be<br>
verified (or falsified) we can of course reject it, in order to minimize oru<br>
ontological commitments, and by the fact, that we will never be able to verify.<br>
But this is old ground.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think the proof is valid but not sound. In particular, I see issues with both "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." and "The universe began to exist." I don't think either of those premises are necessarily or demonstrably true.</div><div>However, if one accepted those premises, then they would be led by the argument to accept the universe has a cause.</div><div><br></div><div>Even arguments that are unsound can still be useful, in terms of focusing the question on what assumptions one is making, and which assumptions need be true to reach a particular conclusion.</div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">> I think inference is fine when the assumptions and reasoning are sound. I<br>
> think the only issue with your example is that you chose a case where P does<br>
> not imply Q, so all the resulting conclusions were in error.<br>
<br>
This is another common problem with relying too much on logic and math, and no<br>
connection with the world. We can always debate P and Q, and if there is a<br>
connectio nor not. But, in this case...<br>
<br>
Where there is smoke (P), there is fire (Q): If P -> Q. No quarrel with that. We<br>
can both use our senses to establish P, we can infer Q, and then you and I can<br>
both check to see if Q. If not, we revise our mental model. This is basically<br>
and excellent example of my position, and why I find it reasonable.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>One of course needs to be rigorous and precise to make a strong logical argument, and it must stand the test of others looking at it and trying to find holes in either the premises or in the reasoning.</div><div>When I defined my three possibilities (A, B, and C), I did so in a way to guarantee that all logically possible cases were covered, so that at least one, but not both or all, of those possibilities must be true.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> > I believe Dennett is a compatibilist. I wouldn't mind a thread on free will,<br>
> > if you want to start one. Though I am not sure I disagree on anything if<br>
> > you're a compatibilist.<br>
><br>
> I think perhaps the best thing for me would be to finish the live threads we<br>
> have, before starting new ones. I feel a bit overwhelmed. When it comes to free<br>
> will, as per my physicalist stance, I have no quarrel with compatibilism. I like<br>
> that it talks abotu degrees of free will, which I whole heartedly agree with.<br>
> You also know that I am a fan of pragmaticism, so the "illusion" (if that is<br>
> what it is) of free will is good enough for me. ;) Maybe we are in agreement<br>
> here? I think, that perhaps we might find some disagreement in nuances or if<br>
> there are any "sub-schools" of compatibilism, but the question is, how far<br>
> should we dig? ;)<br>
> <br>
> Well I perhaps wouldn't call it an illusion.<br>
<br>
You are better at words than I am, so I am absolutely certain you'll be able to<br>
come up with a better word for it, that would be perfectly acceptable for me. =)<br>
I was trying to explain that we might not have any free will at the system<br>
level, but inside the system, for all we can tell, we appear to have free will.<br>
Since we never can reach the system level (break out of the simulation) for us,<br>
"felt" free will is good enough, although, ultimately, it might not be.<br>
Something like that.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I would say nothing like free will exists at the physical level, and that it only emerges at the system level (once we get to machines that are complex enough to be chaotic/non-analyltic/non-linear/undeciable in their behavior). At that level (e.g. a computer running a complex program is at this level) one cannot anticipate what that system will do without either watching it to see what it does (or simulating/emulating it to a sufficient degree of accuracy that you are again, only watching what it (the simulation) does. So it is not even a subjective limitation, but a global one that includes third-person objective observers as well. They cannot predict or anticipate what a sufficiently complex system will do. (This I think is the basis of Turing's conclusion regarding the Halting problem ( <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem</a> )).</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>> I am not following why you think we shouldn't have a word to refer to "the<br>
> experience that is generated."<br>
<br>
We definitely should have, and have that word. My point however, is, that it<br>
leads to confusion, chasing something which is badly defined. So by dropping the<br>
word and concept, and redefining it in scientific terms, we clear up the<br>
confusion, and "qualia" disappears.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Hmm. I am not sure I entirely agree with Dennett on this. I think there are inherent limitations in the communicability of qualia that science can never completely transcend. But we need not explore that any further in this thread.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> "Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of<br>
> conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I<br>
> grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in<br>
> virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do."<br>
> <br>
> So Dennett (I think) was not calling to excise the word qualia, but rather, to<br>
> shed off the mystical baggage that some had attached to it.<br>
<br>
I think qualia goes away by adopting a different terminology and method of<br>
investigating, say, the science of neuroscience. That does not obligate one<br>
never to use the word "red". It does however obligate one not to use the badly<br>
defined, folk-psychology word "red" when doing neuro-science.<br>
<br>
But since this crosses over from meta-physics into science, I am certain there<br>
are better people to take the question from there.<br>
<br>
I think actually, that we know perfectly well (or well... somewhat well) exactly<br>
what happens when light bounces of an object at the right wave length and hits<br>
our brain as a "red" object. So I don't really see why we should bother with the<br>
qualia terminology at all, and I think I'm quite comfortable with that idea.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I wouldn't say we know what happens, at a certain point. This is where the primary mystery enters the picture. As various thinkers have written for the past few hundred years (up to the near-present time):</div><div><br></div><div><div>"We class sensations along with emotions, and<br>volitions, and thoughts, under the common head of<br>states of consciousness. But what consciousness is, we<br>know not; and how it is that anything so remarkable<br>as a state of consciousness comes about as a result<br>of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable<br>as the appearance of the Djin when Aladdin rubbed<br>his lamp."<br>— Thomas Henry Huxley in “Lessonsin Elementary<br>Physiology” (1866)<br></div><div></div></div><div><br></div><div>"We suppose that a physical process starts from a</div>visible object, travels to the eye, there changes into<br>another physical process, causes yet another<br>physical process in the optic nerve, and finally<br>produces some effects in the brain, simultaneously<br>with which we see the object from which the</div><div class="gmail_quote">process started, the seeing being something<br>“mental,” totally different in character from the<br>physical processes, which preceded and accompany<br>it. This view is so queer that metaphysicians have<br>invented all sorts of theories designed to substitute<br>something less incredible."<br>— Bertrand Russell in “An Outline of Philosophy” (1927)<div><br></div><div>"If you ask a physicist what is his idea of yellow light,<br>he will tell you that it is transversal electromagnetic<br>waves of a wavelength in the neighbourhood of 590<br>millimicrons. If you ask him; But where does yellow<br>come in? He will say: In my picture not at all, but<br>these kinds of vibrations, when they hit the retina<br>of a healthy eye, give the person whose eye it is the<br>sensation of yellow."<br>— Erwin Schrödinger in “Mind and Matter” (1958)<br></div><div><br></div><div>"We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of</div>consciousness, but we have, it seems, no<br>understanding whatever of how this can be so. It<br>strikes us as miraculous, eerie, even faintly comic.<br>Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is</div><div class="gmail_quote">turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw<br>a total blank on the nature of this conversion.<br>Neural transmissions just seem like the wrong kind<br>of materials with which to bring consciousness into<br>the world, but it appears that in some way they<br>perform this mysterious feat."</div><div class="gmail_quote">— Colin McGinn in "Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" (1989)<br><div> </div><div>"How could a physical system such as a</div>brain also be an experiencer? Why should there be<br>something it is like to be such a system? Present-day<br>scientific theories hardly touch the really difficult<br>questions about consciousness. We do not just lack a<div>detailed theory; we are entirely in the dark about
how </div><div>consciousness fits into the natural order."</div><div>— David Chalmersin “The Conscious Mind” (1996)<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Do you maintain there is no further mystery about what happens in the brain beyond what we can describe at the physical level?</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
But, if I reverse the question... what would you say are the drawbacks of that<br>
position? Basically, let neuroscience do it's thing, and stop talking about<br>
Qualia?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I actually think neuroscientists are among the worst people to ask to explain consciousness or qualia. I liken that to looking to an electrician to explain how Microsoft Word, since after all, that program running on a computer is "nothing but" a complex circuit of many wires and switches. Of course, no electrician will succeed in doing this, because it is analyzing the system at far too low a level to offer any meaningful understanding. We need a systems person who can understand and connect the various levels in the hierarchy at play, and understand the software and algorithms and other high-level features of the brain's processing if we are to ever understand consciousness in a useful way.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Oh, sorry... let me also add that perhaps this conversation should be put on<br>
hold or move into a Qualia thread, but then I suspect that we'll reach the same<br>
result as 2023, so maybe not a good idea? ;)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am fine if you want to copy the above into a new thread for further discussion.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> Oh, I also found this, but for some reason I thought that in 2023 there was more<br>
> text under the category.<br>
><br>
> <a href="https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/81-Qualia-are-Red-Herrings?is_tree_open=1" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/81-Qualia-are-Red-Herrings?is_tree_open=1</a><br>
> <br>
> Qualia are the very thing that consciousness theories attempt to explain. If<br>
> they don't exist, then what are theories of consciousness about?<br>
<br>
Maybe neuroscience is a better way than philosophy? Speculating without data can<br>
lead to building castles in the sky, which then have to be torn down?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think both science and philosophy are needed. As Chalmers writes:</div><div><br></div><div>"The problem of consciousness lies uneasily at the</div>border of science and philosophy. I would say that<br>it is properly a scientific subject matter: it is a<br>natural phenomenon like motion, life, and<br>cognition, and calls out for explanation in the way<br>that these do. But it is not open to investigation by<br>the usual scientific methods. Everyday scientific<br>methodology has trouble getting a grip on it, not<br>least because of the difficulties in observing the<br>phenomenon. Outside the first-person case, data<br>are hard to come by. This is not to say that no<br>external data can be relevant, but we first have to<br>arrive at a coherent philosophical understanding<br>before we can justify the data’s relevance. So the<br>problem of consciousness may be a scientific</div><div class="gmail_quote">problem that requires philosophical methods of<br>understanding before we can get off the ground."<br>— David Chalmersin “The Conscious Mind” (1996)</div><div class="gmail_quote"><br></div><div class="gmail_quote">I think philosophy (together with arguments from physics, neuroscience, and computer science) provide strong arguments for functionalism. Functionalism, in turn, once assumed/established, allows science to make further progress in identifying or classifying conscious systems. But I am not sure that science alone could have gained any confidence in a correct theory of consciousness (absent the logical/philosophical arguments).<br><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>> The individual would know. As to the question of how do you prove it<br>
> objectively (to others besides the first-person having the experience), that<br>
> is a big and open problem in philosophy of mind. Aaronson dubbed it "The<br>
> Pretty Hard Problem."<br>
<br>
I think the best option is to remain agnostic. I don't see how that could be<br>
done, so my strategy would be to reformulate it into neuroscience and physics,<br>
and disregard the rest. Qualia is a "red herring" that distracts us from doing<br>
science.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>As I see it, qualia are like the observed motion of the planets and the moon. They present the mystery "What keeps those heavenly bodies up there in the sky, perpetually moving?"</div><div>The question might be bad, or based on incomplete or flawed assumptions, but it's that mystery and the questions it forces us to confront, that are the very thing that motivates science to attack the problem in the first place.</div><div>If you remove qualia from the picture, then what's the point of science investigating the brain? We already understand everything going on at the physical and chemical level. The brain would be no more interesting than the kidneys or liver, if we ignore consciousness and qualia, and focus only on what physics/chemistry/biology allow us to explain already. So rather than a distracting red herring, I think the mystery qualia present is indispensable to attracting any interest of researchers / scientists to look at the problem and try to understand the brain at a deeper level.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> At the end of the day, the only thing we have to go on is a<br>
_comprehensiva_ behaviourism which I would add, includes not only behaviours,<br>
voluntary and involuntary, but neuron patterns, nervoussystem activity,<br>
dopamine, serotonine and other chemicals or reactions of organs in the body.<br>
<br>
Since we never can "reach" the subjective level of ourselves experience other<br>
minds as themselves,</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don't agree with that. It could very well be that we can understand the workings of the mind and consciousness, with a sufficiently in depth, level transcending understanding. Think of it like trying to reverse engineer Microsoft Word. We have two easily accessible views, the software interface at the top level, and the transistors and wires at the bottom level. If we want to understand how Microsoft word works, we need to eventually tie these two levels together, and this requires understanding the operations, subroutines, functions, libraries, packages, modules, and overall software architecture. These are all the intermediate levels which are not immediately visible from either the top-most or bottom-most levels, it takes a lot of work to derive them, but it is not an impossible problem (just a difficult and time-consuming one).</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> I think it is best to ignore that, just like (I) ignore<br>
MWI, god and other things outside the scope of the phenomenal world.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It would be easy to, except for the fact that the entire phenomenal world exists within mind (as conscious percepts). Eminent physicists never let this (admittedly inconvenient) fact slip their mind:</div><div><br></div><div>"It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to</div>accept the view that the substratum of everything is<br>of mental character. But no one can deny that mind<br>is the first and most direct thing in our experience,<br>and all else is remote inference."</div><div class="gmail_quote">— Arthur Eddington in “The Nature of the Physical World”
(1927)</div><div class="gmail_quote"><br></div><div class="gmail_quote">"We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that </div><div class="gmail_quote">we talk about, everything that we regard as existing,<br>postulates consciousness."</div><div class="gmail_quote">— Max Planck in “Interviews with Great Scientists” (1931)</div><div class="gmail_quote"><br></div><div class="gmail_quote">"Admittedly our sense perceptions constitute our<br>sole knowledge about things. This objective world<br>remains a hypothesis, however natural."<br><div> — Erwin Schrödinger in “Mind and Matter” (1958)</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>> If you defined consciousness as anything that behaves like it is conscious,<br>
> then (aside from being circular) this definition has snuck in a purely<br>
<br>
I think the reason for people believing it is circular is that they commit the<br>
mistake of looking at each state in isolation. That is not how the brain works.<br>
It can maintain several states at the same time, conscious and unconscious. So<br>
looking at the entire organisms, including hormones and what ever, and using<br>
behaviour as the key for that state, does not imply, I think any circular<br>
reasoning.<br>
<br>
It does make things more complicated for sure, but some things are, and<br>
simplifying too much leads to bad theories.<br>
<br>
> functionalists assumption of mind and discarded any alternatives such as<br>
> type-physicalism, biological naturalism, panpsychism, Penrose's quantum mind,<br>
> etc. which in addition to requiring the presence of certain behaviors, would<br>
> require special physical materials, living organic cells,<br>
> consciousness-enabled particles, or non-algorithmic quantum gravitational<br>
> processes. So by giving a behavioral definition of consciousness, it serves to<br>
> presume behavioral/functional conditions are the only thing that is needed.<br>
<br>
How come? Looking at the link, I see at least 4 isms being compatible with<br>
physicalism. I do not see on that page, that focusing on behaviour by default<br>
should commit one to only functionalism.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Behaviorism isn't a philosophy of mind, it's a philosophy of believing the mind is unexplainable and should be ignored.</div><div>Eliminativism is a denial of mind.</div><div><br></div><div>That leaves physicalism and functionalism.</div><div><br></div><div>Physicalism comes in two flavors (type and token physicalism) though I think it is better to think of these as (reductive physicalism, and emergent physicalism).</div><div>Reductive, or type physicalism, says you need special materials (behavior is not enough), emergent physicalism does not add this restriction, saying that consciousness is a high-level emergent phenomenon, and various materials could in principle be used.</div><div><br></div><div>Emergent physicalism thereby implies multiple realizability, and multiple realizability implies functionalism.</div><div><br></div><div>So if one hangs their hat on the behavioral aspects of an entity as the sole determinants of consciousness, then all paths lead to functionalism. (Since we know that an appropriately programmed computer can manifest any definable behavior, and computers can be made in various ways using various materials, this is another further confirmation of emergent physicalism/multiple-realizability/functionalism).</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> While this is a position I agree with, it won't serve as a workable definition<br>
> in philosophy if we are to permit these other theories to exist and be<br>
> debated. <br>
<br>
True. I do have to confess, that on this site:<br>
<br>
<a href="https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/</a><br>
<br>
eliminativisim does seem quite an attractive stance at the surfave of things. =)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I've never seen a philosopher actually argue for that position. If you come across any references though, let me know.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
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> Does it assume any philosophy of mind? If I believe an entity is conscious<br>
> because it acts as if it is conscious, does that commit me to any specific<br>
> theory?<br>
> <br>
> Yes. I think it commits you to functionalism.<br>
<br>
I think I disagree (as per the above and the below).<br>
<br>
> I found this excellent table about physicalist theories of mind:<br>
><br>
> <a href="https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/</a><br>
><br>
> Accorindg to this one, judging by behaviour and being a physicalist, it would<br>
> commit me to one of the following:<br>
><br>
> * Behaviourism<br>
> * Type identity<br>
> * Functionalism<br>
> * Eliminativism<br>
> <br>
> The eliminativist would say there is no consciousness, even in something that<br>
> in all respects behaves as if it is conscious. The type-identity theorists<br>
<br>
That is an attractive idea. My interpretation there is (similar to what I have<br>
argued previously) that the concept of consciousness is flawed, so by discarding<br>
it, or "reducing" it, we will be in a much better situation to understand what<br>
is actually going on.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>There's a big difference between reducing, and eliminating.</div><div> </div><div>Strawsen calls that, the "silliest claim ever made": <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/online/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers">https://www.nybooks.com/online/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers</a></div><div><br></div><div>I hope that you would not deny that you are conscious right now of something. :-)</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> would impose further constraints on what things could be conscious depending<br>
> on their material composition or design. E.g., a type-identity physicalist<br>
> could deny the android is conscious. <br>
<br>
Another idea here, is to have a separate theory for separate organisms.<br>
Type-identity would focus on human minds. But let's say the subject are octopi,<br>
as per the link, we'd need to start from scratch there.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don't like the idea of requiring a separate theory of consciousness for each of the 10 million species on Earth. And why stop at species and not individuals?</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
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> I think that was a great web site actually. It shows things in a very nice way.<br>
> <br>
> It is a nice chart. Though I don't think behaviorism was ever a serious idea<br>
> in philosophy of mind. Behaviorism was a school of thought in the field of<br>
> psychology that held internal mental states were inscrutable. It was only<br>
> through the fall of behaviorism (with the cognitive revolution) that serious<br>
> scientists and philosophers were allowed to discuss and debate consciousness.<br>
<br>
I think it depends on how it is defined. It can include all the others, from one<br>
point of view.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think if one were to update behaviorism to include internal mental/brain processes, they would arrive at functionalism.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
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> > I think the fame/prestige is enough of a prize especially with so many AI<br>
> > companies competing for glory and investors.<br>
><br>
> Hmm... maybe I should call the Nobel Prize committee and ask them to sponsor an<br>
> AI prize? Maybe then we'll get some "glory" into the competition! ;)<br>
> <br>
> I think what's most important is having a design that everyone agrees is well<br>
> thought out and robust, such that passing the test would be a reliable<br>
> indicator of human or superhuman intelligence.<br>
> <br>
> I also think it would be nice if all entrants were given a score that was<br>
> statistically significant. (e.g. each applicant converses with a sufficient<br>
> number of judges to reach a meaningful objective score) and also this score<br>
> should be tested against other humans as well to give a feel for what score is<br>
> "good enough" to be considered human-level intelligence. Perhaps scores for<br>
> different ages, and levels of education, etc. could be set. Then there could<br>
> be prizes for passing a high-school level and so on.<br>
<br>
My ideal would be that I should not be able to tell if it is a human or an AI<br>
over a week or so. Imagine I talk with a human, I could ask the human what its<br>
job is. Let's say marketing. During the course of a week, I'd ask it to help me<br>
with marketing campaigns, go out online and do some research, bring me back a<br>
nice report, etc. etc. The simple LLM:s I have played with (free ones) currently<br>
would have no chance to perform that role like a human being. The AI would also<br>
have to have all its censoring disabled, that's a clear tell that it's an AI and<br>
not a human being. And of course, it would have to take the initiative. I'd love<br>
for it to reach out and proactively suggest things based on our previous<br>
conversation. That's also something I'm currently missing.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I like the long term time frame idea.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I think we've made great progress, but I think current technology, without some<br>
serious hard coding, de-censoring, and integration with other systems, is far,<br>
far from tricking a human it is human over a period of a week or more.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes I think we still have a ways to go, but it seems all the pieces are in play for a dedicated and organized effort to achieve it.</div><div><br></div><div>Jason </div></div></div>
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